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WHY I AM
AND
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A CATHOLIC

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WHY I AM AND WHY I AM NOT A CATHOLIC

BY

HILAIRE BELLOC

AND OTHERS

NEW YORK
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PART I

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

I

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

HILAIRE BELLOC

THE question which I am set to answer is, "Why am *I* a Catholic?" These are my terms of reference. To these terms of reference I will write: giving as best as I can the statement of why the individual who writes these lines accepts, maintains, and will to the best of his ability, God willing, defend the Faith. And I mean herein by the term "The Faith," both that which teaches and that which is taught: the religious organization in communion with the Bishop of Rome as its supreme and infallible Head on earth, and the doctrine and discipline emanating from this organization.

Now writing as I do to the Terms of Reference, and therefore necessarily in a fashion wholly personal ("Why *I* accept the Faith"), certain provisos are necessary.

First, the thing being personal, there will be a great deal that is personal. That is unpleasant but under the conditions, inevitable. Secondly, I may, or rather, certainly shall, fall into certain repetitions of matter I have

written elsewhere. I will avoid these as much as possible but to avoid them altogether is impossible, because I have been writing upon this very subject (under many aspects, it is true) for perhaps thirty years.

Thirdly, I humbly provise (if that be English, which I doubt) that my personal statement here is not to the prejudice of a thousand others. My own reasons are of less value than those of better men, than those of men who never express themselves (many millions of them), of men enjoying or suffering spiritual knowledge far more profound.

Fourthly, the Church being what it is, nothing I say must be taken as representative. The largest and truest lines of affirmation or evidence probably escape me. I may be drawn, by what our forefathers well called "the imbelicity of private nature," into statements of little or no value, or of worse than no value. Let no one think I pretend to a full, the best, or even a sufficient statement. It is no more than my individual confession.

Lastly (I need hardly say it, save that so many modern readers do not know what the Church is, nor the nature of adherence to Her doctrine), any chance words in this poor essay are wholly subject to authority. If I misstate a point in theological argument I accept its correction at once at the hands of authority.

I, then, who must here present my argument, have these personal advantages and limitations.

In the first place I was baptized into the Faith upon

my birth, and have known it all my life. Next, I have spent my life, for the most part, with people not of the Faith. Next, I have, though baptized into it and familiar with it from my earliest years, in some sense also discovered the Faith—but this line I will not pursue as it is somewhat intimate, and hardly to the point; unless, indeed, it be to the point to tell those who read me and who are balancing, that I also have balanced.

But more important than the foregoing personal points is this personal point: I am by nature sceptical; that is, my inclination or appetite is for intellectual process, for analysis, for discovering the nature of things by the reason rather than by vision. All men know (or should know) the advantages and disadvantages of this weakness or talent in a man. It imposes a certain dryness: it may lead him astray through deduction from insufficient premises. To use the common metaphor, it neglects the heart and lays too heavy a load upon the head. On the other hand, it leads to unshakable conclusions, it establishes perfect discoveries. Scepticism assured leads to confidence absolute. In general this temperament has the disadvantage of restriction, the advantage of certitude, for others as well as oneself.

I have before me two tasks, which I will call, for convenience, Positive and Negative. These words "Positive" and "Negative" are often abused. They are

obviously relative in any connection, for what is positive to one aspect of a question is negative to its opposite. To use them as though they had final meaning is silly (as it is silly to talk with final meaning of "destructive" criticism and "constructive" criticism); but if we define our terms, these words "Positive" and "Negative" have their use.

I mean here by "Positive," all those arguments in favour of the Faith: the reasons I find for accepting it. I mean by "Negative," my reasons for not accepting such arguments as I am familiar with upon the other side.

In either category I shall distinguish (I hope not arbitrarily) between major and minor considerations. For it seems to me that there are both in the attack upon the Faith, and in the defence of it, certain large determining propositions, few or single in number, which I will call "Major," and a host of other converging lesser propositions supporting either side, which I will call "Minor."

Thus in a discussion upon identity in a Court of Law, whether John Jones be John Jones or another, the main Positive point is the recognition of John Jones by a number of witnesses with an experience entitling them to affirm; while minor considerations would be questions of handwriting or tricks of habit, etc. On the other side, the main Negative point may be a mass of evidence to the death of the said John Jones, and minor

considerations would be the disputing of his handwriting, the authenticity of photographs, etc.

The Major argument for an acceptation of the Faith may be stated thus:

The Faith solves the principal problem presented to mankind. It would be truer to say that it solves the problem which is not only principal, but, like the Faith itself, unique. The problem which the Faith solves is not one of many, which vary only in degree of importance. It is rather a Problem of a different category altogether from the rest: to wit, "What is the nature and the fate of man?" Since we are men, this alone really matters.

Someone having lost his memory, and finding himself alone in a locked room, may interest himself in the wall paper, the pictures, and a slight itch upon his left arm. But the business of knowing who he is, how he got there, and what is likely to happen to him when he gets out, is in a different plane altogether. He will certainly begin with the large question before (perhaps in despair of answering it) he amuses himself with the wall paper and the pictures, or even bothers about his left arm. It would be a truer parallel, seeing what the development of a human life is, to say that, on coming to himself, he might first, in a silly sort of way, begin noticing the wall paper and the pictures, and only as he became fully conscious would pull himself together and consider the only real problem before him.

For that is what happens to us in human life. As children we only notice what is around us. Even as young men the chief affair may not occupy our minds. But when we come to maturity of thought, that chief problem must inevitably occupy our minds; and if we leave the great questions for a jaded interest in lesser things, it is only because we have despaired of an answer.

As we examine the great Problem (its best formula is, "What, whence, whither?") we have certain foundations upon which to build. We have certain directives towards a solution.

We have the sense of right and wrong, the sense of honour and dishonour, the sense of pleasure and pain, the strange paradox of mutability coexisting with a necessity for permanence—nay, an acute appetite for permanence.

What is the meaning of these things? It is one answer to say "They have no meaning"; but it is significant that man has never sincerely accepted that answer. He has always corporately and individually attempted a system; in societies through many generations, and moment by moment within his own soul, he gropes for something which should give him some answer. They who have replied that no answer is discoverable have themselves given an answer; but never was there a man yet, still less a society—that is man collective, and possessed of collective wisdom and an inheritance—who did not attempt an answer. Every

man propounds a philosophy. For the word "philosophy" signifies the love of wisdom; that is, the love of knowledge; and that is, the solution of questions in their order. Now, necessarily, the solution of questions in their order points, as a first step to be taken, to the solution of the Prime question, "What? Whence? Whither?" before we can attempt any other.

Every man, I say, propounds a philosophy. The Sophists indeed propound none openly, and what they call their "philosophies" or "systems" are but games; yet they also are men, and therefore each of them has some philosophy in his heart, commonly of despair, sometimes more puerile than despair; though what each propounds to his school is but a system, an opinion, or an arabesque drawn upon the window pane to correspond to the outlines of reality out of doors; at the best a half solution, a guess which may be modified, at the worst a mere negation; never, never an answer. And of this kind have been all the belauded names of the last hundred years, from that of Kant to that of the recently fashionable Bergson.

But what of *philosophy?* What of an *answer* to the main problem?

Were there a system which could flood with light the darkness of these torturing doubts, and make us know what we are and whence we come and whither we go, it would indeed be worthy of acceptance. It would immediately take precedence over all other

affirmations, however well proved, upon such petty things as our bodily life and our passing environment in this world.

If Materialism could give a sufficient answer, we might rightly exalt it to the highest place, for it would at least establish a certitude: though that certitude were but nothingness and despair. It would be a determining Idea and final. But Materialism does not sufficiently reply. It does not assuage the thirst for real knowledge. It stops short at "How?" (and with not nearly enough even of "How?"). It is quite dumb upon "Why?"

Any system, I say, which could give the oracular reply would be blessed of all men, even though it were but a system. But wait a moment. Can any mere system give a reply?

Here we touch the very core of the affair. Man is an organism. All that is organic is complex. The full reply must meet the general nature of man. A merely mathematical reply will not suffice, nor will an emotional divorced from the intelligence. The full reply can only come from something consonant to the noble complexity of man.

Man is a Person; by nothing less than a Person alone can he be guided. He has ears to hear—but nothing that he hears will satisfy him unless it proceed from a speaking soul, expressing will, intelligence, full being, in articulate words. There is that in man which, when he demands a full solution (I mean rather a *sufficient*

solution, a harbour, a repose in conviction), requires something responding to himself; I say, again, a Personality, a Voice, an Organism, a Being. We look about, not for a theory but for a thing. In our search for that which can tell us in gradually convincing fashion "Things are thus and thus: such are you: such is the world," we expect, we cannot be content without, a living authoritative and intelligible Voice and Person.

Now the Catholic is that man who has heard such a Voice, who has come across such a Personality, and who is (most rationally) satisfied with its credentials.

Man is not satisfied by an emotion alone; he is not content with a rational process alone; he must have both in unison and manifestly interdependent. He is illumined by the unexpected synthesis wherein all his ultimate demands are satisfied, and the great Question is answered.

It is no objection to this experience when men say, "That Voice I have not heard; that Personality I have not met; with that Organism I have no real acquaintance; that Society is outside my experience." The only true countervailing objection would be, "All this I also knew, but it did not satisfy me." Now *that* objection—and this must be carefully weighed—is not to be found. Men lose the Faith, indeed, as one may lose his sense of taste, or any other of the lesser approaches to reality; but when this calamity falls on them never do they

cease to remember with anguish the sense of perfect adjustment whereof they have been deprived.

I have in other places used various metaphors to describe the event, the meeting, the realization of home.

One of these metaphors I happen to cherish particularly. Perhaps it will be of less value to others: perhaps of more value to a few. I have compared the world to those pictures which were drawn in a distorted perspective by the artists of the later Renaissance and the XVIIth century, in which pictures all appears meaningless until you put your eye into a particular position, from which all suddenly falls into order, and you see a reasonable, well-proportioned, scheme. The Faith so solves the world.

Another of these metaphors is that of groping in a dark room. You take for granted, from all you know of rooms and from the nature of things, that there is a door, or a window: some entry, some exit. Were there not, you could not be there. No sense proclaims it. There is no sound. All is blackness. You experiment; you feel; you find. And having found, you have no doubts at all. "Here is the door."

Parallels and metaphors are but aids to thought. They cannot of themselves convince, nor am I here occupied in convincing others, but only in making it clear how the Faith comes to, or, having been always accepted, is confirmed in, a man. It is a coming on reality. It is a grasp of things as they are. And if any-

one then add, "But, why do I not perceive as you do?" I suggest this answer. "Have *you*, then, found reality?" I think not.

To this main proposition there come in a flood of minor considerations which will, I am afraid, have greater effect upon the modern mind than exposition of the major point. In another generation I would not have lingered upon them; for, in other and stronger generations men preferred wrestling upon main points. But for what they are worth let me tabulate them.

We who are of the Faith note that with the Faith there has arisen and continued what is manifestly the highest of human cultures. The expressions of the human spirit have in that air obtained and maintained the sublime. Ruins of the past proclaim that truth; relics of old efforts, tradition, and existing characters in the present.

The test of human happiness (the test of tests, if we are to descend to mere pragmatic proof) tells the same tale. So does the test of human dignity. So does (and this will seem strange, I think, in the ears of most English readers, though it is a commonplace abroad), the test of science and discovery. Truth confirms truth; and it is both singular and arresting to note how, for now nearly three hundred years of rapidly advancing achievement in the lesser forms of reality, physical science and the rest, the Catholic Church has found itself supported. The first achievements of research—

hurried, insufficiently confirmed—have almost invariably risen at issue against the Faith. Without exception —I say, without one single exception—the definitely proved conclusions of physical research (even on that insignificant level) have been compelled to withdraw from the attack, or better still, have occasionally confirmed the immortal thesis.

Shall I advance lesser arguments still? What of the completeness of the Catholic affirmation? That completeness might be man-made. That vast and exactly consonant body of moral and transcendental theology might conceivably be of human manufacture. But in what other instance has man done such a thing?

Or shall I advance the unique Individuality of the Faith?

It is not true that the Church is but one of many warring creeds and varying religions. There is but one Authority on earth which claims to reveal to men their nature and their destiny. All else is opinion, habit of life, unreasoned affirmation or partial pickings and choosings from the entire Faith. All else either borrows from that central thing (remaining schismatic or heretical) or is separate from it, yet not conclusive.

And this leads me to another consideration which should be of profound effect with any man who understands the nature of his fellow-men: I mean a consideration of the hatred and attack to which the Church is subject. Herein you discover that strong argument

which runs from Tertullian to Newman through sixteen hundred years. "If there were on earth something which compelled men to the Divine, something which was the voice of the Divine, how should we men, being what we are and know ourselves to be, being what we are and knowing ourselves to be capable of what we are not, being what we are and angry with our own defects—how should we receive It? With obloquy, with persecution, with defiance, with contained reaction against it." So it is with the Faith, and with the Faith alone, as a permanent historical phenomenon.

Many other hatreds there have been, many alliances and counter alliances; but one note runs through the whole of history, wherever this Person has been felt, this Visage seen, this Voice heard; the note of violent antagonism, provoking sporadic, often belated, but sufficiently heroic defence.

And on that minor argument of the tests by which we might know what such a Divine Society would be *if* such a thing existed, what of its Claim? It would claim absolute right, It would claim to speak with the Voice of God, It would demand (in its own sphere, though only in its own sphere) obedience. It would, *alone of things upon this earth,* refuse to compromise. And by that test also the Faith is the Faith.

And here, to end up with, is another minor argument, which will appeal less perhaps to others than it does to me. It appeals to me strongly because I feel it

in every line of good verse, in every excellent room or monument, in every phrase of good music, in every admirable character: I mean the argument from Proportion.

Nowhere else, in all the experience of mankind, will you discover universal Proportion as you discover it in the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Though it applies to the whole of human life, it does, in every relation, keep the normal—which some have translated "the Mean." It does so in the relations of parent and child, of husband and wife, of the propertied man and the destitute, of the citizen and the Christian (I mean of our duty to the Prince and our duty to God). It does so in that most difficult of all actual problems, the management of appetite.

The flesh is good. But the flesh can devour a man. If anyone can tell me where in the whole world there is another authority which decides rightly upon this awful crux, I shall listen with interest. Hitherto I have heard of none. I have met those who have told me that the crux may be neglected, and I have seen madness and terrible death ensue. I have heard those who have told me that it may be evaded; and I have met men contemptible thereby. But nowhere, save within the walls of the Holy City, have I seen the affair put in its just relations, leaving man, though fallen and always suffering, at least neither tortured, nor a sensual fool, nor a slave.

Perhaps if I were conducting this exposition of what

is (I beg you to remember) a personal argument, and in no way a general one, upon general conversational, familiar lines, neglecting ultimate principles, I would lay more insistence upon this point of Proportion than upon any other. That which will give us Proportion even in temporal affairs has been discovered and is here to your hand. Men have achieved Proportion outside the Faith in one department at the expense of another. They have had the grace given them to satisfy the human spirit to the full in column and arch—and meanwhile to despise justice. They have had exactitude of law, and have meanwhile despised beauty. They have had a just arrangement of property, and meanwhile have lost culture. But in the Catholic scheme there inhabits a certain balancing compensating spirit, which though it can never constrain men to achieve perfect proportion, for men are fallen, does make them approach to such perfection sufficiently for the right conduct of life.

And here let me tell you another little point in connection with Proportion. The Catholic scheme (which those who desire to avoid the term Catholic call also by the uncertain title of Christian) will give you that final complement of Proportion which is called Humour.

Let me turn now to the negative affair.

There is one outstanding major argument against the Catholic Church, which, to all men of intelligence,

comes first. It is this: Why should this particular affirmation be true?

"There are a myriad trees in the wood. What is there special about this particular tree? There are a myriad guesses at an insoluble problem, why do you call this guess a solution? You have affirmed the thing to be unique. I recognize" (says the instructed opponent—the uninstructed I neglect) "that it *is* unique. You are right when you say it is something quite unlike any other thing and cannot be put into a category with others. It is not" (he admits) "one religion out of many, still less one creed out of many." (Indeed, being instructed, he knows that even the Catholic Creeds do not pretend to be a full exposition of the Faith, but only special definitions answering special denials). "The Catholic Church *is* striking, individual, something apart. But to say that is not enough. *That* does not make it what you claim it to be, the actual Voice of God upon earth. Indeed, to men like myself and a host of others, it is no more than one, perhaps the most sympathetic, perhaps the most arresting, but not upon that account the most convincing, of I know not how many structures of the human imagination."

Now to this major argument (which alone I respect among the innumerable propositions against the Divine origin of the Faith) there is no answer save that of the Faith itself. To the main agnostic argument, to Lucretius as to Huxley, there is no answer save the answer

of appreciation, acceptation, discovery, and the experience of what Mr. Chesterton has recently and justly called "the king."

That is why Faith is Faith. Were it other than Faith, the mass of men would accept or all men would reject. Being what it is, many, even of those who approach, reject; many accept; the rest remain ignoring.

That one Particular Man out of incalculable millions should alone have been also the incarnate God; that one Organization out of I know not how many myriad organizations should alone be absolute in authority; that one connected and multiple set of statements—however closely interdependent, however widely ramifying—should be an ultimate philosophy; these are not affirmations which can be proved by the deductive reason, nor can they be put to such tests as will be immediately accepted by all rational beings.

Against *that* affirmation "Your Particular cannot take the place of the General," there is, I take it, no answer but the Faith itself. There is no answer, in other words, save that convergence of experience in morals, in intelligence, in appetite, which brings us into, or maintains us in, the Household whereof the inhabiting spirit is a lively, a triumphant, a divine repose.

You are of that Household or not of it. But approach it, examine it closely, and, only after so doing, decide.

Of the minor negative points, perhaps the most important to-day are the arguments drawn against the

Faith from history and from what is called "pre-history"—though I would like to make the exception here, that pre-history is not history at all, but guesswork upon matters very little known.

The argument from real history is of two kinds.

The first is what I may call the Protestant argument. It is the argument that the Church *was* founded by Jesus Christ, who *was* God, who *did* intend to create a society among men after His own image, but that (though He so intended) everything went wrong. Some say it went wrong at Pentecost, others at the conversion of Constantine; others, again, with the Papacy of the monk whom they call Hildebrand, but we St. Gregory VII: others, again, with the excommunication of Elizabeth Tudor; others in the rejection of Mrs. Eddy.

To all this, if you will pardon me, I will pay no attention. Others can deal with it better than I, for I am afraid that I despise it with such a whole-hearted contempt that I am unfitted to deal with it. No one can doubt the existence of an historical visible Church. If it have not authority, *all* doctrine fails: for from that body all doctrine has proceeded. No Christian doctrine has any other historical basis as dogma.

But the second argument from real history is of more weight: it is that history shows the whole affair of the Church to have been man-made. "The earliest documents," it says, "the now lost original memorials

underlying our existing text (which are corrupt) presented a young Jewish teacher who said vague things of a common morality, and was put to death either because he conflicted with government, or because his ideals were too high. These, later, were embroidered on by various hands. Then we get accretions upon accretions: the supposed Divinity of the said young man, and all the Christian theology, spun out henceforward from empty brains."

I can't agree. The first documents are *not* of the sort presupposed by this hypothesis. Any man who has ever written a book knows that they are homogeneous, save for trifling textual discrepancies, and every man who can read at all knows that they are direct, sincere, and overwhelming. Everyone who knows enough history to be worth arguing with knows that there proceeded from the very origin of the thing the Christian Church, and that the Christian Church had authority, claiming such from its founder. You are free to say that the origin was a myth, or an illusion, and only Faith can answer you; but you are not free to say as an historian that, at the very origin, the Church was not founded, or that all the great development does not start from that one seed. The gospels proceed from the Church: not the Church from the gospels.

As to pre-history (in which is included the observation of many savages) the whole argument against the Faith lies in this, that men follow certain lines in

religion, and that because the Catholic Church follows those lines in an exalted way, therefore it is man-made. I don't agree. I say that if God intended to reveal Himself to man, and to give man an institution whereby that revelation would continue and have body and form substance, continuity, life, that institution would incorporate those things which man either remembered or had groped after or in his intimate nature desired.

It is a very old quarrel, and there is no solution save the Faith. You either look at the thing one way, or you look at it the other. But there is this much quite certain, that *if* there be a Divine Institution on earth then its consonance with human habits, traditions and adumbrations of the truth, are not against the claim of that Institution, but heavily in its favour. You may call Our Lady the Egyptian Isis or the Chinese Mother-Goddess. But *if* the Incarnation is true she is the Mother of God, and worthy of our worship.

On the old minor argument from the supposed superior prosperity and happiness of the non-Catholic as against the Catholic culture I will not linger. To-day one can only laugh: though in reading the cocksure nonsense of forty years ago and the timid objections of Catholics living within the anti-Catholic culture, one might also weep.

To the argument that the Catholic Church destroys freedom in the intelligence or in the character I am afraid I can only answer with a similar contempt. I

know that all contempt is acid, and that no man drinks it to his profit; but it is honest truth that I cannot brew any other liquor out of such materials. Within the Catholic culture alone is general freedom of discussion to be found, because within that culture alone are first principles, constantly demanded, and because in that culture alone is Reason the ultimate test. In practice it is within the Catholic culture that you hear matters debated fully, with such a contempt for rank and wealth, the power of the police or of the popular press or of the lawyers, of common labels and uninvestigated affirmation, as a non-Catholic culture can hardly conceive. If you doubt it read the press and the books of our contemporary world in various nations. Take specimens, and decide.

As for character, within the Catholic culture still flourish the saints.

* * * * *

There is my little apologetic. I know it to be grossly insufficient. If I could have drawn a picture of that Face which commands us, written a score of that music which we hear, or presented a map of that country which we see, I should have done better.

To do that is quite beyond my powers. I cannot reveal the Church. But there She stands. *Stat et stabit. Manet ac manebit: Spectator orbis.*

II

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

ARCHBISHOP GOODIER, S.J.

IT must be comparatively rare for a Catholic born to ask himself why he is a Catholic, and why he believes in the Catholic Church; almost as rare as for an Englishman to ask himself why he believes in England. For to a Catholic his religion is so much a part of himself, and its practice is so much a function of everyday life, that it does not occur to him to examine it; any more than it occurs to him to examine the motives for rising in the morning or eating his dinner. That is the reason why, when I was first asked to undertake this essay, my instinct was to decline; there seemed to be nothing to be said, nothing, at least, that was not natural, and obvious, and common to all born Catholics everywhere. Converts to the faith have usually something dramatic to relate when they tell the story of their conversion, and the reasons that have led them to make it. There has been the light that has come to them, they scarcely know from what source, often against their own will; there has been the struggle within, of truth against expediency, of new light against inherited tra-

dition, of ideal against convention, of life against evil, which has been nothing less than a death leading to a resurrection, sometimes more than human nature of itself has been able to face. There has been the complete breaking up of life, the loss of friends and ancient anchorage, the alienation of all they loved, the anxious walking alone into utter darkness, the new existence in a strange house, whose ways, and customs, and manners of thought seemed from a distance utterly foreign, and uncongenial, perhaps even tawdry and drab. There has been lastly the line of reasoning that has convinced him, and has induced or compelled him to sacrifice all to gain the pearl of great price, though it may have meant for him poverty and shame. But the Catholic born has no such tragic story to tell; he has no psychological process to analyse. He has only a tale to relate of the loving hand of God which has been good to him from his birth, and for which he can only be eternally grateful; a tale which is common to many millions throughout the world, and therefore in the telling may seem monotonous; to himself it has always been so familiar, so obvious, that he has seldom adverted to it, and when he is asked to write it down it seems to him scarcely worth while.

Still on second thoughts it has seemed to me that an essay on this question may be useful. Familiarity is a relative term; and what to a Catholic is so much a matter of course as to stir no sort of reaction in him what-

ever may be, and indeed often is, to the non-Catholic almost an apocalypse. Especially would this seem to be the case in Great Britain. For centuries now the English Catholic has lived perforce in alien surroundings, has listened to the most appalling travesties of his beliefs and his ideals and his practices till he has got used to them, and has learnt to keep his faith to himself, since in the face of such blindness if he explains it he will not be believed. He hears it repeated that England is a Protestant country, that therefore all true-blue Englishmen must be Protestants, and that a Catholic cannot be loyal; he knows that it simply is not true, that England is by origin and growth a Catholic country, that she has been Protestant only for three hundred years, that already her Protestantism is fast wearing off, that a Catholic can die for his country as well as any other, if the whole truth were told rather more. He knocks up against the most appalling prejudice, in men who on every other point claim to be broad-minded, and almost he despairs of being able to make himself understood, even by those who seem to seek for an understanding. What is elementary to him, and so part of his very being that he takes it for granted, is to them an unknown land; perhaps, then, if he says what to him seems elementary, it may nevertheless be found to be new to others.

To begin with, then, in matter of fact, whoever we may be, Catholic or Protestant, Hindu or Moham-

medan, most of us are what we are because we have been so born; the reason for the faith that is in us must obviously have been an aftergrowth, and that reason is of necessity coloured by all that has gone before. The convert, as I have already said, is the exception. As Newman has well pointed out, man does not live by reason alone, especially in matters of religion, but he is, or rather he should be, reasonable. His faith does not rest altogether on argument; if it did it would not be faith. But he has, or should have if he is true to himself, reason for his faith; only when the former does not confirm the latter does he find it necessary to look elsewhere. All this I have in mind when I try to say why I am a Catholic. I do not write in a fault-finding spirit; I have no quarrel with anyone, no complaint to make; I just state the facts as they appear to my Catholic mind, knowing very well that I have many friends who do not think as I do, partly because they have begun from a different starting-point from mine, partly because their upbringing has made them look at many facts from a very different angle.

When, then, I ask myself why I am a Catholic, the first reason that occurs to me is that by the grace of God I am one. I am a Catholic because I was born in a Catholic family; because I inherited the faith from a Catholic father and mother, and from their ancestors before them; so far as I know I have no non-Catholic blood in my veins. I am a Catholic because from my

infancy I have been brought up in that tradition; because my mother taught me as a child to say my prayers at her knee, to be familiar with God as I was with herself, to behave myself in His house as I behaved myself in hers, even as she had been taught in her day, and her ancestors before her. I am a Catholic because she handed on to me, what she had received from them, a keen appreciation and love of the Blessed Sacrament, so that Jesus Christ, His personality, His affection, His authority, were grand things to me, proud things as a child feels noble pride, long before I could reason, and had not to be discovered later by my own fallible research. I am a Catholic because in my early boyhood, no matter what the weather, in season and out of season, she would herself call me every morning, and take me to mass, and let me feel with her the joy of belonging to Our Lord, so that if for any cause I missed, it was as if something had been lost. I am a Catholic because I was taught to see so early, as perhaps only a child can see, visions of the infinite in which this world, and all that is in it, shrivels into a very little thing; because in that infinite I found companions, to whom I could talk and with whom I could play, not the fairies and elves of my picture books, but God Himself, and His Son, and the Mother of His Son, and all His angels and saints; not giants and goblins and werewolves to be conquered, but the devil and all his works and pomps.

Here let me add one thing more concerning the English Catholic whose family has never lost the faith, for it is peculiarly his own. Such a one's outlook, on his religion and on his country, is and must be unique. Because he is a Catholic he claims to be, and he knows in his heart that he is, more truly English than his non-Catholic fellow-countrymen. He knows he belongs to the line of those who first made and later developed the soul and character of England. He reads his Bede, and his Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, his Early English texts, and poetry, and mystery plays, his Chaucer and his Langland, and he is at home with them every one. He has not to be told that in those days such and such was their belief or their practice; he knows it at once because it is his own. He is at one with the Catholic rulers who made England; with Alfred in his devotion to the Holy See, with Edward the Confessor, the king of prayers, with Henry doing voluntary penance at St. Thomas' tomb, even as he understands that other Henry who rifled that tomb and scattered its bones, with Richard of the Lion Heart, who would hear mass every day, with Edward who, when the Pope showed him the injustice of his act, canceled a war and disbanded his forces. He is at one with Augustine and Paulinus, Wilfrid and Dunstan, Thomas of Canterbury and Stephen Langton, and the many more who were first themselves made by the Catholic Church, and in the strength of that making proceeded to make England. He is at one with the

Catholic yeomen who fought her battles, who would spend a vigil in watching, and prayer, and confession before they drew a sword or shot an arrow, who would not hesitate to keep the Sacred Host in their camp, who would enter the fight with "St. George for England" on their lips, and, when all was over, would see to it that the souls of the dead were cared for more than their graves.

He is at one with the Catholic monarchs and nobility who studded the land with shrines and altars where masses might be said in this country through all time. He enters their churches to-day, and every corner has a meaning to him, the same meaning that it had to those who built them. The disused piscina, the broken holy-water stoup, the desecrated altar stone, the broken statue, the crusader's tomb—these are not curious, even venerable, antiquities to him; they are the marks of his own life to-day, they are abiding proofs of his own legitimacy. The best of England, and the oldest, is everywhere Catholic, her monasteries, her churches and cathedrals, her schools and universities, her hospitals and houses for the poor, her laws and constitutions, her liberties, her arts, her sciences, her letters, her poetry, her drama, her history. The rest has come later, and is only an accretion; the communion table where once stood the consecrated altar, the cross of brass, where was once the tabernacle and the crucifix, the meaningless candlesticks, the Book of Common Prayer for the

missal, all these of which England every day becomes more and more ashamed and which she endeavours to discard. The Catholic sees all this, and he knows that his ancestors alone have been faithful to the old tradition, that he is in the line of England's best inheritance; and he longs to give back to England the soul that once was hers, and that made her truly herself. He longs to make the dead bones live again.

This, then, is my first reason why I am a Catholic; it is because I have inherited the faith from my forefathers, who link me up with the England of old, and have paid dearly that they might hand on that inheritance to me. The second reason is akin to the first; it is because I have been brought up one. I was sent to a Catholic school, in which the sense of that noble tradition was confirmed; for its history went back to the year when changes were made, and a number refused them. In the days when England was robbed of the Catholic faith, it stayed not only in families such as I have mentioned, it stayed also in schools. Since Catholic education such as had hitherto been found at Winchester and Eton, Oxford and Cambridge was denied them, those families sent their sons abroad, to English schools of their own foundation, even at the risk of life and property. They were taught by men from English universities; men who, as a modern scholar has shown, carried away with them the best tradition of Fisher, and More, and Erasmus, and even

wrote the most perfect English of their generation. Those schools, when troubles abroad grew more violent, and when the times were more temperate at home, came back to England and continued their work, preserving the old Catholic tradition which they had maintained for two centuries elsewhere. For years they grew apart, unable to share in the ordinary curriculum of England, suffering, it may have been, from the lack of stimulus which healthy competition provides, nevertheless giving to their youth a sense of union with the past which, I think, no other schools in England can hope to give.

On the rolls of my school there were names which Shakespeare had glorified; there were those among its professors whose very presence reminded the students of the price that had been paid to give them what they received. Among the treasures of the house were relics which told of a noble ancestry; vestments of Henry VII, caps and trinkets of Sir Thomas More, embroidery worked by Catherine of Aragon and her household, the Book of Hours of Mary Queen of Scots, the rope with which an English martyr had been bound, and the like; and all these acquired, not by accident or by purchase, as an antiquarian might acquire them, but by a proved inheritance that linked up the present with their first owners. There were portraits, and manuscripts, and books which declared by their mere existence, better than any syllogism, or any written chapter of history, that the line of the school was true, and unconsciously

developed in the boy a love of the ancient faith, and a noble pride in Catholic England, which nothing in after life could ever undermine. He would go from the school into the battle of the world, hampered it might be, in many ways at a disadvantage, but he did not mind; he knew that he possessed within himself that which more than compensated. Such was the education I received, not obtruded on me, scarcely ever mentioned; while our classics and mathematics, our football and cricket, seemed to take up our energies, all the time we lived in an atmosphere redolent of the ancient faith. We heard our mass every morning as our forefathers had heard it; we respected the statue of Our Lady as had been done of old at Winchester and Eton; while others might look down on us as being out of the scheme of to-day, we could only be sorry for them because they had been despoiled of the one thing that mattered.

Nor was this any seminary for the training of Catholic priests; it was just a school in which it was taken for granted that the knowledge of God and His Christ was at least as essential, at least as needful for the making of a man, as the knowledge of Homer or Cicero. It was a school in which the sense of right and wrong, and of moral obligation, was based on something more than convention; we learnt to do right, and to shun evil, not only because the former most became a man, or because the latter was a thing that was "not

done," but because right was right, and wrong was wrong, in the sight of God. We could play our pranks as well as other boys, in some sense perhaps more than others; we could break rules, and go out of bounds, and otherwise give trouble, just for the excitement of seeing whether or not we would be caught; but the moment evil-doing rose to the nature of sin in the sight of God, then it became another thing. Then we knew that we had more than our prefects to face; we knew that the ordinary schoolboy penances were no sufficient atonement; we needed no one to compel us, even to induce us, to make use of the sacrament of Penance, to acknowledge like men our guilt before God, to express our sorrow, to receive from Him by His minister some recognition of forgiveness. Such was the influence of our Catholic training upon us. Unconsciously it entered into every detail of our lives and our judgments. It was part of ourselves, as natural as eating or drinking, or of moving a hand or foot; we lived our faith, and our faith lived in us. One who realises all that this means to a Catholic surely cannot wonder that he is so jealous for his schools. It is not the material knowledge learnt there that concerns him most; it is the atmosphere which he has preserved at such cost through the centuries, and which on no account will he lose.

These, then, are two reasons why I am a Catholic; with them, it may be said, I began my career in life. When I began, when I looked abroad across the world,

the past and the present, what did I discover? I discovered, not only that I was one with the best of England in the past; I was one with the best of Christendom everywhere. No one who has been about the world can avoid the overwhelming fact of the Catholic Church. She is everywhere. She is with every kind and condition of men, with rich and poor, educated and uneducated, ruler and ruled, free man and slave, civilised and savage; there is not a race, a nation, a family, an individual, with which she cannot be, and is not, at home. She is nearest to the poles and she is all round the equator; where armies and explorers stop, she goes forward. Often enough armies and explorers find that she has gone before them; often enough, when they return to their base, she remains. She is a living power which goes on when armies perish and explorers die; when traders have done their best or their worst, and have retired from the land they have bled, she will stay behind and heal the wound. Where she goes, civilisation follows; she can tame where no other power on earth can do anything, she can educate where others find it hopeless; above all she can instil principles of right and wrong, of justice and mercy, of humanity and love, of ideals beyond this life which lift up life itself to another plane, such that the meanest of mankind discovers it worth while to live.

So it is to-day, so it has always been from the days of the apostles. As a traveller can scarcely cross a coun-

try on the face of the earth, but somewhere he will strike the trail of the Catholic Church, so can the student scarcely search a page of history but he will find her name written upon it, supporting a tottering fabric here, building up a new thing out of shattered ruins there, on one side standing for authority and right, on another defending liberty and justice. The Roman Empire fell; the Catholic Church gathered up the fragments, and out of them rebuilt the City of God, the world of Christendom. The Barbarians repeopled the Western world; the Catholic Church tamed them, and taught them, and blended them into one. Monarchs arose, and in their imagined divine right aimed at tyranny; the Church alone withstood them, and taught them the limits of their power. The nations grew into consciousness of themselves, as from childhood to youth, from youth to full manhood; the Catholic Church assisted them to frame their constitutions, imbued them with respect for right and justice, established their universities, protected and freed their serfs and working classes by their guilds and corporations, drew them from the love of war and plunder into the ways of peace and industry. The break up of Christendom came, called a Reformation; from that day to this, outside the Catholic Church, there has been cleavage after cleavage, chasms opening which cannot be bridged, and the only bond of union which has been more than temporary, more than a makeshift contriv-

ance, has been the Catholic Church. Alliances, balances of power, treaties, concordats, these are artificial things; they last for a season and perish: let men make them as binding as they may, they themselves grow out of them and soon find them out of date; it may be questioned whether any one has lasted more than a single generation. But the union of nations in and through the Catholic Church is a lasting thing, enduring so long as the nations themselves choose to preserve it.

This is the place which the Catholic Church holds in history, and in the life of mankind, as the Catholic interprets it; and to this harmony his own way of thinking is attuned. I go to any country in the world; I find a Catholic Church; I am at once in union with those who worship in it, as if I were in my own parish church at home. No introduction is required, no credentials or letters patent, no explanations, no pretensions or deceptions or concealments, no sign or password at the door. I hear the same mass, I make my confession as easily as elsewhere, I receive the same sacraments, I listen to the same doctrine, from whatever pulpit, and in whatever language, it is preached. I buy at the church door a religious pamphlet or newspaper; it corresponds exactly to my own in my native place. If at my hotel I fall ill, I send for the nearest priest, it matters not who he may be, and all is done for me as if we had known each other all our lives; I send for a religious to nurse me, and there comes a

nun who might have been brought up in the convent of my own town. In all this there will be varieties of form, the essence is always and everywhere the same; perfect mutual understanding, perfect sympathy, without need of a single word of introduction. And I know that this unity is no result of mere education, or of government, or of system, or of race. It is independent of all these, more often than not it is in spite of them; it is too living a fact to come from anything so artificial and external, too natural, too spontaneous, too much from within, too clearly an assumption that of course it must be, and could not be otherwise, any more than the hand and foot can be other than one with and in the same human body. It is the oneness that can come of no device, of no constructive machinery; it is the oneness of life itself. Nowhere does the European feel this more than when he hears the mass of a travelling Chinese priest, at an Indian Altar belonging to a German missionary, and sees a British officer kneeling beside his Indian boy, receiving communion at the altar rails, with a lady from the Japanese consulate next in the row.

And it has always been the same; not only in every place, but in every generation past, the unity is manifest. The Catholic reads Ignatius of Antioch in the second century, and every word he reads has its echo in his own mind; Tertullian, and his defence of the Church is the same as we use to-day; Augustine the

African on the Holy Eucharist, and he can fill in at once what the Doctor tells his neophytes they are not yet prepared to know; the Syrian Ephrem on the Blessed Virgin Mary, and he enters at once into his enthusiasm; Chrysostom the Greek on the Priesthood, and he is in agreement with every word; John of Damascus on Saints and images, and the doctrine is his own. He can follow Gregory and Leo speaking with authority, as if it were never questioned, sending their missions to the ends of the earth, and he sees that the spirit of those times is the same as the spirit of his Church to-day. The rule of St. Benedict, after fourteen hundred years, needs no alteration; the *Summa* of St. Thomas may still serve as his textbook; the *Imitation of Christ* may be read with every chapter; nothing in Ignatius Loyola's *Exercises* need be omitted; the loyalty of St. Theresa to the Church might have been expressed in precisely the same terms by a Catholic of the twentieth century. So is it with the saints. Benedict, Bruno, Bernard, Francis of Assisi, Dominic; Clare, Bridget, Angela, Theresa; their sons and daughters are with us still, keeping the same rule, holding up the same ideal, serving God and serving man by the same consistent life of prayer, and fasting, and word, and deed. There is unity among them all, and it is the unity which belongs to the Catholic to-day without any need of alteration or adaptation. He is one with universal Christendom, wherever Christen-

dom has expressed itself at its best; one with the kings who, whatever evils they might have done, would ever die in communion with the Holy See; one with the scholars who established her learning and universities, one with the architects who built her cathedrals, with her artists who expressed the beauty of her mind, Angelico, Botticelli, Perugino, Van Eyck, Rubens, Murillo, with her poets, from Paulinus of Nola and before, to Dante and after; the Catholic understands and interprets them all, without any need of comment, because they are living things to him, because the soul behind them is in perfect union with his own.

This is the fact of the Catholic Church as the Catholic sees it, in past time and to-day. It is a tree that has grown with the ages, bearing fruit in every generation, while in its branches all the birds of the air build their nests; and it continues to grow in the present generation, as green and fresh as at the first. It stands alone: there is no other growth in creation can compare with it; there is no list of names of those who have been a glory to mankind like the list of those it counts upon its roll of honour. Branches have from time to time corrupted, but what of that? Others have been broken off, and perhaps have flourished apart for a season; but one by one they have withered and died, or have passed into a profitless old age. Men question the truth of miracles; there is no greater miracle than the fact of the ever-living Church, spread out before their

eyes, whose vitality cannot be questioned. She has been blinded and yet she sees, crippled and yet she walks, hounded out as a leper and yet she comes back, a clean and welcome guest, silenced and yet she speaks, put to death and yet she rises again from the tomb; and "blessed is he that shall not be scandalised in me." Men look for natural explanations of her being and her life, but in their hearts they must know that all explanations come to nothing. No effect can be greater than its cause, or its accumulated causes; when the causes adduced by certain historians have been gathered together and allowance has been made for their fullest possible effects, there still remains that in the Catholic Church for which they have not accounted; her eternal youth, her perpetual vitality, her independence of all that this world would deem essential for existence, her faithful and consistent expression and defence of the truth of God.

The Catholic, conscious of the life within his Church, as he is conscious of the life in his own body, reads these explanations, and lists of causes, and is moved only to be sad that scholars can so easily satisfy themselves. If these summaries really satisfy them—he finds it hard to believe that they do—then have they missed the whole significance of the phenomenon they have set themselves to study. They have failed to see that it is a living thing, instinct with a life of its own, not a compact, not a convention, not a fortuitous result of com-

bined circumstances. It is a living organism; and the spirit which inspires it is more than that of man, more than that of any human covenant. It is the spirit which He gave who prayed that men might all be one, "as Thou, Father, in me, and I in Thee" (John 17, 21); that Jesus Christ, "yesterday, to-day, and for ever," truly God and truly man, physically born of Mary and dying on the Cross, yet no less mystically living on, as He Himself has promised, in the race of men He has redeemed. This is the life of the Church, it is the life of Him who has absorbed it into Himself, making with Him one body, He the Head, every one in the Church its members. He is the living vine, we are its living branches; and the life of the branches does not differ from the life of the vine. "He that abideth in me and I in him, the same beareth much fruit, for without me you can do nothing. . . . If anyone abide not in me, He shall be cast forth as a branch and shall wither" (John 15, 5-7). Which makes St. Paul triumphantly cry out, as the one characteristic of Christianity: "We being many are one body in Christ, and all members one of another" (Romans 12, 5); and again: "We are members of his body, and of his flesh, and of his bones" (Ephesians 5, 20). It is the fulfilment of that memorable prayer: "Jesus lifting up his eyes to heaven said: Holy Father, keep them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they may be one as we also are. . . . That they all may be one as thou, Father, in me and I

in thee; that they also may be one in us. . . . That they may be one as we also are one. I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one . . . that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them" (John 17, 1-26).

This, the Catholic believes, is the secret of the life of his Church; on this account he clings to that life more than he clings to the life in his own body. It is the one compelling reason why he would avoid sin, lest he "crucify again to himself the Son of God, making him a mockery" (Hebrews 6, 6). "Know you not," says St. Paul, "that your bodies are members of Christ? Am I then to take the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? God forbid" (1 Corinthians 5, 15). It is a motive which would make him subjugate himself, and rise to the full height of his possibilities, material as well as spiritual. "You are not your own, for you have been bought at a price. Glorify God, in your body" (1 Corinthians 6, 20). It is the reason why the Catholic is full of the missionary spirit; the desire that all men should share with him the glory of membership. He sets out in no desire of material conquest; rather is it the very opposite. He sets out that he may give; that he may share with others the boon that he himself possesses, and when he has shared it, then that he may take his place with others in a common brotherhood. So does he believe that he helps to fulfil, according to his degree, the life of Christ upon this earth;

"making up in my flesh what is lacking to the sufferings of Christ, on behalf of his body which is the Church" (Colossians 1, 24), "bearing about in our body the mortification of Jesus, that the life also of Jesus may be made manifest in our mortal flesh" (2 Corinthians 4, 10).

These, then, are my reasons, or some of them, why I am a Catholic, expressed in the order of their history. Or rather let me say they are some of my external reasons, as many as can be mentioned here. To resume. I am a Catholic because I have inherited the Catholic faith from a Catholic ancestry, which links me up and makes me one with those Catholic men and women who made, and adorned, and founded all that is good in this land. I am a Catholic because I am an Englishman. I am a Catholic because through the Catholic faith I am one with those who made Europe, who made Christendom, who have preserved it through every vicissitude, who at the present moment, in tens of thousands scattered throughout the world, are doing more for universal mankind than any other power on the face of the earth. I am a Catholic, again, because in all this I see not an accident of human development, for it has been always the same from the beginning, not an efficient organisation which has stood the test of time and circumstance, for it is not a natural phenomenon which calls for human ingenuity to explain it, but nothing less than the hand of God Himself caring for His own,

"ruling from end to end mightily, and disposing all things sweetly," "making all things co-operate to good for those who love Him," "sweet and meek and of much mercy to them that hope in Him," "even the Lord God, merciful and forgiving, patient, and of exceeding sympathy, and true." I see in my Church a fulfilment of His promise that He will be with His own through all time, that the gates of hell shall never prevail against her, that through her He will teach men "all truth," infallibly, without danger of error, that His kingdom, though not of this earth, shall nevertheless spread across the world, gradually drawing all men into one. I see in my Church that living body of which Christ Himself is the living Head; the branches of that vine which is Himself; that body which lives by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost—*Spiritus est qui vivificat* (John 6, 63)—reaching down into the hearts of men and giving love a new meaning—*Caritas Dei diffusa est incordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis* (Romans 5, 5)—It is a Church in which all men are brothers, common sons of a common Father, common brethren of Jesus Christ, members of one same body, however different their race or their calling—*In uno Spiritu omnes nos in unum corpus baptizati sumus* (1 Corinthians 12, 13); on this principle, for which this Church stands, our whole Christian civilisation has been built. I see in my Church the Communion of Saints, living and dead, so bound together that what

one gains is gain for all, what one suffers the whole body will endure—*Si quid patitur unum membrum compatiuntur omnia membra* (1 Corinthians 12, 26). In that Communion we are so one with Christ Himself that He can say: "What you do to the least of these you do to me" (Matthew 25, 40); and when that Communion is persecuted He can cry: "Why persecutest thou me?—I am Jesus whom thou persecutest" (Acts 9, 4-5). I am a Catholic because I believe that this ever-living Church is that which St. Paul described as the "body and complement" of Christ (Ephesians 1, 23), because in it man "makes up what is wanting in the sufferings of Christ" (Colossians 1, 24), because in it, and by means of it, "I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Galatians 2, 20).

There are other reasons, internal reasons of which it is almost impossible to speak, even if, when spoken of, they could be understood; and these reasons are the more convincing precisely because they are unutterable. We remember the climax of St. Paul, in his effort to reveal himself to his Corinthian people. He could tell them of many things, both in doctrine and in experience; but at last he reached a point of knowledge which he could not touch: "Secret words," he says, "which it is not granted to man to utter" (2 Corinthians 12, 4), but precisely on that account nowhere is he more sure that what he says is true, nowhere more convincing to those who listen to him. And St. Augustine is the same,

and St. Thomas Aquinas, and St. Theresa, and countless numbers more, who have been faithful to the tradition, and have seen, and have endeavoured to tell what they have seen to others. They can carry us far if we will go with them; they analyse while reason guides and language does not fail them; but there are certainties beyond the reach of reason, there are truths for which there is no human expression to be found, there are worlds beyond this world, which "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive" (1 Corinthians 2, 9); and the saints have seen glimpses of that world and have been struck dumb. They have seen the truth, not as a conclusion but as a living light, and have known it as such, and have come back to earth able only to say that they know. "That which we have seen and heard we declare to you," says St. John (1 John 1, 3), with the same half-despairing emphasis. And of the same kind, in its own degree, is the certain faith of the Catholic. He gives his reasons for his faith, but none of them, not all of them together, are wholly adequate. For his certainty does not come from reason only; it is "more certain than reason," as St. Thomas Aquinas expresses it; it is the certainty of life itself. He knows that he is right; with the grace of God he would lay down his life to maintain it; and it is not fanaticism or obstinacy. He is sorry for those who do not know; he would teach them if he could; and it is not bigotry. He prays that

all may be one, not so much with himself as with Christ, and with that Church of Christ which is His body, thereby becoming one with each other; and he hopes that the day will yet come when this will be. So does his faith bear fruit in hope and charity.

III

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

FATHER R. KNOX

IF a Communist were invited to give his reasons for being a Communist, he might, I conceive, interpret his terms of reference in either of two ways. He might assume that his readers were unresponsive to the Socialist idea, and devote himself accordingly to an attack upon the principles of the capitalist system. Or he might assume that his readers were Socialists of a less positive colour than himself, and be content with encouraging them to follow out, more logically, the implications of their own thought. Similarly, an invitation to write on "Why I am a Catholic" can be answered either by explaining why you dissent from the unbeliever's attack on Christianity, or why you dissent from the Protestant attack upon Catholicism. I hope I am right in assuming, from the nature of the circumstances, that in this article I am to explain, not why I am a Christian, but why I am not a Protestant. For the ordinary Englishman still thinks of a Catholic as an exaggerated kind of Christian, just as he thinks of the Communist as an exaggerated kind of Socialist. In the

theological estimate he is wrong. If he could think himself clear of a particular country and a particular century, he would see that as a matter of history and as a matter of geography Catholicism is the normal type of Christianity, Protestantism the aberration, the departure, the thing that needs to be explained. And indeed, I suppose that many priests share my own experience—viz., that of becoming increasingly familiar with the type of enquirer who has come straight to the Catholic Church as the natural exponent of religion, without troubling to explore those rival paths which are coming to be recognized, more and more, as blind alleys.

I must take it for granted then—in these days, unfortunately, it is a considerable postulate—that the reader agrees with me in accepting the outlines of the Christian revelation; believes, with me, that our Lord came as the accredited Herald of a final revelation, and that the claims which he makes upon us are absolute in their authority. And among the claims he made one, it seems to me, is abundantly documented above all the rest. He claimed to be the founder of a new kingdom of grace. The prophets had foretold that the Messiah would save, not the whole of the Jewish people, but a remnant of it. And accordingly, our Lord represents himself as choosing out a new Ecclesia which is to supersede the old Ecclesia or national assembly of the Jews. In his parables he lays down the programme for

that kingdom, and explains, in cryptic terms but with increasing emphasis, his intention of including others besides the Jews in its membership. He explains much else that distinguishes his projected kingdom from that of contemporary Jewish ideas. But in one point he leaves us to assume that the new Assembly will be like the old—it will consist of a finite number of human souls, united so as to form a visible corporate body. Nay, lest we should suppose that it was to be a merely ideal entity, merely a register of those names which would finally be revealed in the Book of Life, he warns us that it will comprise unworthy as well as worthy members, cockle among the wheat, dog-fish among the catch.

To be a member, then, of his Church, does not of itself promise eternal life; Judas was a Churchman. Does exclusion from it exclude us from eternal life? It would be hard to prove from our Lord's own words that he meant otherwise; the whole weight of the texts emphasises the momentous importance of welcoming the apostolic testimony. And if the Church herself, with her own traditions to guide her, has found a more lenient interpretation of the principle *extra ecclesiam nulla salus,* it is evident, at least, that loyalty to our Lord's teaching must engage us, without thought of the consequences, to apply for membership of the kingdom he was so explicitly concerned to found. I have never, at any time of my life, doubted of this—that the least

I could do by way of attesting my loyalty towards the Master on whom my hope of eternity depends was to throw in my lot with a particular body of Christian people. Some body of Christian people, could I but find it, must be the legitimate continuation of those hundred and twenty souls that prayed, before Pentecost, in the Cenacle.

"I am with you always," "He shall guide you into all truth," "You are my friends"—such promises were made to me, if I could but be certain that I was one of the people addressed; was I? If so, I must surely be able to point to one visible body of Christians, continuous from our Lord's day to this, in which I stood enrolled. . . . I am fully aware that in expressing these views I shall part company with a large body of Protestant thought, now (unfortunately) on the way to becoming old-fashioned. There are those who will tell me that if I had ever really "laid hold of Christ" I should *know,* with an unmistakable interior certainty, that his promises were meant for me, independently of any attachment I may profess for this or that religious body. I have commonly a great respect for the people who seem to enjoy this certainty; but I cannot imagine myself as sharing it. I cannot imagine any kind of interior certainty, short of a miraculous revelation, which would embolden me to rule the possibility of self-deception out of my thought. My hope of pardon

is based, indeed, on the fidelity of our Lord to his own promises. But the conviction that those promises apply to me springs, as I say, only from the consciousness that I belong to an organised society which is the extension of his own Personality.

If I were confronted by numerous religious bodies, each of which claimed to be the one true continuation of the Apostolic Church, and lamented the lapse of the others into schism, then indeed I should pursue my enquiry with difficulty, laboriously scrutinizing the title-deeds of each. But as a matter of fact there is only one Christian body which even makes the claim in any intelligible sense; and that is the Catholic Church. Now, it is evident that both the Scriptural writers and the early fathers treated the Church as axiomatically one. It is evident that in the mind of the early centuries the effect of schism was not to produce two Catholic Churches (which would be a contradiction in terms), nor two parts of the Catholic Church, for this would be the formal abandonment of the unity which all their thought postulates. How, then, can I imagine that when the Eastern dioceses fell out of Communion with the West, or when England abandoned its former connexion with Rome and threw in its lot with the Continental Protestants, schism had any other effect than it had in the days of Nestorius or of Eutyches? In the latter case as in the former, the effect of schism was

not to produce two Catholic Churches or two parts of the Catholic Church; it produced one Church and one schismatical body.

Which, in either case, was the true Church, and which the schismatical? I only know of two tests which have ever been proposed for finding the true Church in such an emergency. One rule is to take your stand with the majority of the Catholic episcopate; the other is to take your stand with that party in the dispute which includes the Bishop of Rome. I can see no inducement to take sides with a party which is inspired by a Bishop of Constantinople, or with a party which claims to derive its ecclesiastical jurisdiction from a Bishop of Llandaff. Even if there were no need in the Church for a doctrinal authority to repel the invasions of error; even if there were no need of a hierarchy to dispense, validly and legitimately, the Sacraments which Christ appointed, I should still want to enroll myself under the banner of the Catholic Church, as possessing a continuity which even her adversaries do not dare to contest. They accuse her, to be sure, of development in her doctrines, of uncharitableness in her policy, of superstition in her practices, but they cannot deny the plain fact that her descent is unbroken, her succession unimpaired.

And had I come to the decision in the position of a simple layman, this would perhaps have been enough for me. But as a matter of fact, when the question of

ecclesiastical unity first engaged my attention, I was already an ordained clergyman; hands had been laid on me which symbolized an unbroken succession of orders and of jurisdiction which came down from the time of Queen Elizabeth. Could that succession be traced further back? Did the chain find its ultimate link in the Apostles? Now, there was here a double question to be considered. A properly constituted priest must have two qualifications over and above that vocation of his which comes direct from God. (1) He must have the power to administer Sacraments validly; to pronounce, for example, the words of consecration with effect. (2) He must have the *right* to exercise his priesthood, within a certain sphere and for the benefit of a certain group of human souls. If I may make this clear at the risk of being personal, I would state the difference thus. Bishop Headlam, who contributes to this volume, is not regarded at Rome as having either the power or the right to administer Christian sacraments. Dr. Orchard, if his title to orders were investigated, would probably be regarded as having the power to administer Christian sacraments, but not the right. He has ordination, but not "mission."

It is curious to notice how the Anglican apologist, deeply concerned to defend the validity of his orders, burkes altogether this question of mission. Yet our Lord, in the very passage which is commonly regarded as the main text upon the Sacrament of Holy Orders,

puts the emphasis the other way: "As my Father hath sent me, I also send you." This text is solemnly quoted in the prayer of the Anglican ordinal; and it is, I think, the general impression one derives from reading the Anglican ordinal that it is more explicit about *authorizing* the minister to undertake certain duties than about enabling him to perform certain actions. Now, the man who holds "faculties" in the Archdiocese of Westminster is commissioned to do a certain work by a Church plainly universal in its extent and plainly continuous with the Church of the Catacombs and of the Cenacle. The man who is licensed in the diocese of London derives his commission from a body or college of bishops who are, beyond dispute, the legitimate successors of Matthew Parker and his colleagues. By what title could Matthew Parker and his colleagues claim continuity with any college of bishops who went before them? Matthew Parker had sent me; who sent Matthew Parker?

Plainly not the Bishop of Rome; plainly not the universal episcopate. His ecclesiastical title, if he had any, must come from the Bishops of the two provinces of Canterbury and York, considered as an independent Church unit. (They never did form an independent Church unit, any more than the two archdioceses of Florence and Armagh.) Did Parker and his colleagues derive their commission from their predecessors in the same sees? Quite manifestly not. Out of the twenty-

seven sees in question, ten were vacant at the accession of Elizabeth; of the remaining seventeen bishops fourteen had to be deprived in order that the new hierarchy might have its way. Fourteen—by a Providential accident, a bare majority out of the possible twenty-seven. Nor can appeal be made to the Edwardian bishops, who had themselves been intruded after the arbitrary deprivation of their predecessors. In a word, whatever commission Parker and his colleagues held came to them from Queen Elizabeth. And I have never seen any serious attempt to prove that they derived it from any other quarter. That the Church of England possesses valid orders may, from the non-Catholic point of view, be arguable. That it possesses no commission handed down to it by direct succession from the apostles is a plain matter of history.

As an Anglican, then, I stood outside of the one evidently continuous and self-reproducing fellowship which went back to the Apostles. As an Anglican clergyman, I was taking it upon myself to exercise a jurisdiction which proceeded, in the last resort, from no more respectable a source than a Tudor queen. These were the considerations which were most formidably present to my mind when I made my submission to the Catholic Church. But the question which had been agitating my mind for several years already was the old question, Where lies the seat of doctrinal authority? A question which to most Catholics seems

only a theoretical point, but becomes an intensely practical point to any conscientious Anglican, once it is raised. Like an aching tooth that is jarred afresh by every motion of a railway train, the mind that has once begun to wonder about authority finds, in every incident of a ministerial career, a fresh ground of irritation.

The Catholic challenge to Anglicanism has always been this: Where do you find the infallible authority which warrants you in making this and that doctrinal assertion—assertions which seem, to the ordinary agnostic, so fantastically improbable? Roughly you may say that a hundred years ago the answer was "We find it in the Bible"; fifty years ago it was "We find it in the Church—that is, the Church Diffusive"; to-day it is "We have not got any infallible authority, and we do not want one." The old appeal to the Scripture, always self-condemned for want of logic, has now been abandoned under the influence of Biblical criticism. It is still worth considering whether an acephalous episcopal church can get on without an infallible authority, and whether there is any such authority to which it can reasonably appeal.

That a Christian tradition existed before the New Testament was written is a plain matter of history. That it should have been handed on in some form after the death of the first witnesses is a matter of common sense. That in the course of that transmission,

from century to century, the content of the original message should have been expanded, distorted, or rationalized away was, as a matter of human probability, almost inevitable. We could only be assured of its integrity if some supernatural sanction were given, by which the bishops of the Church—for these, from the earliest times, are the recognized channels of the transmission—would be Providentially secured from error. We Catholics hold that this is the fact; that the decision of a majority of Bishops met in council cannot err. But for the greater safeguarding of the truth, we believe that a second guarantee of inerrancy has been granted to us. Not only is it impossible for a majority of the bishops to err; it is impossible for the Church of Rome to err. The Church of Rome consists of about five hundred thousand Catholics living on the banks of the river Tiber. Its bishop, according to our theology, cannot err even by himself, when he sets forth, in matters of faith and morals, the tradition which has been handed down in the Church of Rome.

The old Tractarian criticism of this position was that the second guarantee was superfluous. Why have two infallible voices? Why not trust to the voice of the collective episcopate? Quite apart from the cumbrous nature of the conciliar method, which can leave Christians in doubt of the truth for a human life-time, there is an answer from which I could never find any escape. What is a council? Any and every collection of bishops

which, after inviting the remaining bishops of the world to attend its deliberations, proceeds to pass a decree—the *latrocinium,* for example? Or is there any formality to be observed; is there any authority with which the momentous duty rests of summoning the council and determining its duration? In Reformation times they had an answer ready; that duty rested with the secular power. To-day, when the arm of flesh has failed them, the Anglicans prefer to drop this contention. What authority, then, is left which can guarantee to us the fact that this or that meeting of Bishops was in truth a world-wide council, except the Bishop of Rome, to whom we have made our constant appeal?

There was, of course, a further difficulty for the Tractarians. They were resting their own case on a principle which in fact undermined it. In their text-books, they were accustomed to describe the Nestorians, Monophysites, etc., as "heretics." What did they mean by the description, unless they meant that these Christian bodies had taken the wrong side in a dispute about the Incarnation; manifestly the wrong side, because the decision of the majority went against them, and they still held to their opinions? And there was no imaginable reason why the Tractarians should draw a line across the page of history, and declare that the Church, indivisible hitherto, became divisible at the end of the sixth century. If the Nestorians were wrong in maintaining their protest when the voice of the majority

had gone against them, then the "Orthodox" Greeks were wrong in maintaining theirs, and the Anglicans were wrong in maintaining theirs. Their "Church diffusive" was not in fact a historic majority of Christians, it was an agglomeration of historic minorities—the Greeks, the Anglicans, the Old Catholics—and an imaginary agglomeration at that.

Sturdy Protestants like Salmon had always pointed out these difficulties; in the end, the defenders of "Anglo-Catholicism" have come to recognise them, and have retreated, in tolerably good order, from the battlefield. The spies have returned from the promised land of Infallibility with the assurance that the grapes are sour. They have expunged the word "infallible" from their speech; they retain the word "authority" in a sense of their own. It is to mean, henceforth, an advisory weight such as we would naturally attach to the traditions of antiquity; "the authority of the Church" can be quoted for a variety of pious beliefs, held in early Christian times, to which we shall naturally attach importance before coming to any theological conclusion. Just as a Catholic would not disagree with St. Augustine willingly, so the Anglicans will not willingly disagree with the findings of Chalcedon. After all, we were taught in our Latin books that *auctor* meant "an adviser," and that the *auctoritas* of a politician meant his "prestige." Are not these the very notions we want?

The appeal to Bradley's Arnold is, of course, com-

pletely inaccurate. It defines a theological term by its secondary and applied meaning, not by its primary and root meaning. The *root* meaning of appealing to *auctoritas* is the idea of transferring the responsibility for an action to somebody else who stands behind you and is prepared to take the blame if anything goes wrong; and the Catholic notion of a belief or a practice having "authority" is strictly analogous to the old-fashioned Protestant notion of finding "warrant" for a thing in Scripture. But we are discussing things, not words. And there is an ultimate and fatal difference between an authority which you can trust absolutely and an authority on which you merely rely, when it serves your turn, to favour an opinion.

This new conception of authority *disturbs the whole equilibrium of theological certainty.* It means that the theologian has not merely to ask himself whether Scripture, the Councils, the Popes, the Fathers held this or that doctrine, but whether they were right in holding it. And that is to transfer the whole onus of decision ultimately to the shoulders of the individual. You have dethroned the Church from its positions as a teacher; you accept it only as an adviser. There is no longer any canon of orthodoxy; faith has no longer a Divine Veracity, but the guesses of the human reason as its object; you can no longer use the term "heresy" at all, and the condemnation of Arius and Nestorius was a flagrant injustice—why should not they, like any other man,

have the right to disagree with the traditions of the past, if those traditions seemed to them unacceptable? What a monstrous sin against charity, that Bishop Colenso should be cut off from the communion of the Church, merely because he disagreed in a theological matter with his fellow-bishops!

Let us put the case in the concrete. Is there a hell? The authority of our Lord's own words is pleaded. But may he not have "thought with the mind of his times?" Or at least have accommodated his language to the language of his times? And are we certain that he was correctly reported? In face of such criticism, appeal is made to the authority of the Church; all the fathers seem to have understood our Lord as meaning that there was a hell, and its eternity was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council. Yes, but is not that what we should have expected of the Fathers, with their fondness for literalism in interpretation, for rigorism in morals? Is not that what we should expect of the gloomy pietism of the Middle Ages? We take, nowadays, such a different view of punishment; we have so much more generous a conception of justice—why should we not come to the conclusion that Popes and Councils and Fathers were wrong?

I was once in a position to put this very difficulty to an eminent Anglican theologian. He replied, pointing to his chest, that there was "something in here" which ratified, for him, the judgment of the Church on the

subject, and he felt justified in preaching the doctrine of eternal punishment for that reason. But this means, it is evident, that there must be a private Urim and Thummim behind every clerical waistcoat, which is, for the wearer, the last court of appeal. I cannot distinguish such a view from the most extreme form of Protestantism; in my thought, it is private judgement, naked and unashamed. And I would never mount a pulpit again if I thought as these modern Anglicans do. To assert the truths of Christianity as if they were known fact, with a mental reservation which tells you that in the last resort it is a matter of private judgement whether they are true or not, is to me nothing else than a hypocrisy. During the five years of my active Protestant ministry I supposed, always, that the truth of what I preached was guaranteed to me by an infallible revelation. I held the Nicene Creed to be as certain as the principle that two and two makes four. True, some would have it that this certainty derived, not from the voice of the Councils themselves, but from the subsequent acceptance of their decisions by the faithful. I could never understand this qualification, which seemed (and seems) to me to involve a flagrant circular argument. But I did not think of myself as peculiar or insulated, when I adhered to this notion of infallible certainty; it was a normal point of view, twenty years ago. To-day, it would appear that the successors of the Tractarians have abandoned it,

and have adopted an attitude which differs only in the details of its application from that of Dr. Barnes.

I do not understand what is meant by the word "faith," if it does not mean accepting as true a humanly unknowable fact on the ground that it has been revealed to you by a God who cannot deceive. And I do not see any method in which God could reveal such facts to mankind which does not involve the mediation of an infallible teacher, whether it be Church or Book. I know that the enemies of infallibility have devised various sophistries to discredit it, and I therefore subjoin a brief consideration of them, though I cannot pretend that they ever impressed me, even as a Protestant.

(1) "Your knowledge that the Church is infallible is based on a series of human arguments; and these are fallible; thus your infallibility is tainted at its source." Of course it is true that the certitude with which we hold revealed truths is greater than the certainty with which we believe the arguments which dispose us to accept revelation; if it were not so, there could be no need of a supernatural grace of faith. But, apart from these questions of theology, it is not difficult to see that the man who refuses an infallible Church because he has not an infallible reason to accept it with is like a man who should refuse a strong rope, when imprisoned in a burning house, because his arms were so weak. As a matter of mere logic, the difference between the

Catholic and the "liberal" attitude is plain. The Catholic (by the use of his reason) is led to believe in an infallible Church which is thenceforward, for him, the rule of faith. The "liberal" (by the use of his reason) is led to believe in a fallible church, whose doctrines he is free to accept or reject according to the caprice of his individual constitution. He is left to decide, by the light of "something in here," whether the tradition of the doctrine of the Trinity is true or not. And for myself I have nothing "in here" which would inform me whether there are three Persons in the Blessed Trinity or thirty.

(2) "It is possible for theologians to disagree, some affirming and some denying that a given utterance from Rome is infallible. Thus your certainty in each case rests on the fallible judgement of certain theologians." It might as well be urged that a man cannot tell the hour from his watch because he is not certain whether it is accurate to the minute. The important thing for us is that the voice of authority is there, ready to give an infallible decision if the dignity of the occasion should demand it. And it is evident, as a matter of common sense, which way the decision would go, if the solemn judgement of the Church were invoked. It is obvious, for example, that our Lady's Assumption would be asserted with the same emphasis as her Immaculate Conception, if theologians were found to doubt it; and accordingly (even apart from the witness of the

ecclesia orans) no instructed Catholic would be foolish enough to deny it.

(3) "Since this power of infallible decision rests with the Pope, why has he not given us an infallible decision about vexed questions of the day, e.g., the transformist doctrine of evolution?" One might speculate as profitably why the Fathers of Nicea did not settle once for all the dispute over the authenticity of Homer. The charisma of fallibility is not to be conceived as a kind of thinking-cap which the Holy Father can put on whenever he finds himself in two minds over a difficulty. His office, like that of the bishops assembled in council, is to declare faithfully the doctrinal tradition handed down to him by his predecessors in the Roman See. If a controversy arises, he does not expect to receive sudden illumination from a dream or a vision; he sets out to judge the matter by ordinary prayer and study; and if it seems to him that there is nothing handed down in the deposit of faith which tells one way or the other (as in the famous controversy *de auxiliis*), he refuses to offer a solution.

In writing this essay, I have confined myself to those considerations which weighed with me personally when I found myself faced with the alternative of Lambeth or Westminster. I wish that I had space to treat the subject from a different angle, recording instead the considerations which, since then, have made me rejoice over the decision I was enabled to take. The convert,

after all, has this advantage—that he knows the facts of the situation on both sides; knows more about the Church of England as a living reality than the "born Catholic," more about the Catholic Church as a living reality than one who has never entered it. As it is, I can only summarise a few impressions, lest it should be supposed that the consolations of the Catholic life are merely an exercise in logic.

(1) I find an abiding satisfaction, as a Catholic, in the sense of continuity with the past. True, before I was a Catholic I defended in theory the "continuity" of the Church of England, but I knew in my heart that I was doubly divorced from history. As an Anglican, I held no brief for the pre-Reformation Church; when it was vilified, my withers were unwrung. And as a High Churchman I disapproved of all that had happened since the Reformation. That is all very well as an undergraduate pose; but maturity demands some deeper loyalty than mere love of a party. Why is it, that when Dr. Coulton (for example) criticises the medieval Church, the Anglicans, who are so loud in their protests of continuity, never take up the cudgels in defence of their supposed past? "Happy is the nation" it has been said "which has no history"; but it seems to me now an inglorious destiny, to live without any instinctive piety towards an earlier Christendom.

(2) At the same time, however paradoxical it may appear, my change of religious obedience brought with

it a sense of deliverance from the dead hand of the past. Laborious appeal to precedent, strained interpretations of Reformation history, the cumbrous trappings of Establishment—all these fell away; and you were conscious that the Church of your new allegiance *lived*, was capable of adapting herself to meet a situation, had her finger on the pulse of the present, was ready-armed against the future. Venerable in her associations, she was yet tirelessly young.

(3) As an Anglican, I boasted myself a member of the Church Universal, and therefore one in sentiment with Continental Catholics. But once I knew in my heart that the bond was an ideal one; I did not really belong to their polity, thrill with their triumphs or sympathise with their misfortunes. To become a Catholic is to be initiated into a world-fellowship, living, actual, conscious. The point is too obvious to need development.

(4) I have never been able to analyse the curious feeling of *freedom* which usually comes to the convert, when the exact opposite might have been expected according to any human calculation. An absence of self-consciousness and pose about one's religion, a sense of naturalness—at least to one who has been accustomed to the perpetual tight-rope walk of the conscientious High Anglican. I will not labour the point, lest I should multiply offence; I have recorded it, because it is so often supposed to be a fading illusion of the

newly received; but in the experience of converts it is not so.

(5) As a Catholic, too, you acquire, somehow, a long perspective. Your mind is taken up into the ages, and contemporary movements, whether they be favourable or adverse to the cause of religion, are viewed more calmly, because the background against which you see them is that of two thousand years, not that of a century or two. And this makes for an interior peace, which you will often forget in the strain of conflict, but it will return.

(6) At the same time—and this, I suppose, is only an accident of age and country—a convert to the Church in modern England feels that he has rejoined a body which is regaining its energies, after leaving a body which has run its course, and outlived the conditions it was created to serve. I would not lay too much stress on this sentiment, which the events of the past few years may have artificially exaggerated. But the fact that the Catholic body, in the centenary year of its emancipation, baptized one in every twelve children born in England, necessarily provokes thought.

(7) Submission to the Church is sometimes, for the very reasons given above, represented as an act of cowardly self-indulgence. "You are leaving the battle-field," we are told, "just when your services are needed, because you cannot bear to support a failing cause." It is not so that I understand the present position of Catholics.

Rather, it seems to me that by becoming a Catholic you range yourself, for the first time, in the true arena of the world's debate. In your earlier apprenticeship you were fleshing your teeth on shadows; you were planning for the success of a particular partisan movement, a minority itself within a Church which represents an ineffective minority among the population. Now you are taking your part, however undistinguished, in an Armageddon-fight between the old culture in which Europe was cradled, and the sharply defined materialistic forces of to-day. You have found peace by becoming a Catholic, but if you have bought ease by becoming a Catholic, it is your own fault.

It is easier to attack the Church than to defend it. An institution which has survived nineteen hundred years of chequered history, which has its representatives in every country under heaven, necessarily offers a generous target for attack. But if those contributors to the present volume who espouse the opposite cause could succeed in persuading me that their arguments were justified, they would not, I fear, have made a convert of me. They would only have added one to the number of those souls who have forfeited, God help them, the certitude of the Catholic faith, and are inconsolable over a lost romance.

IV

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

THE REVEREND C. C. MARTINDALE, S.J.

I

1

A REVIEWER of books once said to me that he preferred the French habit of using the first person singular in reviews, to our recurrent "we." I said "I" was too self-assertive. He said that it was really modest: "we" was pontifical: "I" committed no one save the writer. A man may well dislike talking about himself at all; but if he judges he ought to do so, he had better do it thoroughly. And if I have felt that after all I ought not to refuse the Editor's request, I dare not shirk plenty of "I" in these pages, and can but hope it will be due to modesty rather than to conceit; for, it shall imply that for better or worse these pages will contain a partial account of one person, and by no means an exhortation, and in no sense any suggestion of a rule to be followed by others. The request was, that I should state why I (1) became, (2) remain, a Catholic. I must then try to make a "partial" reply. Why partial?

Because were I to write merely the sufficient sentence—"The Grace of God"—no one would be much the wiser. And after all, Grace does not obliterate human nature, and each man is his Self. Grace must be responded to. On the other hand, in no circumstances am I bound to publish, nor would I ever do so, details (to me, very important and perhaps predominantly so) of what I would call "special graces," nor yet of special infidelities. You may judge that you have the duty of "bearing witness"—St. Paul, for example, certainly bore witness: still, he never catalogued his sins, nor yet said what he "experienced" in—say—Arabia, let alone in the third heaven. Not that I know anything about third heavens. Hence I suppose that I can truthfully make some statement about the natural substratum on which, or through which, Grace operated and operates.

II

Psychologists now demand to know all about your childhood. The pressures brought to bear on mine were those to be expected in a family thoroughly Victorian, and both worldly and sincerely evangelical as such families could be. This included the constant recognition of the Supremacy of God; a no less constant recognition of Sinfulness; a frequent reading of the Bible, in which Old Testament histories predominated; an absolute obedience to and reverence for your elders arranged in strict hierarchy; a somewhat resentful and

quite critical homage to be paid to clergymen; and the rigid acceptance of class-tradition, expressing itself in sentiments such as: "Little gentlemen never cry," so that the pain of a knock on your shin was as nothing to the pain of suppressing your tears. Not but what I wept gallons, mixed tears, tears due to pain that made me cry, tears due to shame that I was crying. The monumental sins were the breaking of a promise and telling a lie. I think I broke none, but I told thousands; though I dared not acknowledge this even to myself. And all this was suffused by the tenderness of the affection which enveloped me, to which no gratitude of mine can ever sufficiently respond.

The results of this would seem to have been that the thought of God has always been mixed up with all my other thoughts, or at any rate that it would have been very difficult to disentangle and extinguish it; nor have I ever been able to think of things save as right and wrong; and I have always loved the sonorous and humane and other-worldly and pathetic sentences of both Testaments; and I have been trained, I suppose, to submit easily to authority; and it is as impossible for me to be tempted to imagine that all men are "equal" as it is to suppose that because a man is socially eminent therefore he is the better man. I was taught to hold that the more indisputably a man was a "gentleman," the more rigid his obligations, and the more heinous his offences against any part of his code. Correspond-

ingly, I developed at intervals a great dislike for God; an inclination to do what I thought wrong, because I thought it wrong; an infinite boredom as regards the Bible; anti-clericalism; and the wish to break away from the framework imposed on me by Home. Even, an angry resentment of the spell that everything which set my emotions in play exercised upon me—for example, the tender associations of Sunday evenings, when affection was lavished upon me in an enhalo-ed way. I think, then, that my relatives prepared the way for their own dethronement, precisely because they were laying in me the foundations alike of loyalty to things substantial in the Catholic creed, and of something larger than anything that my home might offer.

III

When I went to my preparatory school, Temple Grove, I came across three books which left a dint upon me. One was Rider Haggard's *Cleopatra,* because it opened up an Egyptian world full of ancient mystery and fascination: I got an Egyptian grammar and learnt to read hieroglyphics and was able to flaunt a knowledge of something that, for once, my relatives did not know—oh so obviously!—better than I. I made a shrine to Isis and worshipped her devoutly. Lytton's *Last Days of Pompeii* made a bridge into the normal classical world: I felt far more at home there, already, than in the English world of history that they tried

to make me learn: hopeless, no colour in it; no real people. I felt I was nearly everyone in Pompeii. It is true that I also wanted to be Umslopagaas, if that is how he is spelt—anyway, a Zulu chief, attired in a moocha, and swinging battle-axes. Finally, I read Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities,* and it intensified my love for French things—(little as Dickens would have enjoyed hearing that), and in spite of his perfectly absurd portrayal of French people: this I instinctively corrected, for I have always been taught to talk French and had read dozens of French books, which, I am sure, helped me to get parts, at least, of the French, i.e., educated mind. For no one could possibly say I was being "educated" hitherto, save by the automatic pressure of a not ignoble home. Also I met two "High-Church" boys, who were very excited about ritual, and who dragged me after them in a sense—I say "in a sense," for the thrill I got from Christian ritual was much the same as I imaginatively derived from the pagan ones. This was, at the time, unimportant: what was vitally and eternally important was that I learnt, just then, the difference between praying and saying my prayers. Into the details of this I certainly need not go.

IV

I went then to Harrow, still attaching no meaning whatsoever to the words Roman Catholic and totally

uninterested in the Church in any form. Apart from fooling about with ritualistic services for the sake of my two friends, and to annoy my relatives, my religion was intense, unspeakably private and personal, full of imagination, chaotic, but suffused with sentiment, undogmatic altogether, barely Christian (save that I felt a great awe for the Name of Christ—his history did not interest me), and very prayerful. At Harrow, I was unhappy, being shy, weak, and therefore unathletic, clever and incredibly lazy, individualistic, and the perfect snob. Thrown back thus upon myself, I developed (I now observe) a prayer-life suited for the Catholic belief. From it, I single out a devotion to the Passion of Our Lord, to Our Lady (to whom I found a prayer in a novel) and even to her Immaculate Conception (a phrase I derived from an account of Lourdes in an illustrated weekly and afterwards from Zola's novel, which at least three people gave me when they began to think I was "becoming a Roman Catholic." Zola? Yes. Anything better than that a lad should become a Catholic) and to the notion of penance. Oddly enough, I had for years prayed for my mother's soul, though I knew nothing of Purgatory; and similarly, I had developed the notion of sacramental communion, though of the doctrine of this I still knew nothing. Certainly I began to haunt Churches and music-halls during the holidays, being inexpressibly bored in the country, where the social framework exasperated me. I

was accordingly given by several more people Littledale's *Plain Reasons against Joining the Church of Rome,* which taught me far more about the Catholic Church than anything had, hitherto, and out of which I began to say the Catholic prayers that he holds up to reprobation. I thought them scandalous and delightful.

How naturally so much introspection and effort in prayer and interest in penitential practices might have turned, at least intermittently, to much harm, is obvious. Whether it did, or to what extent, I need not say. I am committed merely to indicating structural elements in a development, and their upshot.

V

At Harrow, love for both Latin and Greek classics, inaugurated at my private school, increased. It had two substantial consequences. First, I had always been half-hypnotised by the spirit and atmosphere of Vergil; I did not care twopence about the Roman Empire as such; but the way in which he saw the Roman Empire helped me enormously to a vision of a divine and Roman world. I was to find no shock in passing from Vergil to St. Augustine. I insist very strongly upon this—a thing which it was obviously hopeless to begin, even, to explain to quite unclassical-minded relatives. Moreover, as the years passed, I was made to prepare for scholarships (none of which I won: I was far too dilettante and too lazy), and so, I read snippets both of

Plato and Aristotle, or at least read about the latter. Hence I hatched very easily the idea of a Truth that was true in itself, and because I inherited it from my family or because it was put forward by my nation. Priggish as it may sound, I obtained from Vergil and from Plato the conception of Reality and Truth, and of Truth cosmically incarnate, Roman-wise incarnate. What shy, rather angry, most uncomfortable boy could explain such things to anybody? Besides, at any time I would have preferred the mask, and to disguise a sentiment in proportion as it was personal. There were so many masks one could easily assume according to the person one was talking to—high-churchism, agnosticism; Yellow-Book-ism; worldly-wisdom-ism and the like—and you must remember that in 1896 or so young men were very worldly-wise, very world-fatigued indeed. . . . However one's elders no doubt saw through parts of one quite easily, save in so far as they had no notion of what the *Res Catholica* really meant, and still thought all sorts of queer sectarial things about the papal Church.

I have to acknowledge, during the last two years or so at Harrow, a double mood, or rather, violently conflicting attractions. One was to the decadent agnosticism proper to the time, played up to quite substantially by these same Roman and Greek and therefore pagan interests; the other was due to the spell cast upon me by Our Lady of Lourdes, which I have no

doubt at all was supernatural and miraculous. I could not possibly be guilty of the outrageous ingratitude which would be implied by my omitting this. I had met, or re-met, a cousin who had become some time before a Catholic; she was a lady well over sixty—the surmises of people who knew neither her nor me had therefore their piquancy. I thought her, moreover, rather silly; nor was she indeed an intellectualist. She was, however, holy: she prayed for me and caused nuns and children to pray for me. She lent me two Catholic books which appeared to me to be full of special pleading and beside the point, so far as I was concerned: for it was anyhow, by now, something quite different from Anti-Anglicanism that I wanted, since, as I said, my hereditary religion appeared to me hopelessly false precisely because departmental—any proper religion must be Universal, and positively alien to what might be English as such. For England had lasted as such but for a little time, and was on the fringe of the world even so. Books therefore which simply occupied themselves with showing that Anglicanism was wrong, had no interest for me, as they have not now. But since the Roman books seemed to me hardly to touch upon this more general aspect of the problem, and to misunderstand even the departmental one, it was easy to sink for a while into the subjectivist, disillusioned, flattering mood of contemporary agnosticism. I had met only one priest, and him I disliked politely.

VI

From this dream various events awakened me. Unnecessary to relate them. I saw clearly that the Catholic creed was *believable:* indeed, that not to believe it meant a complete intellectual and moral disarray, so far as I at any rate was concerned. This did not in the least mean that I began to believe it. I must now insist most strongly that Catholics hold their Faith to be perfectly reasonable, and that the arguments for it cannot be rebutted while the arguments against it can. But they also hold that the act of Faith, believing (that is to say) as on the word of God that the contents of the Faith are true, is not merely the product of arguments. You can see all the arguments quite clearly, and yet not believe. The act of belief involves, we hold, God's Grace. I can only state that this was given me. What was believable became believed. After a while, I was able to seek instruction in the Catholic Faith, so that I might not only be able to give an "account," a *logos,* to myself, on official and sanctioned lines, of the faith that was now in me, but also, to give it, as St. Peter says we should do (according to one's stage of mental development) on each several occasion to anyone who asks it. I agree readily that I listened to arguments earnestly rather than eagerly: I was glad to find them, so it seemed to me, irrefutable, but I did not need them. The world had fallen into shape, and

I could not pretend it had not done so: the face had revealed itself among the branches of the puzzle-tree; I could not cease, now, to see it. But it was not just a matter of clear vision.

As I said, a neat intellectual pattern has nothing to do with faith; or rather, will be found underlying faith, but is not faith, any more than a map is a country. Already, I think, I had liked to consider the hyperbola —a hyperbola is a curve such that it approaches ever closer to the straight line of the asymptote; but never can the two lines coincide. Let the truth of Faith lie upon the asymptote; the facts of evidence on the hyperbola. The facts will bring you closer and closer to the asymptote, but you will need the snatch of the divine hand to carry you across. Only "at infinity," only in the beatific vision, will you see the Whole in perfect harmony though not even then identified. Possibly too I had then thought about that interesting figure the ellipse—I know I had done "conic sections," as they called them then, and had constructed some sort of symbolism by their means. The point, whose motion traces the ellipse, swings round about two foci. The attraction of each is equal, so that when the point seems about to fall into one of the two foci, the attraction of the other is always just sufficient to prevent its doing so. Hence it swings for ever round the two attracting foci. So, my mind might have swung for ever around the two magnetic poles—the Faith, and Agnosticism,

had not the divine attraction of the former suddenly intensified itself. But the moment the attraction of one of the two foci becomes ever so little stronger than that of the other, it tugs the travelling point in swiftly narrowing curves till it falls straight into the now masterful focus. I could have swung for ever, I presume, around the magnet of the Faith, and that of sweet, regretful Unbelief—yet no: for had the Call of God not intensified itself, it would have weakened: it could not have stayed immutable: I would have fallen into that practical materialism which is the easy recourse of the indolent.

Hence I became a Catholic, hating it: full of the horror of the definite, the concrete, the irrevocable, which marked that period; I struggled hard against that self-commitment which is involved in the assertion that this or that is true, this or that is right. It was my first great lesson that rejoicing in a thing is far from the same as liking it—and in view of this great and deep-seated conflict between what you know, and what you feel, what you love and what you like, I waste no time in underlining my mere æsthetic recoil from all the exterior side of "Catholicism" as the level of English taste than offered it to me; I was always feeling that my critics were so totally at sea that it was no good arguing with them, but never were they more so than when they blandly said that I was attracted by the "glamour" of Rome, the ritual of Rome, the

emotionalism of the Church. In a word—the world into which I came seemed to me, exteriorly, the last word in vulgarity. Poor little waif! Lonely little snob! Somewhere deep inside me was a most firm skeleton both of thought and of choice—the vision in its enormous outlines, the Spirit in its minimum vast tug, were there just as they should have been; but how much more fluff would I have liked; how much more flattering and graceful a welcoming; and how very very little did I get, thank God.

II

I

The second part of the question proposed to me was: "Why *are* you a Catholic?" In answering the first half —"Why did you become a Catholic?"—I said that to reply: "The Grace of God summoned me to do so; and, helped by the same Grace, I freely obeyed" would have been sufficient. None the less I could assign certain facts or mental movements, so to say, which facilitated obedience, predisposed me to obedience, though like all material or even like most mental facts they were able to work in either direction: all those experiences could have led me to become anything rather than a Catholic, save (presumably) a dogmatic atheist or materialist, which, just because it was dogmatic would have been just as bad. I confess, too, that

atheism being merely negative and therefore dead, and materialism much the same, I could never have been attracted to them, since I liked and like what is alive and human. I suppose a sort of humanism would have been the real option; and had it been my fate, I should have become as melancholy as humanists always have been and are. Hence no sort of psycho-analytic explanation of "conversion" can be constructed out of what I have said above, nor could it be, even with the help of those episodic experiences good or bad which I have omitted. Again, the adequate answer to: "Why *are* you—why do you continue to be—a Catholic?" would be: "Because the Grace of God seeks to keep me one, and helps me to play my part in remaining one": but I suppose that I can make some statement of what in me gladly welcomes the divine offer; and of what is stimulated, pacified, enriched, co-ordinated, exalted, established, governed, and made that which alone it was meant to be, by God's gift, for which I render to Him sole honour, glory, and gratitude.

II

Nothing will ever persuade me that I am not alive. "I." I, therefore, body and not-body. Nothing will make me suppose that my body is not different in essence from my thought, nor, that each is not "part" of "me." Nor will I believe that nothing save my self exists—be it matter, like part of "me," or spirit like

part of "me." Nor yet, that I am complete: I am growing, anyway changing. Realism, therefore. Anything that affects me as "unreal," makes me, honestly, feel ill. I get nervous; or I go to sleep. Hence, motion. I never thought of a circle as a pin-point with a line round it. I always thought of it as a force radiating equally in all directions—in fact a circle moved me less than a sphere. . . . "Moved" me. Exactly. If a thing is not vital like myself, and more vital than myself, it is but little of a thing! How then I must leap towards God—supreme Reality, Source of Life, essential Act and Agent! (In five thousand words I presume I am not expected to fill in the steps of the argument. Anyway, it would be rather letting down a ladder from the place I have leapt to, that others might climb, or, that I might show I could have climbed had I wanted to.) But, as I said, reality is everywhere in due measure; and while I welcome every discovery (or hypothesis) of scientific men that suggests to me reality ever deeper-latent, and forces unsuspected, and growth, and while to touch "life" is for me all but touching God, I cannot but feel forthwith a special reverence for Man, that is, for my fellow-men—a special reverence, not an exclusive one, nor yet a supreme one—not exclusive, for, I have said, all that is must be in its measure "in God's image" and His manifestation, though living things especially; not supreme for never have I been tempted to the arrogance (idiotic, as all

arrogance in men like us would be) of supposing that men are the highest possible or even the highest existing manifestations of God's power and wisdom. I should be disconcerted, shocked, and grieved were I to be credibly assured either (i) that there are no higher existences than man, or (ii) that man's existence is to be rounded off in these few years "on earth." Nor need I believe anything so provincial or so glum.

But since I therefore see all that is as a mighty and complex Unity in intention and destiny—a Unity, Harmony, therefore, in God's Mind and in process of formation by the action of his Will, with which, in man, created wills must freely co-operate—and since I expect therefore the maximum of divine unificatory Activities, and the verification of this activity upon all planes according to the nature of each, I could almost expect, possibly pray for, welcome when I am told of it, an Incarnation. For though without Revelation I would not know that this was actually possible, let alone that it had actually occurred, obviously I am so prepared in mind and desire that when I am so told, by whatever seems to have the right to tell me, I greet the Fact with an overwhelming joy.

III

It follows that I am not shocked by the Divine manifesting itself through, and making the maximum of use of, the Material. People who talk of a "purely

spiritual" religion, talk of something that would be perfectly useless to mankind and that in reality professes a contempt for matter. God forbid any such contempt! I would be surprised and bitterly disappointed were God to inform me that though I am a man, and though He has taken up human nature by means of the Incarnation, no further attention to the more material elements in creation is to be paid. I have senses, instincts, a reason, a will, a social urge which drives me into associations and even makes me form them where they are lacking. I expect, then, not only permission to use exterior forms of worship, but that the divine initiative, and not merely sanction, will provide me with sacraments, sacramentals, and symbols, all of them in various ways the vehicle of a reality richer than they, not that they are not real. I expect, further, to be able to use my mind on all this, and to construct a truthful human intellectual version of the Divine Thing. I correspondingly expect what are technically called Mysteries, that is, Truths that the human intellect can understand sufficiently, but never may exhaust. God Himself is true in this manner, and supremely so. My intelligence is real, and truthful by nature (however much it needs to be trained and informed), but it is a half-way creation; and however exalted even the angelic intelligence may be, it never can be other than created, and therefore, never co-intelligent with the Divine. I expect, further, to have

a code to which I must conform by will and its choices —I foresee, and need, not only a speculative, but a moral philosophy. And finally, I would be shocked were the Divine Fact not to work itself out also in an Association, a Church, including all that human societies do include, an element of subordination among their members—hierarchy therefore and Government—and the need of a continual adjustment of the individual to the Whole.

IV

In the world of experience, I also cannot but notice "wrongly." Some of it is produced by mis-use of human wills. Hence I observe in and outside of myself what I call Sin. Hence I am not surprised to find everything that ought to follow from so grave a dislocation—ignorance, pain, enmities. I shall then expect two things —first, that the Divine Will towards harmony, truth, love, peace, maximum life, is to conquer (though without any coercion of freedom); second, that the process of this achievement will involve conflict, and therefore suffering. Already on my knees before the mystery of the Incarnation, I am prepared to prostrate myself face to the earth in view of the probability of the Passion. I am grateful for the promise of my own high destiny, by way of the Incarnate; but I must needs recognise it as a Resurrection; and no resurrection is conceivable without some manner of Death. Hence both the Cruci-

fixion of Christ, and my own duty of dying to all selfishness—dying with great difficulty—seem quite natural to me. But each would be an outrage upon all that is deepest in me, were not each to be followed by the triumph of the "more abundant" Life. While, on the one hand, this would always have been clear to me—that the maximum Life—the maximum union with God and all that else exists "in" God—was, first, obviously intended and therefore possible, and, second, was corresponded to by the maximum disunion from God, un-intended, but possible—on the other hand, what I could never have foreseen, but might confusedly have sighed towards, is, a Maximum-Life that should not indeed be the very Life of God—for God I can never be—but should be a Life so "super-natural" that by no manner of means could my human life be just "improved into it." It would need to be given me by free Gift, Grace, an over-brimming bounty on the part of God. But precisely this is what the Catholic Faith, "exceeding all the imagination of the heart" and even those desires that it is too timid to form, sets forth before me. I am told that I may indeed foresee not only the possibility of an enduring disunion from God, but the possibility of a total union with Him, and through Him with all that is true and good, such as to exceed the entire possibilities of my human nature apart from the special Grace of Him who loves it—loves me—so that He exceeds all that human nature

might expect, let alone deserve or aspire to, in the line of Life.

V

I suppose I must repeat that these are not my reasons for being a Catholic; but at the least they are part of my reasons for not being anything else. The whole of my intelligence and my personal "make-up" would be affronted by atheism, and by any departmental cult. Hence while I have to leave atheism altogether alone, as negative and dead (and, to my mind, just silly—so silly, that I do not believe anyone can be a dogmatic atheist with intellectual decency), I can respect and must transcend all those departmental cults. I respect them as containing a departmental truth, much as I respect an amœba for being not quite devoid of life. (My respect for the cult may be a minimum, but any spark of life is God-given, and must receive real homage; besides, for the honourableness, the sorrows, the secrets of the members of such cults, I have all the respect and affection that the living individual always claims.) I can acknowledge the element of positive substantial truth, or desire or instinct for it, in, say, spiritualism, Christian Science, even Theosophy, not to allude here to "pagan" religions. The one system for which I find it difficult to have either respect or patience is Modernism, though I confess it is not a "system" and certainly not "one"—precisely because it is the disintegra-

tion of a "system" or reasonable unity. Again, individual "modernists" may claim respect and even admiration; for, finding themselves, they know not how, not in possession of a solid living thing, they may be trying to compose some such thing—as hopeless a thing as to try and compose real life in a laboratory. But if they have been dislodged from a real Catholic Faith by historical, psychological, even philosophical arguments, I see in the results mere putrefaction. Modernism is at all points less real, less "one," less alive, than the total *Res Catholica,* and I cannot see how one can alter backwards, from the possession of the Catholic Faith into modernistic who-knows-what, unless for some reason God have withdrawn His grace.

I pray that there may be other explanations, as there certainly are in the case of modernists who never were Catholics. Hence it must be clear that what alone could suit my narrower, lower, undeveloped self, would be a humanist agnosticism, and by no means a cult of any sort. But if I have not shrivelled into contentment with any such thing, I at least beg that I be not supposed to be a Catholic out of any mere craving for Authority-at-all-costs, to which people constantly explain conversions to be due. I do not believe in God because I am frightened, nor because I am thrilled by Nature, nor because my ancestors did, nor because one must "begin somewhere." I do not believe in my immor-

tal soul because I am afraid of dying out, or have seen ghosts (I haven't, or want to meet my "dear ones" again, or reflect my experience of "this" life into every future. I do not believe in sin and its eternal sanctions because distant aunts or proximate priests stand over me with a black thorn and threaten me. I do not accept a discipline taken in the lump, its credentials unexamined, because I expect I should be a bad lot without it—dissipated in mind and behaviour. I do not construct a vision of a Catholic Church and jump to the conclusion that the Roman Church must be it, because I have "disregarded history," whether Christian at large, Scriptural, or pre-Christian. I perceive very clearly certain problems that I consider dignified, concerned with; for example, God Immutable and Creator; God Infinite; and Creation. Evil. Time.

But subsidiary considerations connected with, for example, the history of the Catholic Church, the character of Scripture, seem to me continually off the point and usually biassed when they are adduced against Catholic credibility, even when they are not grotesque, such as the un-Englishism of Rome, the Italianism of the Vatican, the Nordic race, or any which include phrases like "up to date," "this time of day," "the modern mind," "the contemporary conscience." Such catch-words do not at all interest me nor can they hold my attention for more than a mere minute. Dreadful thought—to be offered a religion that suited just "our

generation," not that there is such a thing as "our generation" save so far as the date goes.

VI

I must then finish by professing that I believe all that the Catholic Roman Church believes and teaches, because she teaches it, and in the sense in which she teaches it. I consider that the arguments adduced in favour of her claims are solid (though not coercive) and those adduced against them are flimsy (though sometimes plausible): I repeat, Faith is not the product of arguments; arguments show me that if I do believe, I am thoroughly reasonable in doing so, and even, that were I not to believe, I would be in face of a singular problem—I would have to wonder what obscure element in myself was setting my will against yielding to the pressure of those arguments, for, I would wonder, *if* they were so true as they appeared, why did not God give me, precisely, the help necessary to believe on His word in that which they supported. I would also perceive myself to be worse off at all points if I were deprived of anything in that total Fact which I like to call the *Res Catholica,* and indeed while I perceive good in all the sects, inasmuch as each holds to and makes use of some one element in the All-Inclusive Thing, I grieve that they must go without so much. I well understand that the vision of how much less all departmental faiths are, than the Catholic one,

can escape a man; and hence, I well understand why many an upright and intelligent man does not understand what the Faith is and offers: he has never seen it. But how a man, who has begun to see it, fails to desire it, baffles me.

At times I feel angry that men can live with so vast a thing so near them, and yet be perfectly blind to it —in error as to some of its most concrete and accessible doctrines and practices—for, I have usually observed, in very erudite and conscientious persons, not so much really "dignified" difficulties (as I have called them) in regard to the Faith, as naïve ignorances, comparable to those in men who should imagine that, for example, the king always wears his crown, or imagine he can never die. But experience teaches one how easily men can departmentalise their lives, fail to see what is great, because it is too large; what is obvious, because it is too clear. So easy is it thus to be without an appetite, even, for the soul's right food, that all the more must I be grateful that, owing to the no doubt Providentially directed education I received, and to the God-given temperament that is mine along with all its extreme inconveniences, I am *à terrain* prepared for some elements, at least, in God's great Gift; my instinctive love for reality; for vitality; for growth; for harmony—especially the harmony made between the material and the spiritual; my easy recognition that freedom is best ensured by discipline; individuality, by

co-ordination and indeed by incorporation; joy, by pain; resurrection, by crucifixion. Disloyal, cowardly, indolent as a man may tend to be, or be, perhaps in all such things God's grace and goodness triumphs the more splendidly, and that in itself will prove one explanation why such a man, why the obviously second-rate, may be the chosen material for that triumph, when in far better men God's triumph may remain latent or perhaps fail of its accomplishment, at least in this preface to life, which earth's years are.

Hence, having been asked a double question—Why did you become, why are you, a Catholic—I see that I have of course in no way answered it, but have stated the sort of fact which made it easier for me to become a Catholic not unintelligently, and makes my nature the happier now that God has given it so supernatural a gift.

V

WHY I AM A CATHOLIC

DROPPING THE HYPHEN

SHEILA KAYE-SMITH

A SUBSTANTIAL difficulty confronts me when I set out to tell why I became a Catholic. Because, virtually, the process with me was not a single step, but two. I actually became a Catholic when I joined the Holy Catholic and Roman Church, but long before that I had deliberately chosen Catholicism and to the best of my belief had practised it. My trouble was that I had sought it in the wrong place, and it was not till much sad experience had shown me it was not to be found in the Church of England that I became a Catholic in the full and technical as well as in the aspirational sense of the word.

This article then must have a limited appeal, since it does not tell so much why I am a Catholic as how having sought Catholicism in the wrong place I finally found it in the right one. It must presuppose a great deal—that my readers already know roughly what Catholicism is, and that they are not ignorant of the

history and ideals of the Catholic movement in the Church of England. I could, of course, begin at the beginning, but that would be too remote for my present purpose, and the approach of Catholicism out of official Anglicanism, out of Protestantism and out of nothing will doubtless be treated by other writers in this volume.

I can scarcely remember a time when Catholicism did not appeal to me as the only possible religion, even though I scarcely knew its name. I was brought up in moderate Church of England surroundings, but I can truthfully say that, from the moment I was old enough to think about such things I believed the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments, though the source from which I could have received any teaching is unknown to me. I took little or no interest in other forms of religion—it was Catholicism or nothing, though at first all I apprehended was the union of the outward and the inward in the sacramental system of the Church, gradually building of the rest of my faith round this central point, as is often the way of those who receive Catholicism piecemeal, instead of as an undivided body of teaching from an authoritative Church. In fact, it may be said that my final step of joining the Roman Communion was merely the completion of my growing Catholic conception by the addition of the doctrines of the Papacy and the Church.

I had been an Anglo-Catholic for about eleven years, for five of which I was very well satisfied with my

religion. I had spent those five years in a specially living and thriving parish, and at first the slow growth of the Catholic spirit within me allowed me to be content with parochial boundaries. It was not till I was forced out of those boundaries, to see the Church of England as a whole and Anglo-Catholicism under less favourable aspects, that I began to doubt if I had found or ever could find what I was seeking. At the same time, my craving for the Catholic religion, becoming not less but greater the more I saw of it, made it increasingly impossible for me to give up the search.

As I said, I write for those who are already following the gleam. The mind which sees anything "magical" in the sacramental union of matter and spirit, or "mumbo-jumbo" in the language of rite and sign, or "obscurantist" in the belief that laws of wonder yet unknown may occasionally alter the workings of laws that we know, or "savage" in the sanctification of instincts vital to our humanity and expressing themselves throughout history in inspired gropings after truth—such a mind will not follow me, for it has already finished before I have begun, and there is a gap between us which the limitations of my undertaking will not allow me to fill. I am trying to explain the ideas and processes that influenced me to those who have already gone some way with those ideas and processes, but are, I am convinced, searching, even as I searched, in empty places.

The event which definitely made me look towards Rome rather than towards Canterbury for the fulfilment of my aspirations was really a very simple one. In the summer of 1925, a friend who had been present at the canonisation rites of St. Thérèse of Lisieux brought me back a medal and a secondary relic, and also the wonderful story of her life and death, which I had never heard. From that moment Canterbury began to fade.

It is difficult to describe the impression this young Saint made upon me. It was not only the beauty of her life, the charm, wit and sweetness of her recorded words, or the lovely simplicities of her Little Way. It was rather the realisation of that sanctity, that heroic virtue, that sublime love, being offered to the modern world. Here was a saint who, if she had still been alive would scarcely have been old—a saint of our times, whose features and expression have been given us not only by the painter and ecclesiastical image-maker, but by the photographer. In Lisieux are still living those who knew her and spoke to her, including her own sisters; her canonisation miracles were not found in documents or in tradition, but on the lips of living witnesses. And when I looked at her I saw not merely herself but the living unfailing fountain of sanctity which is the Church that made her what she was.

Hitherto, I had often glanced towards Rome, but

had invariably brought myself to order with the words of a certain Anglican divine (I fear I have forgotten his name) to the effect that when Anglo-Catholics turn longingly to Rome it is nearly always a symptom of spiritual fatigue or coincident with a period of slackness. I had found this in my experience to be true. The Romeward glance had always been the result of some special disgust or impatience with the Church of England—it had looked for comfort, ease, efficiency, peace, rather than for holiness. But now a change had come; when I found myself looking towards Rome, not because I disliked the sight of the Church of England, but because a light had shone suddenly from the Seven Hills and had compelled my eyes.

At such an avowal I can see certain Anglican lips beginning to curl (Anglicans recently have been told that these times require a saint more specifically intellectual than St. Thérèse) and it may appear extraordinarily naïve even to Catholics. But these must imagine (if they cannot remember) what it is like to live in a religious community which has made no addition to its calendar of saints for over three hundred years. In the Church of England one is given the impression that sanctity as well as miracles came to an end with the early Church. The Anglican calendar is astonishingly poor and bare—it was drastically cleared after the Reformation, and no name has since been added to it (with the doubtful and disputed exception of King

Charles the First), till the Revised Prayer Book cautiously inserted a few commemorations, the latest of which is some five hundred years old.

I shall naturally be told that sanctity is not an affair of the calendar, and if the Church of England has no official saints later than the twelfth century, it does not follow that she fails to encourage or to recognise holiness but merely that she does not record and publish it. To which one simply retorts, Why not? Presumably a Church's greatest glory is her holiness, and her holiness is the holiness of her members. It seems strange that she should ignore and suppress her achievements in the only field where success is really worth while. One cannot imagine a country which should ignore its great men, its heroes, its poets, its philosophers and scientists. If one were, inconceivably, to hear of such a country, one would conclude either that it had no great men, or, worse still, that it was indifferent to their merits.

The Anglican Church certainly has its worthies. A score of names come at once into my mind—Andrewes, Herbert, Ken, Jeremy Taylor, Bishop King, Father Dolling, Father Stanton, and many others. These were all saintly men, who served God in their day, and whose memories are justly revered. But I would point out two or three facts about them—first, that the Church of England as a whole seems comparatively indifferent to their merits; they have no place in her calendar,

and indeed certain efforts to secure their commemoration have had to be dropped because of opposition; secondly, they are all in some sense Anglo-Catholics, and therefore not representative of the Church they illuminate, being centres of controversy rather than of devotion; thirdly, none would pass the canonisation tests of the Catholic Church, none is a Saint in the full, supernatural meaning of the word.

A good and holy man is not necessarily a saint. Sanctity in the full sense implies heroic virtue, an abandonment, holocaust of the whole life, something more than martyrdom, something which is completely and entirely not of this world, the consummation and triumph of supernatural grace.

This heroic sanctity is far beyond the sober standards of a good and pious life; it is genius as distinct from a pleasant talent for goodness; and if we compare the Anglican worthies with their contemporaries in the Catholic Church—Francis de Sales, Ignatius of Loyola, John Vianney, Theresa of Avila, Thérèse of Lisieux—it is as if we were comparing Addison with Shakespeare, William Hayley with William Blake, George Macdonald with Charles Dickens. Addison, Hayley and George Macdonald are all good men of letters, but if they were the highest that English literature had achieved, one would I think be right in holding that there was something in the climate, customs or mentality of England unfavourable to the literary art. In the

same way it seems that if such good and pious men as Andrewes, Ken, Dolling and the rest are the best that the Church of England can do in the way of saints, then here climate and mentality are unfavourable to the development of holiness. In other words, one of the Four Marks of the Church is lacking.

The test that Anglo-Catholics apply to any "branch" of the Church, to determine its life, is a purely technical one. Has it or has it not preserved the Apostolic Succession? Hitherto I had held the "churchship" of the Church of England to depend exclusively on the validity of her orders and sacraments. Roman Catholic controversy has only served to confirm Anglo-Catholics in their general belief that if it could be proved that even by chance the Church of England had preserved her orders in the technical sense of the word, then they would also have proved their contention that she is a branch of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. They have little or no idea of schism apart from the question of orders. More than once it has been said to me: "You have the sacraments; don't trouble about anything else"; and my question: "But am I in schism?" has been dismissed as beside the argument.

But at this point I came to ask myself whether it was likely that a merciful God would have left his children no means of recognising the truth without certain highly technical researches which the vast major-

ity of them are incapable of performing. I knew myself to be incapable of deciding such a technical matter as the validity of Anglican Orders, and yet there was little use in appealing to authority, for authority was divided. The authorities of my own Church naturally taught one thing, the authorities of the Roman Church another—so I was pushed back to another question, the question of authority. Before, not after, I could hope to decide the question of Anglican Orders I must decide on the authority of the Anglican Church. On what grounds am I accepting the authority of the Church of England in this matter of her orders? What are her claims to teach me on this point differently from the Catholic Church in Rome? What are her claims to teach me at all? She claims to be the Catholic Church in this country, though Rome says that she is not. How does she make good that claim? Does she show the Marks of the Church—is she One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic? Our Lord has said, "By their fruits ye shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?" Does the Church of England bear the mark of the true vine, which is not necessarily a luxuriant growth, a wide extension or a sturdy root, but grapes?

I set myself to examine the marks of the Church of England, having already found, in the light shed from Lisieux, that one of them was missing. I had seen that she is not holy in the sense that the Church of Rome

is holy. It did not require the same supernatural light to show me that she is not One. There cannot be, surely, any religious body holding together a wilder assortment of religious opinions than the Church of England. She is the home of chaos, and for this chaos the Catholic revival within her is largely and directly responsible. Before the Tractarians the Church of England may have been inert, but she was comparatively homogeneous; whereas now she is a mass of whirling atoms, a veritable explosion, as if the invading force of Catholicism had been too strong for her, and instead of having, as its supporters claim, raised her from the dead, had blown her to pieces.

Surely her most uncritical friend could not see in the Church of England the mark of Unity. When it comes to the mark of Catholicism, the issues are not so clear. She might claim it in that very variety which some call chaos, asserting that she does not cater for one type only but for all sorts and conditions of men, and pointing to the "rigid uniformity" of Rome as a definite mark of exclusiveness. But true Catholicism does not lie so much in outward variety as in a fundamental appeal which is common to all, and when we come to look for this in Anglicanism we see that it is lacking. The varied doctrines, customs and services of the Church of England do not appeal to anything resembling the variety of types that are attracted by the unity of Rome. On the contrary the Anglican Church is very

definitely the religion of a certain limited class and type.

The social limitations of her gospel had, indeed, always in some measure troubled my allegiance. She is so obviously the church of the upper and upper-middle classes. I do not mean that her clergy are not heroic workers among the poor—the work of certain Anglo-Catholics in the slums it would be impertinent to praise. But apart from the Anglo-Catholics, her attitude to the poor has always been a trifle condescending, and she has served them chiefly in the corporal works of mercy, ignoring their religious rights and aspirations. There is little of that cheerful mixture of rich and poor one sees in Catholic churches; the poor "know their place," and do not expect the same privileges as the rich.

The recent revision of the Prayer Book will teach them their places still more thoroughly. It is difficult, indeed, to see how, under the new conditions, many of them can expect any form of sacramental religion. As a prominent Anglo-Catholic once said in exasperation: "The result will be to excommunicate our working-classes. It is all designed for the Bishops' wives and daughters who want to go to 'The eight.'" Certainly the rubrics regulating Reservation will, if obeyed, effectually prevent any poor person's receiving Holy Communion in sickness or in the hour of death.

The Anglo-Catholics have done their best to abolish

these class distinctions, but they have been successful only to a limited extent, as the whole weight and tradition of Anglicanism is against them. In dealing with other forms of exclusiveness, they have failed altogether, and in some cases actually drawn the line more strictly. Besides class-distinctions, in the Church of England there are sex distinctions, and the Anglo-Catholics have failed completely to win the men of the country. Here and there, through the personal efforts of some gifted clergymen, the deficiency of men is not so apparent, but in the majority of Anglican congregations, High, Low, Broad and Moderate, it is glaring.

I used to believe it was because women are naturally more devout than men; but I do not think this argument will bear close inspection. It is rather that the quality of their devotion is different; it is more personal and at the same time less objective—hence their large response to Anglo-Catholicism, from which the men have kept for the most part aloof. That men have no objection to Catholicism in itself is proved by the attendance at Roman Catholic churches, where there is seldom an undue preponderance of women in the congregation. In most Anglican congregations the proportion of women to men must be something like four-fifths at the ordinary Sunday services. Here the Anglo-Catholics have failed as badly as the rest, and that in spite of the inducements they frequently offer the male worshippers in the shape of priority at the

altar, specially reserved seats, and even special times for confession. They have made no appeal whatsoever to the plain man, who has perhaps no special religious genius, but a soul to be saved like everyone else. The Anglican Communion as a whole ignores him sacramentally—he may be a sidesman or a churchwarden, but as a communicant he is rare, regarding communion as a privilege reserved for good people only. The Anglo-Catholics, while urgently desiring him have alienated him by their forced atmosphere of hothouse piety, the hectic and personal tendencies of much of their church life. Also he suspects them (wrongly if he is thinking of conscious processes) of being in bad faith. Altogether the Church of England has lost him, and has halved her catholicity by a sex.

Neither does it include the children. The attitude of official Anglicanism towards childhood has always been a mystery to me. Why a church which claims to base her practices on Scripture and the Book of Common Prayer, should exclude all young children from her altars, is a problem I cannot pretend to solve. It is probably part of her growing craze for intellectual subjectivism, of which children are notoriously incapable. But while she does so, I cannot see how she can seriously claim to be "catholic" in the inclusive sense of the word. Surely an Anglican altar is the most exclusive thing on earth, with its tiny proportion of men and its entire absence of children. "Exclusive Rome"

on the other hand feeds at her table both sexes and all ages, just as "the rigid uniformity of Rome" appeals to every variety of human class and type.

Here surely is the universal appeal, whereas the Church of England has only a limited appeal—to the leisured, to the good, to the grown-up, to the devout. Such an appeal scarcely bears the mark of Catholicism.

There remains the last mark of the Church—that by which she claims to be apostolic. I have already said that Anglo-Catholics have narrowed this down to the maintenance of an apostolic succession, but the term surely stands for more than that—for apostolic truth and teaching. Has the Church of England taught apostolic truth? I suppose that Anglicans as a whole are the worst taught community in the world. The average Anglican layman has only the sketchiest idea of his religion, and falls a victim to any stray wind of doctrine that may be blowing his way—hence the flourishing condition of theosophy, spiritualism, Christian Science and similar religions in this country. In addition to this, from a number of highly placed Anglican pulpits flows a stream of raw pseudo-scientific, pseudo-theological talk, supposed by the talkers and their hearers to be Modernism, though Tyrrell and Loisy might well protest at the abuse of the word. This is reported in the newspapers and still further sensationalised, till the plain man loses his last shred of faith, under the impression that this is what his intellectual

superiors have done long ago. In such sour fields do Anglican sheep find pasture.

> The hungry sheep look up, and are not fed,
> But, swoln with wind, and the rank mists they draw,
> Rot inwardly, and foul contagion spread;
> Besides what the grim wolf, with privy paw,
> Daily devours apace, and nothing said;
> But that two-handed engine at the door
> Stands ready to smite once, and smite no more.

Thus, when I came to examine the credentials of the Church of England in the light of reason, using the methods I should have used in any other test of genuineness, I became convinced that she was not what she claimed to be—the Church of this country. I had looked for her trade-mark, and it was missing—all four parts. She was not One, nor Holy, nor Catholic, nor Apostolic. The Catholic movement within her, to which for eleven years I had looked for her salvation, now seemed definitely to share her unchurching. Anglo-Catholics generally assume that they are exempt from the reproaches levelled at the Church of England as a whole; but they cannot very well stand without her. If she is not a Church, then no amount of Catholic faith or practice will make them Catholics, and I cannot believe that, even if it could be proved beyond all reasonable doubt that Anglican orders are technically valid, a Church which does not bear a single mark of a divine institution can yet be a Church merely by virtue of an external

rite. High Churchmen do not hold the doctrine of Intention in any Catholic sense of the word. They quite genuinely believe that if a form is susceptible of a Catholic interpretation that form may be validly used by some one who does not in any sense put that interpretation upon it—in other words that a Bishop who has no intention of ordaining a sacrificing priest can nevertheless by means of the Anglican ordinal (which is, to put it mildly, reticent on the subject) confer a sacrificing priesthood on a man who has no intention of receiving it. Such a belief would be altogether too magical for most Roman Catholics.

But Anglo-Catholics are the most optimistic people in the world, for they think that Rome will change, or at least that she will re-explain herself. They think that the flowers of Catholicism will bloom in the sand of the Dead Seashore of Anglicanism. They think that within a span of time they will convert the Anglican Church, or at least the greater part of it, and that then will come the day of corporate re-union, of a Uniate Church of England, keeping many of her local customs and privileges, but one again with that great Western Church towards which they have always looked with longing admiration.

It is the strength of these dreams which keeps Anglo-Catholicism alive. It is a movement made of dreams and unquenchable hope and the most disinterested loyalty. These men cling to a Church which has con-

sistently maligned and ill-used them, from whom they have not a ha'porth of worldly expectation, whose one cry to them has been to get out. They endure misunderstanding and obloquy in the hope that they may one day be able to restore to her the "lost beauty of her Catholic inheritance." It is an attitude which no Catholic can refuse to admire, however much he may be irritated by the characteristically English failure to face facts.

Anglo-Catholics hold that they have already changed the face of the Church of England, and certainly they have enormously quickened her religious activity, and improved the order and beauty of her services. But looking back on the days when I thought even as they, it seems to me now as if I had been one of a party of children planting flowers in the sand, by sticking in the stalks of flowers we had picked from somebody else's garden. These flowers have no root, and they cannot grow apart from the soil out of which they were taken; in the end the sea will come and wash them all away.

For in spite of these lovely decorations the Church of England is in many ways not better off, but worse off than she was a hundred years ago. If in some respects she had grown more Catholic-minded, in others she is definitely more Protestant. The use of private judgment has never been so widely abused as to-day, and by the Anglo-Catholics as much as anybody. Every

man picks and chooses just as much or as little as he likes to believe of the Catholic religion. There is not, as many Catholics think, a common standard of belief and worship among High Churchmen. Each man is a law unto himself. In the forefront of the movement are those who hold everything except the Catholic doctrine of the Church; at the back of it are those who, perhaps, hold only one or two specifically Catholic dogmas, such as the Real Presence or the duty of praying for the Dead. But even among the leaders there are strange instances of Protestantism. One prominent Anglo-Catholic, who had renounced all hope of promotion or of peace because he would not obey his Bishop by giving up Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament, told me quite frankly that he did not believe in hell. He did not seem to realise that the doctrine of hell stands on exactly the same ground as the doctrine of the Real Presence, and that to reject one while accepting the other is nothing else than Protestantism.

Almost every parish clergyman in the Church of England is a Pope infallible in his own parish, whose services he regulates, and in whose pulpit he preaches just so much or as little of the faith as he chooses to believe. The three Anglo-Catholic churches with which I have been most closely associated each taught a different religion—different not only in the ordering of the services but in teaching and outlook. The officials of the English Church are aware of this anarchy, but the only

means they can think of to remedy it is to delegate the power of the Parson to his Parochial Church Council, which may consist entirely of uninstructed persons, with more prejudice than information on religious matters. It is all chaos, chaos, chaos, and not the fruitful chaos of which worlds are born, but the dismal chaos of disintegration and dissolution, the decomposition of a limb which is cut off from the body, and is dead.

There are also the inroads of "Modernism" falsely so-called, which during the last thirty years or so has made as deep a penetration as Catholicism into the English Church, and, like the new Protestantism, has seriously affected the Anglo-Catholics themselves. The great cry of some of them now against Rome is "obscurantism"! They are no longer drawing the line between Rome and themselves at the Papacy or at Transubstantiation, but at the difference between an "enlighened" and a "reactionary" Catholicism. They imagine that Anglo-Catholicism is enlightened, free, and progressive, whereas Roman Catholicism is obscure, fettered, and reactionary. This is dangerous, because it is untrue. There *is* a difference between certain High Church presentations of the doctrine of the Real Presence and Transubstantiation, there *is* a difference between the Roman doctrine of the Papacy and the Anglo-Catholic theory of a primacy of honour. But it is not true that the Catholic Church is obscurantist, fettered or reactionary—it is an idea existing entirely in the Protestant

mind, and with that mind Anglo-Catholicism has once more identified itself.

It is unlikely then that, apart from other difficulties, the Anglo-Catholic dream of a corporate reunion with Rome will ever come true. Rome will never touch Protestantism or Modernism, and the growth of these has at least kept pace with the growth of Catholicism in the English Church. Besides, the idea is based on an unreality—the conception that the case of the Church of England is in many ways parallel with that of the Eastern communions which have been admitted by Rome as Uniats. These churches, besides being of unimpeachable orthodoxy, are historically as old as Rome; their traditions, customs and liturgies were in existence long before the schism which cut them off. To ask them to abandon their Greek liturgies and separate customs such as a married clergy and communion in both kinds, would be to ask them to make startling innovations in an unbroken tradition, and Rome has never been a violator of tradition or a despiser of antiquity.

It is quite useless to compare these Churches with the Church of England, whose separate liturgy, customs and discipline originated with her separation from Rome, and indeed in protest against Rome and in support of certain Protestant heresies. Re-union could only be on a basis of complete re-absorption, and submission, a return to the position she occupied before the Reformation, when, except for certain local uses which

had their counterparts in most countries, she was the same as the Church in France, in Spain, or in Italy, without any special practices or privileges.

What then is to be the future of this great movement, which has changed, in the sense that it has disintegrated, the Church of England? What are its future relations with the Church of Rome? It is difficult to say. It is much easier to say what almost certainly will *not* happen. Some Catholics seem to think that High Churchmen may in the end break away from Anglicanism and form a separate sect of their own. This is unlikely for two reasons: first, because Anglo-Catholics are not united among themselves—indeed their chief point of union is on the hither side of the hyphen, and were that removed, and their connection with Anglicanism severed, far from cohering in a new sect, they would probably disrupt in chaos. Second, they are the most uncompromisingly loyal people on earth, and the bad treatment they continually receive only serves to make them more determined in their purpose to plant their garden in the sand. Catholics born in the Church may find this difficult to imagine, but some others remember.

I doubt, also, whether Anglo-Catholics will ever in large numbers make their submission to Rome, partly because of this same invincible loyalty, and partly because most of them are temperamentally less Catholic than their practices and beliefs. They like to go their own way, to pick and to choose, to fight with authority,

to rule parochially. They are, as I have already said, Protestant at heart.

But Catholics can, I think, remove many obstacles and misunderstandings which are keeping back certain Anglo-Catholics who are not Protestants, who are not invincibly loyal or impracticably illogical but whose prejudices have been aroused by certain Roman Catholic methods of propaganda, and who consequently regard a change as in the nature of a leap from the frying pan into the fire. Without cherishing any more the vain dream that Rome can change her methods or explain her teaching, I still believe that certain individual Catholics may change their methods and explain her teaching more courteously. I know by experience that the truths of the faith may fall on the non-Catholic either as a shower of stones or as a shower of roses. Violent attacks on Anglican orders, as I said before, often do more harm than good. Attacks on Anglican good faith only serve to rouse irritation and antagonism. All that is required to win the allegiance of, I believe, a number of Anglo-Catholics is an Epiphany—a showing of Christ to the Gentiles.

That was the victory that overcame the world when the pagan religions fell, and the Roman Church rose out of the ashes of the Roman Empire—an Epiphany of Divine Light, an Epiphany of Him Who has promised that if lifted up He will draw all men unto Himself. Most spiritually minded Anglicans are sick and weary

of controversy, of worldliness, of modernistic marsh-lights that move hither and thither but lead nowhere. They are looking for the Star, and when they see it they will follow it.

PART II
WHY I AM NOT A CATHOLIC

VI

WHY I SHOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BECOME A ROMAN CATHOLIC

THE REVEREND W. ORCHARD, D.D.

THE statements in this book are by its very title advertised to be personal; therefore no apology is needed for the intrusion of the personal element and the emphasising of the personal point of view. But in this particular statement the personal element will probably be more marked than in any of the others, because the writer's position is not merely personal—it is intensely individual, and is perhaps quite isolated; for he speaks for no one but himself; he has no organised Church behind him, nor party which he represents; indeed, he sometimes wonders whether, even in the vast modern variety of Christian belief, there exists one other person who accepts so much of the Roman Catholic position and yet remains a non-Roman. Therefore, I have been careful in this personal contribution to discriminate my exact position from the outset: "Why I should find it *difficult* to become a Roman Catholic." For I could not write under any such title as: "Why I could never become a Roman Catholic"; I

could imagine many conditions under which I should find it possible or necessary to do so. Neither should I feel comfortable writing under the title: "Why I am not a Roman Catholic." It is conceivable that I might become one before I come to the end of this article; which confesses how near to becoming a Roman I often feel I am; though the "little less" may be "how far away!" I often wish that I had been born a Roman Catholic in a predominantly Roman Catholic country; for I was not—I only know that I should find it difficult to make a change. I am well aware that among those difficulties, pride or cowardice may play their part, even though I might find no trace of either. Nevertheless, it is possible to state, with some assurance of sincerity, that I am sure I shouldn't find it difficult to *be* a Roman Catholic, but only to *become* one. I have thought about that possibility hundreds of times, and have read every Roman apology I could lay my hands on. I know, too, that I myself should find it much easier to be writing on the other side. The passport of power and strength that would be gained is always most alluring. Why, then, do I remain where I am?

It has been suggested to me that the real reason why I do not become a Roman Catholic is either that I am one of those eccentrics who rejoice in taking up a peculiar and isolated position or that I am too personally involved in the work I am doing, and am unwilling to relinquish the position it gives me and sink my-

self in a wider communion. I need hardly answer anyone who understands what it means that my present position is far too lonely and difficult for me to rejoice in it; but I admit that there is considerable truth in my wanting to continue at my present work. For many years I have been convinced, and I have been endeavouring to persuade others, that there is no insuperable barrier between what is essential to Catholicism and what is vital to Protestantism. I believe that an unnatural divorce has taken place inside the Christian religion, and although it has been pushed to extremes by controversy, both sides are standing for something true and vital, but complementary rather than contradictory. I strive so to interpret Catholicism to Protestants as to show them that Catholicism enshrines and protects all that is vital to real evangelical faith, and this has often had considerable success with sincere and single-minded lovers of our Lord. I have had far less obvious success in persuading Roman Catholics that a great deal in the position of Protestants is due not only to ignorance, but to genuine fears, which Roman Catholic authorities could remove without violating a single one of their principles. If I became a Roman Catholic I could do this work no longer. Moreover, "conversions" only further exacerbate an embittered situation; and particularly the fact that they are called conversions; for this word has a widely different annotation on the opposing side.

Even if the hope of reconciliation that I am pursuing is chimerical, there are however wider aspects of my work which I fear I should also have to surrender if I became a Roman Catholic. I am naturally impressed with the primary need of persuading this generation that there is a God, that Christ is divine, or that any kind of Church is even a human necessity. The great majority of our people to-day are far away, not only from Roman Catholicism, but from Protestantism, and they have a good deal to accept before they can even come in sight of the things that divide us. Further, I am convinced of the need for confronting the vague religiosity, in which so many others are content to remain, with the claims of personal religion and the call of Christ.

If I were a Roman Catholic, these three main concerns of my ministry would be brought to a close. If I may judge from most Roman Catholic sermons I hear, I should have to confine myself to a much narrower set of concerns. I should no longer be able to address myself to the hostile, the indifferent or the half-convinced; the very fact that I was a Roman Catholic would make it impossible for me to get the hearing that I have hitherto been able to obtain. This may be due to the mere prejudice of the majority of my countrymen, but I have to take them as I find them.

I am well aware that no consideration of the work one is doing, or supposes one is doing, should settle

the question whether one should or should not become a Roman Catholic, and I am not giving this as a sufficient reason for remaining where I am.

There are, however, other consequences of crossing which I should find more difficult to reconcile myself to than a restricted audience on a narrower platform. I find no difficulty in accepting the whole of Roman Catholic doctrine, as defined, including the infallibility of the Pope. Nevertheless, I am compelled to distinguish between the statements of defined doctrine, authoritative teachers and saintly mystics and the statements which I often hear in Roman Catholic pulpits or read in their popular books of devotion and propagandist tracts. The general religious attitude which seems to prevail amongst considerable numbers of the Roman Catholic laity I find a great stumbling-block; and it seems to me to be fostered by the emphasis placed upon the formal acceptance of doctrine and the performance of external practice, and the absence of a sufficient balancing insistence upon the interior apprehension of faith and the need for its expression in personal and social life.

Perhaps some instances should be given. I find no difficulty in the Tridentine definitions as to what takes place in the consecration of the bread and wine in the Mass; but I very much doubt whether the popular understanding preserves the Tridentine balance which, in its main statements, is careful to insist that it is the

substance of the bread and wine which is changed, and this becomes the *substance* of the body and blood of our Lord. If "substance" was omitted on either side, I take it we should be presented with an entirely different explanation. I therefore welcome the doctrine of transubstantiation, because it relieves us from any idea that in receiving the Sacrament we shall be consuming the accidental qualities of Christ's flesh and blood. But the very word "substance," even when it is carefully insisted on, is unfortunately liable, because of its modern connotation, to crude and carnal conceptions. It is because of this that transubstantiation is so feared and hated by Protestants; the term substance is entirely misunderstood by them; but I am not at all sure that all Roman Catholics understand it: which thus leaves room for gross and misleading notions.

Again, I find no difficulty in accepting the theological definition of the position awarded to the Blessed Virgin, Mother of Our Lord; and this, right up to the declaration of the Immaculate Conception, which, I understand, really only involves that something was granted to her by anticipation similar to what Christian Baptism bestows upon us all—namely, freedom from original sin. I think it is impossible to exaggerate the position she has among the saints who now intercede for us in glory, who was chosen to be the Mother of Him who is Very God of very God. Nevertheless, I should find it difficult to use some of the prayers ad-

dressed to her, which seem to me to pass beyond the asking of her prayers and to become petitions addressed to her, and sometimes apparently with the idea that they have more efficacy when addressed to her than if addressed to her Divine Son. I do not feel very comfortable in joining in the Litany of Loretto, when that is recited before the Blessed Sacrament exposed for worship. I trust I am not grudging or envious of the theological position given to the Blessed Virgin; indeed, I am gratefully conscious of the elevation of our humanity involved in her exaltation; but I am jealous for the honour and place given to our Lord Himself. I do feel, in the popular devotion to Mary, something which not only enters into competition with the Divine but even threatens to eclipse it.

Again, I do not find any difficulty in the definition of the infallibility of the Pope. Unless the Church can lay down what is of faith, I do not see why I should listen to her, any more than to any other statement of opinion; and when this is solemnly confirmed by the responsible head of the Church, with the full conscious intention of speaking on behalf of all Christians, I find no difficulty in believing that special protection is given to prevent any such statement leading to error. I do not even quarrel with the closing words of the Infallibility Decree, that such statements are irreformable "of their innovation and not by reason of the Church's consent." I want at least some statements to be irreformable.

Unless some can be so regarded, there would be no prevention that the Church might not attempt to lay other foundations than those which are laid. Further, only an irreformable statement could give those guarantees which are needed not only for the security of the Church, but for the safety of the world. I should feel much happier if the decree itself laid down what is, I believe, recognised as a practical necessity—namely that the Pope first consults the Church before he promulgates a decree. And I hope that the "irreformability" of doctrine does not mean that the doctrine could not be better stated in the future, when changing language or further understanding made that necessary. I am naturally anxious to know what Papal statements infallibility actually covers, and particularly that it does not mean that certain attitudes of the Church taken up in the past are beyond question, and can never be repudiated—such as, for instance, the blessing of the Crusades, the methods of the Inquisition, or the wisdom of some excommunication. I am anxious, in short, that infallibility should not be pressed to include what is virtually a claim to the impeccability of the Church.

There are questions of atmosphere in which I should find it perhaps a little difficult to breathe freely. I love the regular services of the Roman Church—the Mass, the Offices, and such popular devotions as Benediction —but I should say good-bye with great regret to the freer services of Protestantism, in which preaching,

open conference, and the free utterance of prayer by anyone have a larger place; for I regard them as necessary instruments for reaching the populace or for giving to the laity sufficient self-expression. In addition, I am afraid that I should find what I feel is the prevailing political atmosphere of the Roman Church at least slightly oppressive; for I cannot but feel it to be not only predominantly conservative, but conventional, and even worldly. I am by way of being both a socialist and a pacifist, and while I am prepared to define those terms in a way that does not conflict with the allowance of a place for private property and the natural right of anyone to defend himself, his goods, or his country I feel the general attitude of the Roman authorities to these ideals to be indiscriminating, and the general impression and positivist effect created lamentable, ultimative, and reactionary.

I should feel equally unhappy about the attitude of the Roman authorities to Biblical criticism. I recognise how anarchic and irresponsible Protestant criticism has become; but I feel the Roman attitude to be timid, too much tied to doubtful traditions, and insufficiently governed by the Scripture itself.

These difficulties might, in certain eventualities, have to be put up with, for of course I should only accept what I had to and believed I was accepting; but there would still remain what I at present feel to be the greatest difficulty. If I were to pass over into the

Roman Communion, instead of that bringing me into closer union with all my fellow Christians, which is what I most earnestly long for, I should find that I had only secured communion with one part of Christendom at the expense of separating myself from all the rest. For, according to the rubric for the reception of converts, I have to declare that I believe the "Roman Church to be the one true Church established on earth by Jesus Christ"; and this would, in practice, necessitate that I must repudiate all who are not in communion with Rome as having no part or lot in the Church of Christ. I was once told by a well-known Jesuit that this is not what the rubric really entails; it would only mean admitting that Rome was the one Church which had kept the true faith. I had to confess that if that was its meaning it would go far to remove my greatest difficulty. But I questioned whether this was not his private interpretation of the rubric, and with his usual frankness he admitted that it probably was. Even if I could read into the rubric that meaning, by any private judgment that it would be legitimate for me to adopt, I know I should have to show by my actions that it meant very much more.

I know that it is authorized Roman doctrine, that there is a mystical as well as a visible Church; that the mystical Church is the ultimate source of salvation, and that many souls outside Rome and even outside the explicit confession of the Christian faith may belong to

it. But in practice I should not be allowed to have any Christian fellowship with them; I must never again take part in the worship of other Christians. If I entered an Anglo-Catholic Church where the Blessed Sacrament was reserved, I must refuse to make my obeisance to it; and I must treat all other organised Christian bodies as apostates, pretenders and enemies. If I was to be of much use in propaganda I should have to spend a lot of my time pouring scorn upon the Church of England and treating Nonconformists as something almost beneath Christian consideration. Now, despite the fact that a good many of my fellow Christians outside Rome already refuse me communion with them and treat those with whom I am in fellowship much as the Roman Church treats them, and although some of my Low Church and Nonconformist critics will not thank me for remaining where I am, and I fear will only be contemptuous when they learn that I do it for their sakes, nevertheless I cannot bring myself to purchase communion with one half of Christendom only at the price of separating myself from the other half.

It may well be that at this point some acute Roman Catholic reader will exclaim: "This man is really more of a Protestant than any of his fellow contributors; he may accept Roman doctrine, but he accepts it on his own authority; he exercises the right of private judgment rather than the mind of the Church in the

interpretation of Roman doctrine, and this final objection only clouds the one clear issue that has to be faced—namely, that the Roman Church claims to be the one true Church of Jesus Christ. If he rejects that, he rejects everything else." I am well aware that this is the issue; but is it as clear as all Roman apologists imagine? In the first place, I very much question whether any infallible decree can be pointed to which declares the Roman Church, at any rate, the one true Church; Rome has not yet altered the Nicene Creed to read, "I believe in the One Holy *Roman* Catholic Church." It is certain that the Roman authorities cannot and will never attempt to decide who belongs to the mystical Church. Can they decide, and have they done so infallibly, that they know precisely where the boundaries of the true Church can be rightly drawn? I am perfectly willing to admit that historical considerations establish at least the lineal descent of the present Roman communion unbroken back to the primitive Church and the apostolic foundation. I am willing to allow that at the great Schism the Greeks were at least more in the wrong than the Romans; that the Orthodox Church in its present attitude to the Papacy gets back on what the Eastern Church once held. I am not moved by any consideration that the Greek Orthodox Church is to be preferred to the Roman Church. I am under no delusion that the Reformation reformed the Church, or that the Elizabethan Settlement settled anything. The

"establishment" of the Church of England has only resulted in a separation from itself of many of its most earnest members. The fissiparous tendency that has manifested itself in Protestantism, on whatever basis it has tried to build, the general doctrinal confusion of the Church of England, and the debilitating vagueness consequent upon the rejection of all doctrinal authority which now afflicts Nonconformity, all speak for themselves. Meantime the Roman Church persists, and is perhaps the only Church that is making a real advance, both in numbers and in prestige. Nevertheless, this is not the whole story.

It is admitted by many Roman exponents and apologists that the abuses which preceded the Reformation were of the most scandalous and reprehensible nature; others will admit that the persecutions which repressed heresy in Spain, were unsuccessful in Holland, and have left in England an embittered opinion on both sides, have only bequeathed a heritage of suspicion, fear, and hate that cloud the issues for thousands of souls. I am under no delusion that Protestants have not persecuted. Even after physical persecution was abandoned, they have repressed Roman Catholic worship and profession in England, with heavy penalties. If some of the more extreme Protestants still had their way, I would not guarantee that they would not persecute again, or at least see that Roman Catholicism was either hampered by distressing legal restrictions or altogether prohibited.

Nevertheless, while most intelligent and illuminated Protestants now repudiate persecution as principle it is not so certain that Roman Catholics do. I find in Roman Catholic books on Toleration and tracts on Persecution an apology, timidity, and reservation on this subject which leave the door open to the possibility of its worst revival.

It is not, in my judgment, sufficient to apologise for the persecutions of the past by saying that they were part of the accepted policy of the age. The Church of Christ surely ought to be in advance of the spirit of the age, and not give in to popular hate and fear. It is no excuse to say that Protestants were just as bad, and to object that, if Rome issued a decree that persecution must never be resorted to, Protestants either would not or could not give any equivalent promise. That distinction would surely only be a proof of the practical and spiritual superiority of the Roman Church. Nor is much weight to be allowed to the suspicion of some Roman Catholic apologists that the modern objection to persecution is due partly to sentimental reasons, which put physical security before the integrity of faith, and partly to the giving up of belief in any definite faith and maintaining that one kind is just as good as another. Such opinions may be found, but the opinion of the present writer, and of many others, has nothing whatever to do with such considerations. There are even worse things than being put to death, even by

being burned alive. It is not a question of the injury done to the body, but of the harm done to faith. It is not the people who are put to death for heresy, but the people who embrace orthodoxy to save their skins, that I am concerned about. It can surely be maintained that the dogmatic decision of a Pope that faith is not to be coerced is contradicted by recourse to persecution.

I find I have a divergence between Roman principles, which I can accept, and Roman policy, in which I cannot allow it to be thought that I acquiesce. This consideration leads to the question of abuses. They ought not to have led to schism; but where does the responsibility for that error even then really rest? Surely partly, at least, on the side of those who not only tolerated these abuses for centuries, but allowed them to become so firmly entrenched in the practice of the Church. No Church can prevent wolves getting in among the sheep, but there must surely be something wrong with a Church when wolves not only get into the fold by the simple device of wearing sheep's clothing, but manage to get themselves elected as chief shepherds of the flock. If only a Pope, in calling Christendom to unity, would sorrowfully admit that some of his predecessors in that office had at least put a terrible strain upon unity, what a difference it would make! We are not raking up the abuses of the past in order to discredit the Roman Catholic Church, but to ask that the abuses of the past shall be officially admitted,

their scandalous effect allowed for, and more guarantee given against their recurrence. For instance, one of the obstacles to accepting the Papal supremacy is that it has been used in the past to make quite other than spiritual claims over individuals and nations. This was, of course, due to entanglement of the spiritual claims of the Popes with the exercise of temporal power. It is quite possible that the recent settlement between the Papacy and the Italian State really puts an end to the temporal power; but when the event is hailed on the placards of Catholic papers with the announcement "Pope and King," one wonders if it is not regarded by Catholics themselves as a regaining of temporal power. If there could be an infallible declaration concerning the purely spiritual jurisdiction of the Pope, prejudice would be undermined and the fear that still remains removed.

The comparison which has been sometimes drawn between Catholic and Protestant populations has often been made as if financial prosperity, industrial progress, or external cleanliness were sufficient indications of Divine favour, of democratic liberty, or of approximation to godliness. All such comparisons are sufficiently ruled out the moment New Testament standards are surrendered. But even with these qualifications in mind, and perhaps with the admission that whatever balance there was against Catholicism is not only being redressed, but being reversed, on such issues as intellectual

integrity, commercial honesty and sexual purity, there is still a widespread opinion among travelled and not obviously prejudiced people that in ethical standards, personal responsibility, and personal intelligence Protestants are manifestly in advance of Catholics. The Roman Catholics that I myself have been closely acquainted with, chiefly monks and priests, have been of a very high order. I have also a wide circle of acquaintances in the Anglican priesthood and a great number of friends among Nonconformist ministers and laity, and I can testify to the sincerity, earnestness, piety and consecration which I believe are their prevailing qualities. As regards the general average produced by Catholicism and Protestantism, I have no means of judging beyond common observation. It is unfair to take the highest Protestantism can produce and contrast this with the worst that disgraces Roman Catholicism.

I am forced to admit that Roman Catholicism is capable of a sanctity which I very much question whether Protestantism could ever produce; and I should maintain this, even though feeling that sometimes Roman Catholic canonized sanctity is of too exotic and cloistered a type, and while at the same time recognizing that Protestant sanctity is left uncanonized and is more exercised in social service, though there often with a distinterested aim and an extreme of sacrifice which really deserves canonization. But there is something about Catholic canonized sanctity which bears indis-

putable marks of being supernatural; Protestant sanctity more often bears the marks of ordinary ethical attainability. I very much question, however, if the worst that Protestantism can produce is quite equal to the worst Roman Catholicism can sink to. I still remain doubtful whether the ethical and intellectual level of, say, Mexican, Italian, or Irish priests is on the level with German Evangelical, Scottish Presbyterian, or English Nonconformist ministers. Something, no doubt, must be allowed for racial characteristics and the opportunities for education; but have not the last four centuries of the differing types of Christianity some responsibility for these comparative conditions? A Protestant friend of mine always puts in an argument at this point, however, on behalf of the Roman Catholics, that the Roman Church has to minister to ignorant, common, and degraded peoples. I willingly admit that Protestant congregations tend to be eclectic. But the comparison I would press here as valid would instance the converts of the Salvation Army. There are many things about the Salvation Army that do not win my entire approval, but its workers do go down to the lowest people, and do not leave them where they are. If I can trust to general observation and contrast the Catholic and Protestant quarters in Liverpool or Glasgow, I find considerable room for perplexity.

To sum up the comparison as charitably as possible, I do not find a general superiority of Catholic over

Protestant such as I should expect if Rome were the one true Church and Protestants were altogether outside it. I am persuaded that whatever differences can be traced have nothing to do with Catholic doctrine, nor are they chargeable to the teaching of the great Roman doctors or the example of the great Roman saints; but I believe there is a danger in every form of Catholicism, Roman, Greek, or Anglican, which accounts for what I still believe to be a disquieting balance on one side rather than on the other, and it is something which I believe could be reversed. The Catholic system is always in danger of making too much of external expansion, and too little of interior demand. This applies in my judgment both to doctrinal demands and sacramental devotion. I entirely recognise the need for a well-defined doctrinal faith, and I regret that in Anglicanism this is so often repudiated and in Nonconformity so widely abandoned. But the maintenance of the necessity for doctrinal fidelity can be so pushed forward that it comes to be regarded as sufficient to believe certain doctrines, or just to accept in general what the Church believes, as if that ensured one's salvation. Added to this there may be encouraged a pride in orthodoxy and a contempt of all others which make this attitude a positive spiritual danger. Moreover, it has to be said on behalf of those who not only have drifted away from orthodoxy, but have taken up a prejudiced attitude towards it, that it

is often the way it has been preached and expounded and the unlovely attitude with which it is often combined which go far to explain their reaction to the extreme position that dogma is dangerous and doctrine is unnecessary.

And this brings me to what I am persuaded is a very serious weakness and cause of difficulty to much present Roman argument. The fact that I accept Roman doctrine because it appeals to me as philosophically sound, and faithful to Scriptural teaching, exposes me, as I know, to Roman condemnation that I am merely relying on my private judgment, that I do not believe on the authority of the Church, and therefore that what I possess is not faith at all. My position would surely be inadequate if I rejected the authority of the Church altogether, or believed merely on my own judgment; whereas the putting forward of faith as merely belief on authority, which is the point so stressed in Roman Catholic exposition, is surely quite inadequate. This difference of opinion, I am well aware, goes back to the Reformation controversy, when the Reformers stressed the idea that faith is an assurance that one is forgiven —or, as modern Protestants would put it; faith is due to a religious experience which cannot be doubted.

Surely what is wrong here is that Protestants and Catholics are maintaining between themselves two essentials of faith. I take it that it is orthodox Catholic

doctrine that some things are believed on the basis of reasonable argument, that other things are believed on the authority of the Church; but, since it is admitted also that saving faith is a supernatural gift, that must be something different from belief established on argument or belief on the reasonableness of trusting the Church. Now it is surely this supernatural gift of faith which the Reformation stood for as a necessary completion if it was to become the faith that saves. This is included, I take it, in defined Roman doctrine; but is it not often forgotten, in pressing for belief on the authority of the Church? And is not the emphasis on this one point, apart from the other essential elements, likely to have a dangerous effect? When one is asked to believe simply on the authority of the Church, does it not tend to produce a carelessness about the experimental confirmation in a personal experience of grace, and the need for expressing our belief, not only in creed and devotion, but in character and social life? Further, does it not breed a tendency simply to say, "I believe what the Church teaches," without being even too careful to enquire what exactly the Church does teach? I am the more moved to press this point because I can find Roman Catholic admissions to the effect that the doctrine of faith has not yet been very fully worked out. And is it not just for this essential element in faith —namely of going on to an experimental knowledge—

that Protestantism in general, and Evangelicalism in particular, in however one-sided a way, have insisted on? I am convinced that it would make a great difference if Roman Catholic teaching insisted more upon the rationality of belief in God, which modern Protestantism has so come to reject; and if the necessity of an interior experience and some other confession than a creedal one were more emphasised, not only would difficulties be removed in the way of accepting the general Roman Catholic position, but the whole life of Roman Catholicism would be lifted above its present level.

A similar distinction needs surely to be drawn in the way in which Roman Catholicism insists upon attendance at Mass. It may seem a fortunate circumstance in these days that Romanism has something to hold people to worship when everywhere else worship is being neglected; but is it sufficient to secure that true and spiritual worship is being offered by those who attend? I believe that the Mass is the highest form of Christian worship and I believe that no Christian who really understood what the Mass was could do anything but joyfully assent to it. The often poor exposition of what it is, however, is responsible for its being so feared and disliked, and the insistence merely upon attendance leaves many Roman Catholics able to infer that attendance is enough, when surely what conditions acceptable assistance at Mass is that one really enters into some

degree of communion with the Sacrifice of Christ. Now it is precisely this that Protestantism, while neglecting the sacramental representation of Christ's death, has nevertheless so much insisted on, as its hymns and preaching sufficiently testify; for in their own way they are a proclaiming of the Lord's death.

I should conclude, therefore, both from the way in which Romanism and non-Romanism divide Christendom and from the elements which Catholicism and Protestantism respectively emphasise, as well as from the complementary virtues and defects which Catholics and Protestants exhibit, that the two systems have managed to divide Christianity roughly in two, each appropriating simply one half. It is the whole that I, and I believe so many others, crave. "I believe in the One Holy Catholic Church"—not in half of one. I cannot merely exchange one half for the other with any sense of gain for myself or for the whole Church of Christ; I cannot repudiate half my fellow Christians to placate the other half; and therefore I maintain that my present position, Protestant though my Roman brethren may declare it to be, is a protest on behalf of Catholicism. I go further and believe that I am true to the best Roman teaching; and I do not want to be unfaithful to that by even appearing in the sight of the world, or of my fellow Christians, to accept a system which is bound up with so much of the past unrepented of, and even with so much in the present that is a confusion

or a contradiction of the vital and necessary things for which Rome stands.

This position involves, I know, the acceptance of the idea that the Church of Christ has become outwardly divided. The very tenor of the apostolic exhortations and of Christ's prayer that it should be one do not, to my judgment, exclude the possibility that such a disaster might happen. But while our Lord's prayer does not involve that this could never happen, it surely involves that it need not continue. Moreover, while feeling quite unable to admit that the Roman Catholic Church is coterminous with the whole Church of Christ, or that to be, temporarily, out of communion with the Roman See means that one does not belong to the Church, I find no difficulty in believing that the Roman See is the heir to the promise made to St. Peter: "On this rock I will build my church." I can find no other adequate historical fulfilment of that promise but in the Papacy, and I look to the Roman See yet to bring about the reunion of Christendom by such admissions, explanations, and promises as would detract nothing from her past definitions or future dignity, and to construct some way back to communion with her that shall not entail repudiating other Christians who cannot as yet take that way. So upon her threshold I stand, waiting for the door to be opened, not to me as much as to others for whom I am concerned. If, in taking that position, I am adjudged as thus only condemning my-

self to exclusion from the true fold of the Church, then if I may, without irreverence, take words of Christ as defence, I can only say, "Other sheep He has, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring."

VII

THE ROMAN SACERDOTAL HIERARCHY

PRINCIPAL J. W. OMAN, D.D.

ONE of my old professors, who, though he was specially learned in all that concerned the Roman controversy, had remained a convinced Protestant, said, after long and intimate conversation with an old French Catholic peasant woman, "I rejoiced to know that, in all essentials, our religion was the same." This is the communion of saints, which I take to be the Church that is the pillar and ground of the truth, being founded on the apostles and prophets, by the only adequate way which is, by having their spirit and their faith in the Father of all men, with Jesus Christ as the chief corner stone of this faith. To call in question, not only the essential faith, but the true saintliness of that old peasant woman, because she was a devoted Roman Catholic, would surely be a deplorable lack of charity. But, if I ever met a good man in this world, it was my old teacher. As, in all matters of charity, it is exclusion which needs to justify itself, because inclusion is itself of the nature of charity, a church which excluded him from the household of faith, would need

a great deal of justification, more especially as I am quite sure the Master Himself would not. On the contrary, I could conceive him as the beloved disciple. Surely there must be something seriously wrong when persons Jesus would have welcomed to His heart are excluded from His Church—and that for external reasons He never used, and which would have made a very different division between His disciples and His enemies, if He had.

This may help to make plain what I am calling in question. I have seen priests faithfully discharging their duty among their people and I have seen people devoutly worshipping in Roman Catholic services in more countries than one; I have heard sermons in Roman Catholic Churches on the essentials of the Christian life to which I could most heartily say Amen, in more languages than one; and I have known Roman Catholics I highly esteemed, though some of them were regarded as not quite of the approved pattern. That all this belongs to the true Church, I rejoice to believe. Moreover, even the outward form of the Western Church had historical reasons, and, in some respect at least, historical justification. Even an infallible pope, who could alter things, though I am unable to believe in him, was better than the Eastern ossification in the past of the seven inspired synods. What I am dealing with exclusively is the claim of the sacerdotal hierarchy. What I do not believe is that the Church, founded on

the Carpenter of Nazareth, can be rightly constituted by its clergy; that He ever contemplated its rule by a hierarchy; and that He handed on to its priesthood special sacerdotal powers.

For disbelieving anything there may be three good reasons. The first is that it is incredible; the second that it is not proved; and the third that it is inconsistent with beliefs conceived to be higher and more certain. On all three grounds I disbelieve in the Roman claims, but I will deal with the last first, because, though least often dwelt upon, it is what is most decisive and, what is more, it has a right to be. Nothing proves so much the reality of any faith as the making of contrary beliefs incredible. There is a kind of facile catholicity of accepting all sorts of views, which is due merely to no one of them being sufficiently in the light to show that the others are in darkness. Moreover, by their positive direction our lives should be determined. When we steadfastly pursue what we take to be the higher road, the others simply reject themselves. In this way I am not a Roman Catholic, primarily for the reason that all my conclusions regarding life and history are not only inconsistent with that belief, but seem to me higher, as well as more certain.

There are three essential points, to which attention may be confined. The first concerns authority; the second history; the third the idea of progress.

The question of authority is constantly confused by

the failure to distinguish between personal authority as a secondary ground of belief upon which a great many of everyone's ordinary working convictions rest, which has a right and important place, and authority as the ultimate ground on which anything should be believed, in respect of which, however exalted and however ancient, it has no place at all.

On one occasion, happening to be in Cologne Cathedral, I heard a monk preaching somewhat to this effect. "In spite of the evidence of your senses, which seems to show that the sun goes round the earth, you believe, on the authority of the astronomers, that the earth goes round the sun. Yet the astronomers are merely fallible men. How much more then should you receive the witness of the infallible Church, even though, as with transubstantiation, it may seem to have against it the witness of your own senses."

Did the question end with an acceptance which is merely not denying what we are told, the personal authority of the Pope might be as good as the personal authority of the astronomer; and, were not his infallibility simply another personal affirmation however many persons may be involved, a great deal better. The Church sounds more impersonal, but the authority of the Church is also merely the authority of a great number of persons, which type of authority has often been mistaken. But we do not believe the astronomer because of his authority. We believe because we know that he

has reasons, based on the study of the actual nature of things, which he is ready to produce, and by which we believe we ourselves would be convinced, were it for us a matter of life and death to know them. Moreover, when any point is called in question, the Astronomer Royal has an obligation to justify his belief by the evidence, even were the person who adduces good reasons against it a last year's graduate in the subject. The only primary authority is the authority of the witness of the reality, and the sole personal authority is the extent to which, in knowledge and discernment, it has been submitted to. Official position, in particular, is a wholly irrelevant consideration; and the universal acceptance of the re-ptolemaic astronomy by the whole body of the learned did not make it right.

Judged in this way, the papacy has not usually been even a very good secondary authority. But the question at issue is its value as a primary authority, as something to be accepted, not because we know it rests on good grounds, ready to be produced, the sufficiency of which anyone prepared to take the necessary pains to test it both in thought and action can judge, but as itself the final ground for believing.

The usual argument is that the right of inquiry would make religion a matter for the learned, and that God must have provided something to be accepted humbly, for the ignorant man and the toiler. But, if there should be anyone who is equipped for the inquiry

and considers it a matter of life and death to know, his case should be met; and the unlearned and the toiler would also be in a better position if they knew that he had been satisfied as they are about the movements of the heavenly bodies. At all events, everyone has surely a right to ask whether the papacy is this kind of authority or not: and the difficulty about this question is just that it cannot be answered on religious grounds, where even the humblest might be at home, but depends on purely intellectual and historical grounds of the utmost dubiety even for the learned.

On the other hand, when we look at the teaching of the Prophets and Jesus, we find that it rests on grounds which are wholly religious, appealing to man as man, to be tested as it is found to be true for our daily secular life, wherein the learned and leisured have no advantage over the unlearned and toil-worn. Jesus spoke with authority but not as an authority. On the contrary, He is the supreme authority in religion, because He always spoke direct to the image of God in man's soul, saying, This you will see, unless you cloak it with hypocrisy. Moreover, His constant method was, not to announce truth for reception at all, but to draw it out of men's own thoughts, asking quite ordinary, and sometimes not even highly moral people, what they themselves thought on the matter. Newman's statement, that He uttered germs of ideas doctors and lawyers were meant to develop, no really objective study

of the Gospels could ever confirm. What Jesus uttered was for humble people to see for themselves, and was as far as possible from learned theology and codified law. Nothing, He thought, ever hindered His appeal, except hypocrisy, and even it, not because it was sinful, but because, calling good evil and evil good, it had no way of being convinced by the appeal of truth itself. And St. Paul says the same thing when he affirms that, if his gospel is hid, it is only to those whose eyes have been blinded by the god of this world.

Only the poor in spirit can see the truth, and the word is to be received in meekness. But this is wholly misrepresented when it is taken to mean that people are not to look at the truth and judge it for themselves, but are to receive it implicitly from the Church authorities. On the contrary, it means that, when we know that this is God's truth to our own soul, we are no more to listen to other voices without us than to the fears and worldly ambitions within. Like the prophet, we are not to say, I am but a child, but to say what God gives us to speak, even if it be against all human wisdom, and do what He calls us to do, even against all authorities, ecclesiastical as well as political. If the pure in heart sees God, it must be God alone and no delegated authority.

This is no more self-assertion in religion than in science. It is the true humility of a scientist to submit his mind utterly to the direct evidence of what he

studies, which, in its sphere, is God's witness, and to be so possessed by it that the opinion even of the greatest has no right to silence it. And, as religion is everyone's first duty, in it, above all else, his business is to seek to see truth for himself: and as our whole experience is the greatest experiment, the toiler is in as good a position as any other to do so. Nor is truth really believed except in so far as it is seen to be true; and the task of seeing the Father in Jesus Christ, who Himself was a hand-worker, no one may delegate to another. Doubtless a great many important matters are outside any one person's province. Yet, in so far as they come within his view, he can have a sound judgment upon them; and in so far as they are beyond him, they are outside of the essentials both of faith and practice. This, it is true, requires a religious mind, ready to accept the religious task: but a very marked feature of the Gospels is the way Jesus seeks to stir up such a mind, and His complete indifference to any merely traditional or formal or routine faith or anything less than seeing God and accepting His will.

The duty of deciding what is that will for ourselves, and as between God and our conscience, is an essential of all true goodness, as well as an essential element in the Gospels.

Nothing done because other people think it right is ever rightly done. And it is still less good, when enforced by gains and losses, rewards and penalties,

even if they be announced as from God Himself. To see for ourselves that it is right, and do it solely because we see it to be obligatory upon us is not something additional to morality, but the heart of it. If we are truly conscientious, we can hardly be wholly mistaken; and, in any case, God, who looks on the heart, sees what is better than correct action. The decision may be mistaken, but there is only one right way of seeing and doing better, which is to be more sensitively and sincerely conscientious.

With this the New Testament is entirely in accord. Jesus says that those whom He makes free are free indeed; and He came to fulfil the law, but it was by love, and not by precept. Nor could anything be farther from His method than casuistry. That was for Him the tradition which made void God's word to one's own soul. Casuistry can only deal with cases, which can be formulated and have degrees of guilt attached to them, as in the law courts; and its measure of heinous sins can hardly be other than their grossness, as in jurisprudence. What is at once unique and wholly convincing in the dealing of Jesus with sinful men is His reversal of the whole legal judgment and His power of going behind conscious intention and obvious motive. Intention and motive are taken into consideration, but so are they in the law courts. Hypocrisy is the one sin that has never forgiveness, not because God is not ready to pardon even the most heinous, but

because it shuts out God's appeal and cannot know itself so as to repent. The publicans and harlots go into His kingdom before the visibly well-doing and religious, just because they have responsive hearts and penitent minds, and even because the grossness of their sins cannot be ignored like pride and self-satisfaction. Religious and moral privilege, by which our own moral judgments, as well as most judgments of the confessional, are made, had no place in His estimate, which went behind them to the attitude of the heart, with which no casuistry can deal.

St. Paul shows in this, as in many other matters, how well he had learned of Christ. About few things is he so much concerned as the liberty of the children of God. We are to stand fast in the liberty with which Christ has set us free, and not to be entangled again in the yoke of bondage, by which he meant ecclesiastical injunction. Nor does he set any limit, for he says that he who is spiritual judges all things and he himself is judged of no man.

Against gross sins the confessional and hierarchical authority may be some security, though history does not make even this very certain. But in what are sins only to a sensitive conscience, it is very far from being helpful. In the most essential of all matters, which is truth, there is not a little evidence to show that it is the reverse. In any case, Christ came to bring grace and truth, and this meant the abolition of law in this

juridical sense: and all true moral theory and all higher moral insight approve.

Thus, in the end, my disbelief in the Roman claim to control faith and direct conscience arises from my faith in the direct witness of truth and goodness, and the conviction that what is held on any lower witness is not genuine truth or goodness, and that whatsoever is not of such faith comes short of them even if it be formally correct dogma and conduct.

That anyone who has ever seen this should afterwards be able to think that true faith is not what is seen by one's own insight, but what is implicity accepted on the authority of the Church, and that true morality is not loyalty to the legislation of one's own conscience, but putting oneself in the hands of a director of souls, is difficult to conceive. That the High Anglican is not able to do so, but still thinks that, however much help and guidance is to be sought from the traditional creed, truth is still better held when seen to be true, and that however much guidance may be given by the confessional, forgiveness is a transaction between the soul and God, so that it does not suffice to say the Church pardons, remains a radical difference between his position and the Roman. The Roman position, for one who has never questioned it, has no doubt a very comfortable finality, but the kind of reasoning indulged in by so many converts to Romanism, which makes the same impression as Newman made on Lord Acton,

himself a Roman Catholic, that "he was never a servant, but always a manipulator of the truth," shows at least how closely the old garments cling to them. Nor do they ever seem to be quite satisfied with the idea that we are forgiven, if the Church forgives, if the necessity of peace between God and our own conscience has ever been seen. The character based upon the two ideas is different, and once having learned to value an independent morality, it is not easy to esteem a dependent. A lady, who had been a member of my own communion, but had been converted to Rome, said to me, "No doubt the faith is the great thing, but I have yet to meet the Roman Catholic of the same strong character as the best type of Protestant!" That may only have been because she was unable to rid herself of the Protestant standard, but once having seen that it is also the general ethical standard, to get rid of it cannot be easy.

The next question concerns history.

This is usually settled by an *a priori* argument from God's omniscience. If He gives a revelation of His mind and will, it must be infallible and absolute to be worthy of Him; and it would be vain to put this into the world without an infallible authority to secure that it is rightly preserved, interpreted and applied.

But, if it be incumbent upon God to speak only infallibly in one thing, it ought to be in all, and there should be no error. And equally He ought always to act upon His omnipotence, and there should be no short-

coming or sin. Surely it is not for us short-sighted mortals to say what God must do, but to try, as best we can, to learn by inquiry from what He does. When history is studied as God's dealing with man and man's with God, instead of any such infallibly imposed imperial writs, we merely find the fulfilment of the promise that man finds God, if he seeks him with all his heart. As it is a knowledge which is only truly of the heart, this is long and troubled and often blundering search; and history goes on its groping and erring way, just because this search is not ended, and because it needs the right attitude of the soul, and not merely correct information.

What is convincing about revelation is precisely that it never was directed by any external authority, never even became a formulated creed, yet always faces in one direction and sees ever more fully all the depth of faith and the claim upon the heart, as well as the action, of doing justly and loving mercy and walking humbly with our God. Each prophetic soul was guided only by his own experience: and that it was an experience of reality has its evidence precisely in the fact that the harmony of conviction was not imposed by any authority except the authority of direct dealing with God in face of man's sins and sorrows.

The incarnation was an incarnation of this attitude in perfection and of the fulness of love which is the complete fulfilling of the law. The essential revela-

tion is of the Father who is kind to the unthankful and evil, and who waits to overwhelm his erring son with every token of pardon and the restoration to his home, which should convince and convert the erring soul itself. Jesus is our true humanity, one like a son of man, and His symbol is a lamb slain, the symbol of victory by patience, sacrifice and service in contrast with the world power of subjection by might and dominion. This was changed to the imperial idea of the divinity of power, and became an incarnation of the very thing that had been set aside. Hence arose all the troubles about two omnipotences, and hence also the idea of an imperial vicar of Christ.

St. Paul is no doubt more of a theologian, yet what he says in essence is just the same. The word justification neither means being declared just nor being made just, but being put right with God: and what he says is that, if we have faith in God as He truly is, it works by His love, and we are right with Him, and then we can be right with our own souls and with all else, so that our whole world is a new creation. This is not merely expanded, but is transformed into a quite different transaction from a father's pardon, which, in spite of offences, restores to fellowship, when it is explained, as in the Tridentine Decrees, by five causes —final, efficient, meritorious, instrumental, formal. Protestant theology, it may be, has only imperfectly recovered the original simplicity, but at all events it

has room for those who have, as it does not enforce its views with anathemas, which is no more a Christian than it is a rational way of persuasion.

These anathemas rest on the doctrine of the Church. This, it has been said, is in the end the one doctrine of Trent: and at all events it is the most essential. But there is no other doctrine also which is so sharply in conflict with the Gospels, as we can only fail to see if we read them with the preconceptions of the Tridentine Decrees, which declare all to be anathema who deny that Jesus himself appointed the seven sacraments, and with them the hierarchical and sacerdotal church, as what Bellarmin calls a state, as much as the Republic of Venice or the Kingdom of France. What we actually find is a warning against any attempt to exercise such temporal power. Jesus taught His followers that they were not to exercise lordship like the Gentiles, but to make the last the first, and to look for no honour except to be the servant of all. Nor were they to call any master, for Jesus Himself was their Teacher, and, only as He taught them, was He their Lord.

Loisy acknowledges that this was the original form, but defends the departure from it on the ground that such a merely enthusiastic society would soon have disappeared; and a political order, with superiors, and inferiors and rules and regulations, was necessary for its continuance. Possibly, if there could have been such

a society, with faith enough to live in the order of Christ's Kingdom, there never was a time when it might not have been the most powerful of all influences on the earth. But, at all events, there was not found such a society: and nothing is so vital for understanding God's ways as to know that He always waits for the fulness of the times. The leaven was put, therefore, into the mixed society, which arose, as it would arise to-day in China were there only one generation of missionaries, a society mixed not only in character, but, in various degrees of Pagan and Christian ideas. Yet it is the leaven which has always constituted the true Church.

In respect of outward form, so far as we can see, there seems to have been in the Church at the beginning nothing uniform. Yet in general the Church was the *ecclesia,* the gathering of the brethren, with leaders called because it was believed God had called them already by gifts and graces, who were named indifferently, after the usage of the synagogue, elders, and, after the usage of Greek gatherings, bishops or overseers. A century afterwards we find the bishop distinguished from the elder. Yet he was in no sense a metropolitan, but much more like the minister of a congregation. The headship of the pope and the whole metropolitan system grew out of the Roman secular administration and followed its divisions; and when the empire fell, the Church largely stepped into its place,

claiming its provincial tax as the tithe consecrated by Abraham, and exercising civil rule, largely, it is true, because there was no one else to do it, and very much to the benefit of law and order.

But what may thus have for a time historical necessity does not, for that reason, rest on eternal right. On the contrary, by entering into the political order, a church endangers its eternal principles, and is exposed to the vicissitudes of temporal change, so that some day the passing of its power may be a milestone on the road to progress. In spite of recent happiness, this temporal power has passed, and that to the spiritual gain of the Roman Church, as well as to the liberties of the European peoples. Yet its imperial spirit has not wholly been renounced, nor the way of subjecting to its dominion by the exercise of power wholly abandoned. At present its defenders are very busy giving the *tu quoque* to Protestantism. But, in the first place, the Protestant persecutions arose from political fears, not from the idea of this being a mode of religious persuasion; and, in the second, a bad heritage is not lived down in a day. Considering the violence and love of finality of human nature, it has been lived down very quickly, and so effectively that it is doubtful, whether, with any power, even Rome would now have courage to exercise the compulsion she has never in theory abandoned, though theory, like a snake, is never quite safe till it is quite dead.

That Jesus ever conceived of His Church as being one by political method or by any employment of physical force and visible authority is inconceivable, in view of His complete indifference to such unity and His complete renunciation of such means. He looked forward to His followers being perfected into one, but this looks like the goal, not the beginning, and to be of the spirit and not organisation. St. Paul acknowledges differences of mind, but urges that it should not create alienation of heart. Also, so far as we can learn, Jesus most carefully refrained from any laws or forms or instructions regarding outward order, and confined himself rigidly to the order of life and service which springs from being one with God, and so one with His children. Moreover, instead of appointing His apostles as superiors over His society, He warned them not to presume on their early call and longer labours, by the parable of the labourers in the vineyard, where those who come at the eleventh hour are paid the same as those who laboured from the first. The essential unity, therefore, is not by ecclesiastical supremacy, but by surmounting or even ignoring difference, and regarding all faithful followers of Christ as our brethren.

But if unity depends on this spirit, and not on outward forms, we must begin with it, and not wait till we have converted the pope or the pope converted us; and the Church Universal is not one organisation, but one fellowship. Hence, instead of supporting the

claim of one particular section to be the one true Church, the real lesson is that, as we have learned to have understanding and peace in spite of great difference of opinion, we must also learn to be one, in the sense that Christ and the Father are one, in spite of what is much more irrelevant to it, difference of organisation.

Possibly the very reason of our divisions may be to prevent us from being content to rest in mere political unity. They may have the same purpose as the divided state of ancient Israel, which made men look beyond the visible nation to a more spiritual Israel, which was to be a light to lighten the Gentiles, as well as the true glory of God's own people.

As I look at history in this way, it is needless to explain farther that the claim even of the largest and most effectively organised church to be the only true church makes little appeal to me.

The third point concerns Progress.

People are spoken of as seeking the shelter of the Roman Church: and there is good reason in most cases for the description. But the question is whether mankind was ever meant to live in shelter, and whether our real safety is not upon the high seas, with no security but to carry on our course and have plenty of sea-room. On the view that God is primarily concerned with keeping us from unrest and error and with merely imposing on us correct belief and submission

to order, it is impossible to see any divine hand in man's chequered and troubled career. Unless experience has as its end to teach men by their own errors and failures the wisdom of His way and the folly of their own, God would surely have imposed His truth and His rule from the first; and, as He is omnipotent, by some more effective means than even the most infallible hierarchy.

The purpose of God in a most distressing time was conceived by Jeremiah to be that man should so learn thereby that no one should need to say to his brother, Know the Lord, for all should, of their own insight, know him; nor anyone need to direct the conscience of another, for God would write his law himself on every heart. This Jeremiah thought so glorious a purpose that no possible material conflict or even distress of mind could be too high a price to pay for it. This was the Rule of God, which would bring true peace, by men seeing eye to eye in truth and standing shoulder to shoulder in righteousness. And this was also the Kingdom of which our Lord proclaimed Himself the Messiah; and He too taught that it alone could give a peace established in true righteousness. God's Kingdom comes when we hallow the name of God as our common Father, and seek to do His will on earth as in heaven, which surely must mean in freedom, as it is seen and accepted as our own.

If this be the goal, however distant, we can see why,

if man is good only as he himself chooses good, he may have to learn life's painful lesson by facing the consequences of his failure, as they work in the order of time. Nor, except it be advance on freedom, is there any standard of progress? Doubtless civilisation has meant a larger possibility of evil as well as good: but this is the case with all increase of power and opportunity. If God's end is merely to prevent error and evil, we cannot ascribe to Him any great success. No history can be interpreted by a power which wishes to keep man safely in the nursery. But if progress is to be judged positively by what is won, and not negatively by what is avoided, it is to be seen, first in the growth of knowledge, as the individual learned to stand on his own feet and judge for himself, and then in the growth of order, as compulsion became less and the freedom of the citizen became greater.

Freedom is a high and difficult task and men weary in it and put themselves again under what St. Paul calls the law; and, when they enjoy long material prosperity, they sometimes sacrifice political as well as spiritual freedom to the safeguarding of their ease. But no nation is ever long suffered to retain its peace with anything less than girt loins, both for independent thinking and for independent acting. This is the prophetic interpretation of calamity, and time has only added to the evidence that God will not suffer a nation

to be satisfied with less than seeing and doing his law in the love of it.

This Kingdom of the Father, which is the freedom of His children, may still be far away. But it is nearer, even in human order, than when the prophets preached it. And anything ahead, however distant, is nearer than anything behind, however slowly it is being left. If one can read the signs of the times at all, the Roman idea of submission is behind, and, as a general purpose of humanity, is never likely again to be the goal. Even its present attraction for many is merely because of weariness and discouragement, which never is of true faith in the Highest.

The other two reasons given for rejecting a belief, first that it is not proved and, second, that it is not credible, can be dealt with shortly, partly because what has been said already shows how they would be answered, and partly because one example of each will suffice.

As the example of what is not proved I take the assertion that Jesus founded the Church, as a hierarchical, sacerdotal state, with the apostles as rulers in His stead, and Peter as the chief, who became bishop of Rome, and handed down his supremacy to all future bishops of that see.

With our present knowledge, this might be confidently said to be disproved. We have seen how our

Lord's last injunctions to His disciples were in the quite opposite direction. The apostles claimed no lordship over men's faith, but wrote, with warning and instruction, as themselves disciples of Jesus to His disciples, and as themselves members of His fellowship to their fellow-members. Among the many fine qualities of St. Peter, infallibility never seems to have been one: and he was most deplorably wrong at Antioch. Further, it is not difficult to trace, at a later date, the rise of the political idea, and its effect in changing the early Christian fundamental conception of the family to the Greek and Roman conception of the state, and of pardon, as the Restoration of His children by the Father, to state condonation of offence. In the New Testament, the very idea of a saint is one open to the leading of the Spirit, with its effect to be judged by the spirit of love. Moreover, holiness is entirely ethical, and there is not a single ritual precept, while the vital change to the Catholic Church is in the reintroduction of the idea of the holy from Paganism as 'a sort of awesome potency, of the same type as obtained in the early Jewish ritual, and which the Prophets spent their energy in combating. Nor is it by any teaching of the Apostles that the claim of the Roman priesthood to be their sacerdotal successors is justified, for they never claimed any sacerdotal potency.

But it suffices here to say that the Roman claim is entirely unproved. History is not what may have hap-

pened, but what can be proved, by known evidence, to have happened. Moreover, assertion in which Rome has an easy supremacy is rather the opposite of evidence. If her claim is so essential, we can only say that there has been a most regrettable neglect on the part of Providence to provide the evidence for it. In particular, this is the case with the primacy of Peter at Rome. There is not even an account of it like Livy's story of Romulus and Remus, though even it no serious historian regards as evidence. The Roman argument is little more than the possibility that it may have happened, which is no historical foundation at all. A tradition, known to be late and a reason for the rise of which can be given, adds nothing as evidence.

As an example of what is incredible, I take transubstantiation.

Even as late as Tertullian it was assumed that Jesus was speaking figuratively when he said, "This is my body." No one ever spoke more frequently in this way; and the observances, as recorded in the Gospels, are in the usual double form of his parables, the second member saying the same thing as the first, with deepened meaning. The natural explanation of the rite is that it was the sign and seal of his disciples' fellowship with Him in His suffering, their participation in the benefits of His sacrifice, and their consecration with Him to the Kingdom of God, in the renunciation of fear of them that kill the body. The idea that the

bread was actually changed into the body depended not on the New Testament, but on the Platonic idea of substance and accidents; and the possibility of conceiving it vanishes with the theory.

That the power of working this miracle depends on an act of ordination is still less Christian. Originally laying on of hands was only a specially solemn invocation of the help of the Spirit for any specially difficult undertaking, as with Barnibas and Paul, when they went on their first mission, though they had long been leaders in the Church, and had doubtless exercised all its ministries. Nor is there the slightest probability that any apostle took part in the ceremony. The belief that ordination creates a special priesthood has nothing to do with the prophetic and Christian conception of the holy, but this holy priesthood of descent by ordination is of the type of Paganism, and early ritual Judaism. Nay it is just primitive *mana*. Moreover, if we can judge by the disorder in St. Paul's time, there could have been no special administrator at all: and, in any case, he puts all the stress on the right spirit, and none at all on the right method of administration, and still less on the right person to do it.

All this may be summed up by saying that the Roman claim to inherit promises which were first attached to the ideal Kingdom of God, as the rule of God in the freedom of His children, in their own vision of truth and their own consecration of love, makes the

Visible Church an end, whereas it is to be judged merely as a means for fulfilling the final end. Size, under the myriad stars, is in God's universe less than nothing and vanity. Only what is wholly different from visible greatness, by possessing absolute quality, has in it the promise of infinity and eternity. As far as history shows, this has usually been highest in one inspired soul, and has wrought most effectively and even widely through the truly consecrated gathering of the two or three. Most of our Protestant divisions are distressing, and many of them seem to be useless: and the true spirit of God's Kingdom would heal most of them. But they are not profitably to be suppressed, even by ecclesiastical authority, because, as the deepest changes in our material world may be preparing their beginning in some development of an atom, some higher realisation of the Kingdom of God may be preparing itself in the spirit and vision of the smallest society. Naturally, the task of freedom is much more difficult, and even more divisive than the way of submission. But, if it is God's end, we must, like Him, not faint or grow weary. In view of its magnitude, we have only been occupied in it seriously for a very few hundred years: and we must remember that with God, a thousand years are but as one day. Nor has it ever been with the faith and courage and devotion which it, of all tasks, most requires. But, if God's final order is not one imposed on His subjects, but one the essence

of which is the freedom of His children, we also may not be content with less than this victory on the earth of truth seen and right chosen, and our call is not to seek shelter in anything less, but to hazard all in the assurance that was the end of God's working, and should be of ours, that, in spite of all that seems to be against it, it alone is sure to triumph. The trouble is that we seldom wish to trust God, unless we have failed to find some more visible substitute: and so are far more apt to be impressed by an external authority which claims to be Divine than to be ready to commit our hope to the direct authority of God which works only by His love, both in its endless claim and its infinite succour.

VIII

WHY I AM NOT A ROMAN CATHOLIC

PROFESSOR A. E. TAYLOR, D.LITT.

WHEN I am asked, "Why are you not a Roman Catholic," my first impulse is to meet the questioner with a counter-question, "Why should I be a Roman Catholic?" I happen, in fact, to be something else, namely, an Anglican; it is natural I should be that, for that is what I have been made by all those influences of education, tradition, and personal history which, in the main, settle what a man's intellectual and moral allegiance shall be, and nothing has ever happened to me to make me at all uneasy about my allegiance. I am Anglican, that is, for much the same reasons that a Roman Catholic, born into a Roman Catholic community and educated in its traditions, is a Roman Catholic, or, for the matter of that a Jew, born and reared in the traditions of the Synagogue, a Jew. It is generally the case, I suppose, with all of us that what our birth and education predisposes us to be, that we are, unless some critical experience of the failure of our traditions forces the necessity of a change upon us.

Naturally, I recognize that this answer, true as it it, is no answer to the question in the sense in which it is presumably put. For reasons assigned for a belief, or an act, may be of either two kinds. They may be merely *explanatory,* an account of the causes of my belief or my act, or, again, they may be *justificatory,* a statement of the grounds for holding that my belief is true, or my act right. What I have just said is, of course, only an explanatory reason, an account, and I hope an adequate account, of the causes of the fact that I am outside the Roman communion; what is expected from me, I feel sure, is a justifying reason, a statement of the grounds on which I believe myself to be right in remaining outside that Communion. What some of these grounds are I will now attempt to indicate in the simplest language I can find. But before I do so, I should like to make two brief prefatory remarks. The first is that I do not concede that the Roman Church, or any other, has the right to throw on the outsider the burden of justifying his position. It is for the propagandist who calls upon outsiders to come over to his society to provide them with sufficient reasons why they should change their allegiance, not for them to give him justification for their loyalty to the system in which they have been bred. The Church of Rome is a more august society than that of the Seventh Day Adventists, but either, if it would convert me, must make out its case. Neither is entitled to con-

front me with the challenge, "Either make your submission or prove my claims to be unfounded."

My other remark is that the reasons I shall offer are simply those which, if I know myself, have decisive weight with me personally. They are *my* reasons for holding that I should do wrong to contemplate becoming a Roman Catholic; they commit no one but myself, and must not be taken as presenting the controversial "position" of Anglicanism, or any other 'ism. Such as they are, I honestly believe them to constitute a valid justification for my loyalty to my own Church; whether I am mistaken or not is a question for my readers.

In the first place, then, I must state as emphatically as I can a principle which I hold to be of first-rate importance. As I have already said, the convictions which ultimately determine a man's allegiance in the great practical issues of life are not, in point of fact, adopted by serious men arbitrarily, by an act of unfettered personal choice. A man's love of country does not take the special form of an ardent devotion to England, or Scotland, or France because he has looked round, in a detached spirit, on the various nations of Europe, and selected England, Scotland, France, as the case may be, as the community which enjoys the best laws, or has the most admirable social organisation, or appeals most forcibly to his historical imagination, but because he is born an Englishman, a Scot, or a French-

man. A man does not normally even make his political party a matter of deliberate and reflective free choice. He is a Conservative, a Liberal, a Labour man, because being the man he is, shaped by the inheritance of social tradition by which he has been shaped, he finds his own aspirations and ideals already, in the main, embodied for him in the "programme" of one of these parties, and so has no "live option" but to throw in his lot with it. And the same thing is about equally true, as I have said, about confessional allegiance in matters of religion. Now I hold very strongly that this not only is so, but ought to be so. Convictions and allegiances so intimate to us that they cannot be changed without deep-seated reconstruction of the whole personality, ought not to be lightly worn; readiness to change them, except under the stress of the most imperative necessity, is only possible where there is no real depth of personal character. It ought, for example, to be as impossible to an Englishman born to transfer his devotion from England to some other country, whose institutions he may think more satisfactory, as it is to a good son to transfer his filial devotion from his actual parents to others whom he may judge, perhaps correctly enough, to be more "deserving" persons. In the same way, for most of us, at any rate, our political "party" ought not to be determined by personal unfettered selection. There are those who *ought*

to be Conservatives and again, those who *ought* to be Labour men, because, being the men they are, they cannot follow a different allegiance without something like treason against their own personality. And the same considerations apply with at least equal force in the sphere of religion. A man's religion ought to be so intimately a part of his own personality, shaped for him by the forces which have made him the person he is and expressive of the person he is, that without passing through a spiritual crisis from which he comes out a radically different man, it should be impossible for him to change it. Facile "conversion" means either or both of two things. Either the convert's old belief meant very little to him and was not really inwoven into his personality, or his new "convictions" are very much "on the surface," and he is not the sort of convert it is worth taking much trouble to make.

Thus, for my own part, I agree entirely with Newman when he says that a mere intellectual or emotional preference of one religion or Church to another, however well founded, is no adequate motive for transference of allegiance: "nothing but a simple, direct call of duty is a warrant for any one leaving one Church; no preference of another Church, no delight in its services, no hope of greater religious advancement in it. The simple question is, Can *I* (it is personal, not whether another, but can *I*) be saved in the English

Church?"[1] And I would add that it is not only wrong, but in principle "uncatholic" to be ready to abandon one's allegiance on inadequate grounds. There is, in the end, no reason why the "true worshippers" should be one body rather than many, except that God is one, Jesus Christ is one, and the Truth is one. Readiness to forsake a loyalty which ought to be as deeply ingrained in the personality of a man to whom his religion has a real meaning as his loyalty to country, for any reason other than the imperative call of the highest truth, is an expression of the spirit of sectarianism rather than of serious catholicity. The man of genuinely Catholic mind—at least this is my own conviction—is unlikely to be disposed to "chop and change" in the matter of religion. *His* tendency is rather to stay where he is, to feed to the full on the spiritual sustenance his actual church provides for him, not to be forced out of it except by the conviction that it has *no* spiritual meat and drink to offer. For my own part, I do not believe that it is usually the most catholic-minded among Anglicans who become converts to Rome, nor the most catholic-minded of Presbyterians or Congregationalists who become Anglicans. There

[1] From a letter of January 8, 1845, quoted in *Apologia* Pt. VI. Newman naturally argues the case with special reference to the alternatives, "England or Rome," but the principle applies to all contemplated change of religious allegiance. I could wish that Newman had formulated the "simple question" in the rather less ambiguous way, "Can *I* remain in the English Church without known treason to the highest truth?"

is little in common, I take it, between the spirit of a genuine catholicity in religion and the temper of the restless seeker after piquant emotions and curious intellectual adventures.

For one who holds such a view as this, there can clearly be only one consideration which could justify his becoming a Roman Catholic. He might hold that the speculative and dogmatic theology of the Roman Church embodies much truth not sufficiently recognised by that of his own communion, that Rome makes much ampler provision than his own Church for the needs of the practical life of Christian devotion, that her public worship is at all points richer and fuller than that of any other Christian Church, even that, in fact, unity and concord between Christians will never be recovered except by universal consent to recognise the central position of the Roman See and its Bishop, that a really united Christendom is unthinkable without the Pope as its head. These are positions which go far beyond anything which I could honestly concede myself; indeed, from my own point of view, they would amount to confusing what is universal in Christianity with what is specifically Latin. And I should say that if it is really true that one cannot be completely Christian without being something less than thoroughly English (or Russian, or Chinese), it must follow at once that Christianity cannot be the one true and universal religion, the final self-disclosure of God to mankind.

For that religion, if such a religion exists, must be capable of appropriation in its fulness by all of us, and not only by those with the special Latin inheritance of institutions and modes of thought.

But even if I held all these rather extreme positions, as I do not, I should still say, there is nothing in the whole of them which would make it anything but wrong for me personally, here and now, to forsake my own Church for the Roman. At most all that would follow from all these concessions, which, as I have said, I could not myself make, would be that, if I made them, I must desire that the whole world shall ultimately be gathered into the Roman fold. But even if I desire this for mankind, my desire does not of itself make it *my* duty to become a Roman Catholic. The only way to convince me of that duty would be to satisfy me that outside the Papal "obedience" there is no Christian Church at all, that is, that those who are without the fold of the Roman Church are actually completely cut off from the practice of the specifically Christian Life. It is not, to my mind, sufficient to tell me that I, or any man, by becoming a Roman Catholic would have access to a richer and fuller Christian life than I at present enjoy. For if my own community has a genuine spiritual life, though an impoverished one by comparision with that of some other community, since personal self-seeking is certainly not the supreme aim of the spiritual life, it may well be my duty to my

own community to be content with such personal development as is consistent with loyal service to it. The case only becomes different if it can be sufficiently shown that outside the Roman Church there is *no* specifically Christian life; in that case, my own non-Roman community has none, any more than I myself, and the one service I can do to the community and its spiritual life will be to bring home its present spiritual deadness to it by precept and example. That *extra ecclesiam nulla salus,* and that the *ecclesia* outside which there is nothing but death to God is the Roman Catholic Church, would be an excellent reason for conversion to it, and to my mind, the only fully sufficient reason.

Here then is an argument, and, so far as I can see, the only argument, which ought to be conclusive. Satisfy me that the society which Jesus Christ lived and died to found, and did found effectually on the day of Pentecost, is conterminous with the Roman Catholic Church, and I hope I should have the honesty to become a Roman Catholic to-morrow. But it is not by any of the methods common in controversy that I can imagine myself being brought to believe this momentous proposition. Appeals to ambiguous "proof-texts," evidence from history that unreason and un-Christian passions have counted for a good deal in the separation of the Easterns, or of the sixteenth-century Anglicans and Protestants, from the Roman communion, alike leave

me personally unmoved. They can all be met, so far as I am able to judge, by equally good arguments of the same kind in the contrary sense; it is certain that there is nothing in them which had not, in the opinion of the non-Roman, been considered and refuted again and again. In fact, I should gravely doubt whether controversy of this kind has ever, by itself, made a single convert much worth the making. On me, at least, such polemics have much the effect ascribed by Hume to Berkeley's proofs of his doctrine of the non-existence of matter; they admit of no answer—perhaps —but equally they produce no conviction.

What would convince me, and, as far as I can see, the only thing which would convince me, would be an experimental proof. Suppose it could be said, "Look at the Roman Church, and you will find the Christian life of faith, hope, charity, prayer, and the practice of the sacraments flourishing among its members; look at the Anglican Church, or any other which is not Roman, and you will see that though these societies may have many good qualities, and are often excellent training-grounds in civic and social virtues, their members know nothing in practice of the specifically Christian graces and the distinctively Christian virtues, such as humility; they do not lead the life of prayer; sacramental devotion has no reality for them"; if this could be said with anything like truth, it would be hard to deny that the case for identifying the Church of Jesus Christ

with the Roman Catholic Church had been made out. And, no doubt, eager controversialists have sometimes said things of the kind. But those of us who are not professional controversialists know well enough that such statements are simply not true. I remember once reading a novel in which an ardent Roman Catholic was made to propound the rather scornful question, "Who ever heard of a spiritually minded Protestant?"[2] Well, the answer is really not difficult to give. A Roman Catholic, who only knows "Protestants" from outside, may not have come across spiritual minded "Protestants," as Fascination Fledgby, in Dickens' story, had never come upon a poor Jew. But the Jews, as old Riah told him, "often hear of poor Jews," and the "Protestants" equally often know spiritually minded "Protestants," and have occasion to thank God for them. Anglicans were, of course, intended to be covered by the censure I have just quoted, but if any man seriously maintains to me that the life of prayer, of the Christian sacraments, and the Christian graces does bear ample fruit in the converse of countless quiet Anglicans, I know of my own personal knowledge that he is under a strange illusion, and I should

[2] The word is, of course, being used in the way habitual among Roman Catholic writers to include all who severed communion with Rome, or were denied communion by Rome, at the Reformation. It is meant to include Anglicans, and I therefore take it in the sense in which it is meant, without discussing the suitability of this use of the name.

say the same thing of any Anglican who might be rash enough—though I hope none would be so rash—as to question the existence of spiritually minded Presbyterians, or Congregationalists, or Quakers. In fact, one has only to look at the broad general features of the Christian life as practised by my own communion, the Anglican, at the present day to see that it is remarkably vigorous.

The visible outward manifestations of the specifically Christian life in the English Church were, no doubt, sadly curtailed in certain post-Reformation periods, but though the principle of life was, for a time, driven inward upon itself, thank God, it was not extinguished. The tree was, so to say, pollarded roughly and often unwisely, with results not comely to the eye; it was not cut off from its roots, and that is why it is not only recovering its old comeliness, but putting out new branches from day to day. If the interruption of communion with the Apostolic See could affect the life of a Church at its source, the Church of England ought to be at least moribund to-day; in fact, it is alive, as it has been in no previous generation for centuries, in good works, and has become, against long unfavourable omens, a great missionary society to the world at large. Were the rigid Roman theory of the Church correct, the apparent life of the English Church ought really to be, as our Roman brethren sometimes imagine it to be, a ghastly mockery; in fact it is a tremendous

reality, and a theory which cannot be squared with reality must be wrong somewhere.

For my own part, I must confess that the fact of Christian missions in particular seems to me proof that there is something amiss with all theories of catholicity which make the unity of the Catholic Church into something easily recognisable by external marks. I cannot think it right to single out some one visible organisation, or a small group of such organisations, and say this (or these) is (or are) the Christian Church, and all who are outside them, though they may be personally Christians, are beyond the bounds of the Christian society. For what makes the unity of the Church is its living connection with its one Head and Root, Jesus Christ, and where there is really fruitful Christian missionary activity, then I cannot doubt there is this living and uninterrupted connection. I fear too many of us are often led into a false and uncharitable simplicity of theory by the old metaphor of the seamless robe. We tend to think of the "unhappy divisions" of history as though they had torn here a piece and there a piece clean away from the main fabric of the garment. But when I look at the unmistakable signs of real spiritual life to be found in so many diverse Christian organisations, I cannot but think that though there have been many lamentable rendings of the robe it has not been torn in two, or in three, from top to bottom, as the veil of the Temple was torn at the

Crucifixion. Consider the oldest and most grievous rent of all. If the Eastern Churches were the robe and the Latin a severed fragment, the Roman Church and all Churches which derive historically from it should for many centuries have been dead in faith, charity, and good works. And what then, to take only one hard fact out of many, of the heroic record of the Jesuit missionaries to Canada in the seventeenth century? If the Eastern Churches were the severed fragment, what shall we say of the martyrs and confessors of the persecuted Russian Church of to-day? And the same argument applies equally to the divisions of the great disruptive period of the Reformation.

If the theories of root-and-branch Reformers were anything like the truth, we could not so much as speak of a Roman Church in any true sense; what is called by the name would be an apostate society, a "synagogue of Antichrist"; if the strict Roman theory were the truth, or anything like it, the same thing would have to be said of the Anglican churches, and all others which have been without formal communion with Rome since the sixteenth century. It might, no doubt, be held that here and there in such an apostate society, a few individuals, less deeply infected than their neighbours by the general corruption of the society, had been preserved from the contagion, by a special grace, but how should we account for the fact that, on both sides, it is not those who have held aloof from the body of their

Church, but those who have been most loyal to its corporate inheritance, who have been the most illustrious examples of the Christian graces? How does the uncompromising anti-Roman explain Friedrich von Hügel, or the "ultra-montane" William Law, or let me add, the "Tractarian" Alexander Whyte? These men are the product of their societies, and a society which produces such men is *obviously* not simply a dead branch cut off from the vine.

The more I consider such facts, and the oftener I read the history of the divisions which have arrayed Christians in hostile camps, the more deeply do I feel myself convinced of two things. These divisions are a scandal and a disgrace to the Christian name. To do its work of leavening the world, the Christian Church ought to be one with a unity more real than that of a healthy nation; it is living in an enfeebled and unnatural condition so long as it is a battle-ground, so to say, for the animosities of Yorkists and Lancastrians, or even for the feuds of Whig and Tory. But it seems equally clear to me that no great permanent division has ever arisen from a difference in which the guilt has been simply on the side of one party, and there is no such division to-day in which one side is simply right in all its contentions, and the other simply wrong. It is the duty of all of us to attempt to restore the lost unity, and to begin the attempt in a spirit of genuine humility. We cannot be too anxious to learn from any

quarter where we have overstepped the truth, or where we have been blind to the value of some institution or practice for the spiritual life, and we must not let ourselves be robbed of the lesson by any attachment, however pardonable, to venerable and time-consecrated prejudices of our own. If unity is to be restored, we shall all of us have to make confession of errors and wrong-doing, and we shall all have to be prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of unity, and the confession and sacrifice will sometimes be hard. But neither will any one who shares my position forget that there is truth, as there are precious elements of practical and proved value, on his own side also, and that these must not be thrown away in a passion for union at all hazards. We shall regard ourselves also as custodians of a treasure which must be kept intact in order that it may yet enrich the re-united Catholic Church of the future. The duty of preserving it undiminished may sometimes make it obligatory on those who are most alive to the evils of division to refuse to purchase an immediate outward unity, or the semblance of one, by submission to demands we honestly believe unjustified. So long as I hold the views I have tried to explain, I am bound also to hold that the secession of an Anglican who thinks with me on the main issue to the communion of Rome, however honourable his motives, would be something very much like an act of "formal schism." And for the same reasons, I see no prospect of a corporate

re-union of the Anglican Churches with the Papacy while the conditions of the re-union, or the Papal rule, remain what they appear to be.

I must bring these pages to an end by a brief statement as to what I take to be the really vital principle which is, as I said, to my mind the special deposit Anglicans are bound to keep intact for the benefit of the Christian Church of the future. What I am concerned about (and I think most Anglicans, even those who are popularly thought to be nearest to Rome, share my concern at heart) is something which goes much deeper than any particular theological dogma; it is the distinction between *authority* and *infallibility*. And I am not referring here in particular to the Vatican Council and its pronouncements about the infallibility, under certain conditions, of the utterances of the Pope, but to something still more fundamental. Quite independently of the Vatican Council the Roman Church is committed, or so it seems to me, to what I at least regard as the fatal confusion between *authority* and an *infallibility* with a definite and ascertainable locality. Now to me—and I hope to all Anglicans—it is a real matter of principle that while there is a real and venerable authority about the pronouncements of the properly accredited spokesmen of the Church in any age, there is not, and never has been, any infallible man or body of men who "cannot err." This is not to say that we "despise authority," or that we "think one man's

opinion as good as another's." We are well enough aware that everywhere alike, in matters of science, of morals, of art, there are always those who speak with authority, and whose authority, even when they offer no reasons for their verdict, a man only "neglects at his peril."

But we do not believe that authority, even the most complete authority, is ever the same thing as formal infallibility. From our point of view, to admit such a formal infallibility, whether claimed for Pope, or for Council, or for both together, would be in principle the same sort of surrender of the truth as it would be to concede to a "fundamentalist" the inerrancy of every statement found *totidem verbis* in the canonical scriptures. And we seriously hold that we have the stubborn facts on our side in making this distinction. We believe that there are definite facts, not to be denied or explained away by artifice, which forbid us to repose a blind confidence in the infallibility of either Scripture, Councils, or Pope, and that a confidence of this kind is really out of keeping with the whole spirit of Christ's Christianity. If this inability to identify authority with infallibility is to be called—as it may be called for purposes of hostile controversy—"Protestantism," or "Modernism," *in that sense,* I should say, Anglicanism is incurably "Protestant" or "Modernist," and has no cause to be ashamed of the fact. I have heard a story, true or not, of a Roman divine who said of a well-

known Anglican, "He believes the same things that we believe, but he believes them for the wholly irrelevant reason that he thinks them true." True or not, the anecdote illustrates a mental attitude which we cannot commend, though it seems to be inseparable from what we regard as the confusion of authority with infallibility. We do not think personal conviction of the truth of a doctrine an irrelevant reason for believing it, and though we should be the first to say that the weight of legitimate authority ought to play a great part in deciding for any of us what are to be our convictions, I am afraid we find it hard to understand how a belief can be a man's own belief at all unless it is held with a personal conviction. Christianity, I think we should all agree with Dr. Inge, does not desire us to believe anything except for the reason that it is true.

To put the point in a way which is simple to the verge of colloquialism, what dissatisfies Anglicans about the attitude of the Roman "authorities" to the believer is that they seem to be saying in effect, "Here is the truth, without adulteration or alloy, straight from Rome; you must take it or leave it. And that's that." What we look for, and what we think we have a right to find, in our "authorities" is a sympathetic guide into the truth, wiser and more cautious than ourselves but capable of learning something from our bewilderments and perplexities; what we get, if we go to Rome, seems rather to be a drill-sergeant. And we do not believe

this is as it should be. The worst of it is that this method of the drill-sergeant does not seem to be confined to the sphere of dogmatic definition of theological doctrine. It seems to pervade the whole system of devotional life and practice. The most striking example of the attitude is, I suppose, the disciplinary enforcement of "private confession to the priest" as a pre-condition of admission to the sacraments, if not as an indispensable condition of remission of sins. For my own part I cannot dissent from the criticism sometimes made by members of the Eastern Churches that this practice tends to convert the priest from the physician of the penitent soul into something like a *juge d'instruction,* and a *juge* who, if report speaks truly, is not unacquainted with the methods of the "third degree." The attitude of the Anglican Church, as set forth in her authorized book of devotion, is different. She does not compel the confidences of the penitent, but invites them, and offers counsel and direction to the distressed in conscience whenever they are sought, without claiming the right to impose interrogatories, or encouraging the dangerous habit of throwing the responsibility for my own conduct upon my "director."

Whatever may have been done amiss in the age of the Reformation, it was, to my mind, an imperishable gain that the framers of the Book of Common Prayer inserted the open "general confession," to be followed by an open absolution, in the offices for daily prayer,

and left the further making of more private specific confessions to the conscience of the individual believer. In declaring for the open sacraments, the English Church, so to say, broke the seals of the grave in which Christ had been hidden for centuries by the Middle Ages, at the same time that it snapped leading-strings which may once have had their uses, but had to be discarded if men were ever to realise their own personal responsibility before God for their own lives. John Inglesant is made to say by his creator that this difference between the closed and the open sacrament is the only difference between Rome and Canterbury; it is, to my mind, at least the one all-important difference. For the question is whether the laity are to be minors in the Christian life all their days, or to grow, no less than the clergy, into adult manhood. To state the issue so is to indicate my own conviction that the freedom of the sacraments is a vital necessity unless mankind is to lose once more the one supremely good thing which it has gained from the confusion and turmoil of the Reformation age, the sense of full personal responsibility and the dignity of conscience. This, in fact, I should say, is the chief treasure which Churches like my own are bound to preserve as a sacred trust for the better reunited Church of our hopes.

Not, of course, that this is the only field in which, from my own point of view, an exaggerated official authoritarianism works mischief. Without pretending

to disguise the fact that some of the "Modernists" affected by Papal action thirty years ago were incautiously divesting themselves of much that is fundamental to historical Christianity, I still think I am speaking the sense of most, if not all, Anglicans when I say that the methods by which they were treated reveal an attitude on the part of the "authorities" with which Anglicans can make no terms. Men who should have been reasoned with were struck at by authoritative declarations, and these declarations not merely contained warnings of possible serious danger to the interests of religion, or enforced cessation of controversies for disciplinary reasons; they undertook to pronounce results arrived at by biblical or scientific research erroneous in point of fact. I hold no brief for the particular views thus pronounced false; some of them, I dare say, *were* false, and others were at least insufficiently grounded. What does seem to me wrong in principle is that an ecclesiastical authority should undertake to decide, independently of the relevant evidence, how and when the Pentateuch or the Synoptic Gospels were composed, or whether there has been an "evolution" of biological species. My conviction that the proceeding is wrong would remain unaffected if I were of the opinion that the authorities had, in fact, been right in every instance. The proceedings taken against the Modernists would of themselves keep me outside the Roman Church, if they stood entirely by

themselves. For I should have no confidence, were I a member of that Church, that I might not be called on, at any moment, to pronounce any historical or scientific proposition whatever false at the bidding of an *Encyclical,* or *proprio motu,* on pain of deprivation of the sacraments. I do not say that this consideration would lead me to forsake the Church of Rome if I had been brought up within it; one may be prepared to suffer a great deal from one's parents in silence.

But the very fact that a Church claims to deal with history and natural science in this high-handed fashion is to me evidence that there is a radical error somewhere in its conception of the nature and grounds of its own authority, and that it is no duty to God to submit myself to a society which may, for anything I can tell, at any moment demand of me a crime against conscience.[2] If there is ever to be once more, as we all must hope, a Church which realises the ideal of Catholicity, I do not doubt that its administrative head, or heads, will find themselves armed with a very real authority, and I am far from denying that a Bishop of Rome may not prove to be the natural administrative head of the society, though I should think it rash to assert as much. But I am sure that nothing but mischief has ever come from mistaking rightful authority for

[2] Of course I shall be told that the formal definition of infallibility does not cover the area of such pronouncements as those I have mentioned and that the Church is not formally committed by them. But to all intents it is practically committed so long as they are in force.

infallibility, and no less sure that authority is all the more readily recognised and willingly obeyed when it advances no such extreme pretension.

May I say one other thing which is very near my heart? If we are in the future to see a Church which is not only truly catholic but truly Christian, it must, I hold, absolutely renounce all claim to wield or to direct any sword but its own, the "sword of the Spirit." My own Church, among others, has sinned in the past by grasping at the other sword, but it has long enough now owned its contrition. Is the great and ancient Latin Church, whose offences in this kind have been so many and so flagrant, prepared to make the same confession? If it is not, as I suspect it is not, then the time for reunion is not yet, and in the meanwhile, were there no other obstacles, I cannot find the abode of the supreme truth in a society which has not renounced the right of persecution.

IX

WHY I AM NOT A ROMAN CATHOLIC

PROFESSOR H. L. GOUDGE, D.D.

IT is often hard to explain our convictions, even to ourselves. We may know what we believe, and be able to defend it, and yet be unable to say which of our arguments influences us most, or whether, even taken together, they mean as much to us as some experiences of our own which we could hardly explain to others. But I do not find this difficulty with the Roman question. I am conscious neither of any deep attraction to the Church of Rome; nor of any deep repulsion from it; as far as I know, the reasons why I am not a Roman Catholic are reasons which I can explain. But we are all influenced in ways unknown to ourselves; and all that I can do is to answer the question put to me as accurately as I can.

Let me say first how I understand my task. I am not to write a treatise on the Roman question, or to say what in the abstract I think the strongest arguments against Romanism to be; I am to say what influences me personally. Ordinarily I should shrink from a subjective treatment of the question; I dislike saying, "I

am certain," when others at least as well-informed as myself think very differently. The feeling of certainty arises in many ways, and the fact that we feel certain about a thing is no proof that it is true. But I am asked to speak simply for myself, and even the mistakes which I may make may help to explain my position.

My family then, and early surroundings, were strongly Protestant; and I have never met more devoted Christians than the best of the Evangelicals whom I knew when I was young. That Catholicism is necessary for sanctity I shall never believe. But even as a boy I found the Fundamentalism of the old Evangelicals and some of their theology for me impossible, and began to read and think for myself. Among the boys of the school to which I went there was considerable interest in religion; and there was at one time a "rage" for going to the Roman Catholic Church, though, as far as I know, nothing came of it. I did not do this myself; but I remember buying and reading a Roman Catholic hymn-book, and as a young man I read perhaps more of Newman than of any other religious writer. Though, however, I specially liked one or two of his Roman books, I do not remember ever being impressed by his arguments. I also read with interest and profit Roman devotional books, such as those of Scupoli and Rodriguez, and I do so still; of all devotional books I value most Arvisinet's *Memoriale Vitæ Sacerdotalis*. But I read Roman books just as I read others, and in

the formation of my religious opinions I am not conscious of much debt to any Roman book except Moehler's *Symbolism.* What I have continually tried to do is to reach for myself, and for those whom I have to teach, a theology consistent with itself and broad-based upon facts; and I have cared little where I found my materials. That the Church is divided is to me an obvious fact; and I have not expected to find the full truth in any part of it, still less to attain it myself. Whether the Church of Rome is on the whole superior to the Church of England is a question which interests me little, since I should not join it, even if I thought it were. I have been brought up in the Church of England, and am at home in it; I am more likely to be of use there than anywhere else. I have prayed repeatedly to God to show me if He wishes my allegiance to be changed, and He has not done so. I have considered and reconsidered the Roman claims, and can find no basis for them anywhere. I have found in the sacraments as ministered where I am, all, and more than all, that I could have expected to find in them; and, though I have a profound regard for many Roman Catholics, I see nothing in their conduct and character to lead me to suppose that they possess advantages denied to others. Moreover, all that is best in the teaching and practice of Roman Catholics, as in that of other Christians, I can study and assimilate where I am. Thus I have no motive for becoming a Roman Catholic. I

hope that, if God called me to change my allegiance, I should do so; but the possibility seems to me very remote.

I

Now, before giving my reasons, it may be well to make clear the place of "private judgment" in religion. Obviously I am judging for myself, in spite of the vast possibilities of error which this involves. I do so because, like every other human being, I am obliged to do so. Private judgment is in one respect a right, and in another a duty; but primarily it is a necessity which we cannot escape. To say this is in no way to repudiate authority in its proper place, or to claim the right to believe what we please. It is often wise to accept the authority of others, and we have no right to any opinion which is not the truest which we have been able to attain. But, if we accept the authority of others, it is because our private judgment leads us to accept it; and, if we continue to rely upon our chosen authority, it is upon our private judgment that the continuance of our reliance must rest. It is thus upon a guidance which may be mistaken that we all alike depend. It may seem strange that God should so have ordered things for us; we might perhaps have expected Him to provide us with more certainty than He has actually given. But, as someone has said, we are living in a very improbable world; and we must take things as they are. Now, as

things are, "the spirit of man is the lamp of the Lord." God has given to us our reason and conscience, and facts upon which to exercise them; and in religion as elsewhere there is no way discoverable for the attainment of truth except honest and patient investigation. No doubt, if we are Christians, we believe that the help of the Spirit of God is offered to us; we must pray for it, and so purify our hearts that it can be given to us. But it is by the illumination of our minds and consciences that the help is given, and not by the supersession of either.

Is all this, as many think, very unsatisfactory? Yes, if what we desire is to be saved from trouble; but not otherwise. We must remember two things. First, reason and conscience are not just individual faculties, but universal ones; though we speak of "private" judgment, the word private is misleading. We are sharers in a gift which fundamentally is the same in us all; and in religion as elsewhere the right use of it leads in the long run to unity of belief, not to diversity. Religion is a difficult subject. But one great reason why we differ so much in religion and so little in astronomy, is that our wishes and prejudices overwhelm our reason in the one case, and not in the other. Secondly, we can surely see that the way which God has chosen for us is the best way. What matters most is not the immediate correctness of our religious opinions, but the training of our characters; and the latter is impossible without

trial and difficulty. Just as we cannot acquire patience without enduring suffering, or courage without facing danger, so we cannot acquire the intellectual virtues without the pains, and often the pain, which the honest seeking after truth involves. We may indeed find peace of a sort by ceasing to think, and accepting doctrinal formulæ at the word of command. But the result is impoverishment of character; a faith which has cost us nothing is generally worth about what it has cost. If we have faith in God, we shall have no fear that, if we are faithful to the light we have, He will suffer us to go far astray. But patience is necessary; faith is "an experiment which ends in an experience," and we must not ask for certainty at the outset of our course.

Now I am far from charging the Roman Church with formally denying all this. The trouble, as so often, is that it speaks with two voices. On the one hand, its best apologists, so far from despising reason, seem to repose in reasoning an even exaggerated confidence. We can and should, I understand them to teach, be led by it to belief in God. Further, we can and should be led by it, as we consider the facts of history, to belief in the Divinity and paramount authority of the Lord. Yet further, we can and should be led by it to the belief that our Lord gave to His Church the power to teach infallibly and to claim obedience to its teaching and to the belief that His Church is to be identified with the Church of Rome. It is not until reason has done all

this for us that we can rightly be asked to accept without criticism what that Church teaches us. It is this quite intelligible position with which I shall presently be concerned. It means that, in dealing with the most fundamental questions, Roman Catholics are no better off than Protestants. The Church cannot in these questions appeal to her authority, since the acceptance of her authority presupposes that they have already been decided upon other grounds. Unfortunately it is just in these fundamental questions that our difficulties arise. It is belief in any God worthy of the name, and belief in the Divinity of Christ, that we find difficult in view both of the facts of life, and of the problems raised by modern knowledge and criticism; and the position is similar with the further steps in the argument. Rome only offers to guide us when we are already out of the wood. On the other hand, the popular apologists of Rome by no means admit that this is the situation; if they did the very nerve of their appeal would be cut. They do not want to argue, but to teach with authority from the outset, and all along the line. Just as a certain type of popular scientist seems to suppose that everything can be explained by evolution, even evolution itself; so they appear to suppose that everything can rest upon authority, even authority itself. We are to take on faith not merely the superstructure of our system of belief, but the foundation also, and have no trouble anywhere. It is just the fact that the

vast majority of Roman Catholics never seem to examine the basis of their faith which makes their acceptance of it intellectually valueless. The agreement of those who think and examine for themselves is impressive. But if all bow to the authority of one, it is only the one who counts; and two of those who think for themselves outnumber him.

II

I shall then assume as incontrovertible the necessity of private judgment in the sense explained. I fully recognise my responsibility for my faith, and in no way claim to believe what I please. On the contrary, I must bow to the witness of facts, however unwelcome it may be. Moreover I am entirely willing to accept the authority of those who can prove their right to speak, and habitually do so. Happily the best Roman apologists seem to approve this attitude, nor could they do otherwise consistently with the teaching of their Church. Thus I can go with them a long way. I may and do think that neither the existence of any God worthy of the name, nor the Divinity of our Lord, can be "proved" by reason in the ordinary sense of the word; but the question is not important for my immediate purposes. Not only do I believe in God and in the Divinity of our Lord, but I know of no difference in either case between my own belief and that of the Church of Rome. All then that is necessary to make me

a Roman Catholic is to prove that our Lord permanently gave to the Church the same authority that He Himself possessed, and that the Church and the Church of Rome are identical. The reason why I am not a Roman Catholic is that I believe neither of these things; and I shall explain why.

Now I approach these questions primarily as a student of Scripture and of Christian origins, and not as a philosopher or a Church historian. Though I am interested in philosophy, I have never gone very deeply into it, and in Church history my knowledge is but secondhand. I am more or less familiar with the arguments commonly drawn from the latter and from the Father both for and against the claims of Rome, and think the arguments against them much the stronger. But they do not weigh heavily with me. By the time that we have reached the latter half of the fourth century when we first seem to find anybody outside Rome accepting the Roman claims, we are much too far from the apostles to speak of the "Primitive Church." Moreover, historical criticism was then unknown. No one either did or could unravel the many strands which united to give peculiar influence to Rome. What is plain is that even in the fourth and fifth centuries there was no one capable of deciding the endless controversies which arose. Rome might speak; but, as when others spoke, the controversies went on as before.

It is then to the Bible that I turn, and the history

and teaching contained in it. I have been studying and meditating upon its words for more than forty years, and finding in them one great support of my faith. The result has been the conviction that by no ingenuity can support be found in Scripture for the claims of Rome; and that, the better we understand Scripture, the more impossible for us does Romanism become. Modern Roman Catholics, even the most saintly, never appear to me to have gone deeply into Scripture; and I have never known a deep student of Scripture to become a Roman Catholic. Moreover, I am clear that the grounds upon which Roman Catholics refuse the appeal to Scripture except as interpreted by "the Church," have no force whatever.

Christianity is a historical religion; and, when controversy arises about it, we must appeal to its earliest documents, and interpret them as freely as we should interpret any others. The fact that it is from the Church that we have received the Scriptures in no way affects this. The Church from which we received them is the Church of the first century, not the Roman Church as we know it to-day; and, so far from the latter having any special advantages for their right interpretation, it has been peculiarly suspicious of modern knowledge, and unwilling to pay attention to it. Moreover, it is far easier to-day than in the sixteenth century to arrive at the true sense of Scripture. If there was then truth in the old gibe that the Bible was a nose of wax, which

everyone could twist as he pleased, there is no truth in it now. Differences in detail as to its interpretation there will probably always be; but not, if we have adequate knowledge, in matters of the first importance.

Now of course within the space at my disposal I cannot give even a summary of the Bible teaching about the question before us. I can only touch on a few points; and I shall leave for the present the most important of all, and deal with it separately in the final section of my paper. In some ways the Bible has drawn me nearer to Rome than were my early Evangelical teachers. It has led me to see the immense importance of the Church in the purpose of God, and destroyed for me the purely individualistic outlook characteristic of the older Evangelicals, though not of the best Protestantism to-day. It has made me very hostile to nationalism in religion, the worst vice of traditional Anglicanism. It has led me to recognise the importance of the outward as the expression and instrument of the inward, and the folly of contrasting the spiritual with the material instead of contrasting it with the carnal. It would be unjust to Rome not frankly to say this, though just now I am concerned with the other side.

Let me begin with the Old Testament, which is here far more important than is generally recognised. The Church in the view of the New Testament writers was not first founded by our Lord. Israel was the Church of

God before the Lord came, and the Life of the Catholic Church is continuous with that of Israel before it. From the earliest days of Israel's life we find the Church of the greatest importance; the present blessings and future hopes of the individual are bound up with membership in the body to which he belongs. Israel was from the first intended to be One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic. All divisions within it were condemned, just as was all disobedience to the divine commands. If it was not yet fully Catholic by being open to all, it was one day to become so, and it was regarded by the prophets as Apostolic in its God-given mission to the world. But, if we ask whether in the Old Testament we find the boundaries of the Church always distinctly marked, and outward unity always maintained, or whether there was a visible head to guard the divine revelation and to safeguard unity, the answer in each case is No. We find, e.g., quite early the division into the northern and southern kingdoms, a division so serious that they are frequently at war; but neither has ceased to be a part of the Church of God. God sends his prophets to both and both almost certainly make their contributions to the literature of the Old Testament. So after the exile we find a division between Israel in Palestine, and the wider Israel of the Dispersion, which shades off into the heathen world; indeed the Jews of Elephantine had at one time a temple of their own. But unity was not altogether

destroyed. In the common adherence of Israel, however imperfect, to the national God and the law that He had given, in the common remembrance of His redeeming work in the past, in the common hopes for Israel's future, great bonds of union remained which brought with them a large measure of visible unity; no one in our Lord's day would have denied the visible unity of the Jewish people. But the unity never depended upon adherence to any visible centre of unity. In the best Old Testament teaching visible kings are regarded as a human invention which God tolerates rather than approves, since they secularise the Church, and obscure the rule of the invisible King, upon Whom all depends. What the Old Testament teaches is that we must always distinguish between what the Church is in the divine purpose, and its actual condition when that purpose has been thwarted by human sin; and that this applies just as much to the unity of the Church as to any other of its "notes" or attributes.

We see then that the Old Testament in no way disposes us to accept the Roman claims; and, though this does not settle the matter, it is of great importance. For the minds of the New Testament writers are steeped in the Old Testament; and, if we are unfamiliar with the latter, we are sure to misunderstand them. The coming of the Lord and the gift of the Spirit made a vast difference to the Church; all things became new. But the Old Testament was the Bible of the Apostles,

to which they continually refer; and by it we must always interpret their words and outlook unless there is reason to do otherwise.

How then does the New Testament speak of the Church and its unity? Exactly as the Old Testament would lead us to expect. The Church still consists of men and women only too apt to "receive the grace of God in vain"; and thus the notes of the Church are still rather ideal than realised to the full extent of the divine purpose. The Church is imperfectly one, just as it is imperfectly holy, though the Lord had prayed for both its holiness and its unity; indeed the two attributes are inseparable, since holiness and love are one. Great bonds of union no doubt there are, as there had been previously in Israel; St. Paul in the Epistle to the Ephesians (iv. 4-7) enumerates seven, and the Papacy is not one of them. But it is not at all true that the unity is not liable to be broken; it requires ceaseless effort to maintain it; and nowhere is there a suggestion that it depends upon adherence to one particular Apostle. Christian unity is primarily an inward thing, as the Lord's words declare: "that they all may be one, even as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." No doubt He continues "that the world may believe that thou didst send me," and it is rightly argued that the Lord desires a unity which the world can see. But that goes without saying. If we

were inwardly one, as the Father and the Lord are one, outward unity would follow as a matter of course. Thus, as far as unity is concerned, the Roman claims find no support in the New Testament, unless it be in the position assigned to St. Peter, and in the inheritance of his position by the Bishop of Rome.

What then is his position? He is extremely prominent in the Gospels and in the first part of the Acts, especially in the late Jewish Gospel in some way connected with St. Matthew. But what we find is a personal pre-eminence due to his character, and not to any official headship. To the end of the Lord's life the Apostles can dispute as to who is the greatest; and we find no authority given to St. Peter which the other Apostles do not share, and no mention anywhere in the New Testament of an office higher than that of an Apostle. If there is any apparent exception, it is to be found in the Petrine text (Matt. xvi. 17-19). But, its authenticity is far too questionable for anything substantial to be built upon it. I myself happen to take a more favourable view of it than many do, and have dealt fully with its authenticity and interpretation in a recent commentary. But I could not defend it, if I thought it was to be interpreted in the Roman way, since it would then contradict the rest of the New Testament. St. Peter was in a true sense the foundation of the Church; the debt of the Church to him is incal-

culable. He had, even pre-eminently, both the porter's keys to open the Church's door, and the scribe's to interpret her laws. He possessed a real primacy among the Twelve, and a rightful leadership among Jewish Christians. But with Gentile Christians it was otherwise, as the New Testament shows. St. Paul's position among the Gentile Christians was as high as St. Peter's among the Jewish; and in all St. Paul's controversies, even with Jewish Christians, he never appeals to St. Peter's authority, but insists upon his own. Neither the Petrine text, nor anything corresponding to it, is found in the Gospels originally intended for Gentile Christians. But the matter of importance is this. It matters little what St. Peter's position was, unless there is reason to suppose that it could have been, and was, handed on to the Bishop of Rome; and there is no such reason. The expositors of the early centuries, however they interpret the Petrine text, seem never outside Rome itself to connect it with Rome; and that rightly. That St. Peter at the end of his life visited Rome and was martyred there I believe to be true, though not quite certainly so. But that he was ever "Bishop" of Rome is a pure fable; there is no evidence that his relation to the Church of Rome differed from his relation to other churches which he visited. In a word the New Testament is just as unfavourable to the Roman claims as the Old Testament. There is no Spiritual support anywhere to be found for them.

III

And now I come to the last point with which in my allotted space I can deal, and there I have far more sympathy with the Roman outlook. What Roman Catholics feel is that, if there is to be any abiding religion in the world, it must have as its foundation something much more solid than Protestantism supplies. There must be a living voice to which we bow. It is not enough to say that we believe the Lord to have been an infallible Teacher; as a historical figure He has passed away. What we want is someone who can speak to us with His authority now. The Gospels tell us that the Lord gave His authority to His Apostles. He said, "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me," and promised them that He would be with them till the end of the world. Thus the Lord's authority must be a present thing; and, if we do not find it in the Church of Rome, where are we to find it? That argument has force; it rests both upon our Lord's authentic words, and upon our sense of need; and I can understand, though not justify, those who refuse to be troubled by the facts of history or the witness of Scripture, and rest upon this alone.

Why then do I not yield to this argument? Because it rests upon a conception of spiritual authority which is mistaken, but which many—and not Roman Catholics alone—are apt to take for granted, if they are un-

familiar with the Bible teaching. They confuse spiritual authority in the highest sense with official authority, and ascribe to the latter the power which belongs only to the former. No doubt official authority is a real thing, even in Church; it belongs to every one, whatever his character, who can prove that his office has been regularly conferred upon him; and the Lord Himself recognised both the authority of Pilate and that of the Jewish priests. But spiritual authority in the highest sense is different in kind from official. It is the authority of the Spirit, the authority of God himself exercised through men. It is a divine power to command, accompanied by a divine power to convince and it authenticates itself by the response which it awakens in those to whom it comes. It may be found in those who possess official authority; but it does not depend upon official position, nor is it necessarily attached to it. Illustrations will make this clear.

We find this authority first in the prophets of the Old Testament, with their "Thus saith the Lord." Some of the greatest prophets were also priests, but the authority of their teaching did not rest upon their official position. It rested upon their personal relation to God Himself, upon the fact that in hearing them men heard Him. When God Himself draws near to us, in conscience or in any other way, He does not prove His authority on external grounds or come to us with a testimonial from someone else. He speaks, and His sheep

hear His Voice. We may refuse to obey—and then we show that we are not His sheep—but we cannot deny that He has spoken. So it was pre-eminently with our Lord and the authority that was recognised in Him. There is a vast difference between Him and the earlier prophets. The Word of God does not "come to" Him, as it came to those who went before Him, for it is never absent from Him. He, unlike them, not only speaks, but is, the Word of God. But he is like them in this, that His authority does not rest upon any official position. It rests upon His perfect union with the Father as His Son, Who knows the Father's mind and lives to carry out His purpose. Though His word, He tells us, is not His own in the sense that He originates it, it is His own in the sense that He is identified with it, and that what the Father says He as one with the Father says with Him. The Father's authority is not so delegated to Him that the Father Himself recedes into the background. He is in the Father and the Father in Him, so that in Him the Father Himself is ever speaking and ever working. Indeed it is in His self-evidencing authority, as well as in His wisdom and mighty works, that the Father is first adequately revealed. There is an authority which is its own evidence to the honest and good heart, but it is the authority of God.

Now it is this spiritual authority, and not merely an official one, that the Lord gives to the Apostles; and that on the same terms as those on which He Himself

possesses it. Just as it is His own continual union with the Father through that obedience by which He "abides in His love," which enables the Father to speak with divine authority through Him, so it is the union of His apostles with Him through a like obedience which enables Him to speak with divine authority through them. That present and living voice, which the Roman Catholic so rightly requires, is provided for us by the Lord dwelling through the Spirit in those whom He sends; but it is a voice which is not necessarily found in an Apostle because he is an Apostle, or in anybody because he has an official position in the Church of Christ. It is found because Christ is present in His servants by the Spirit; and this presence of the Spirit depends upon their continued love and obedience. "If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments. And I will pray the Father and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may be with you for ever." "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; so neither can ye, except ye abide in me." It is to the Apostles themselves that the warning is given. If the presence of the Spirit is lost, this highest spiritual authority is lost with it; and, though we may try to make official authority take its place, official authority cannot do this. Are we then to say that the Roman Church, or that the Bishops of Rome, have no spiritual authority of this kind? Far from it. It may be most true that he who hears them hears Christ Him-

self. But if so, it is because in them the conditions are fulfilled which the Lord lays down. There can be no security that they will not teach what is false unless there is also security that they will not lack the love and obedience upon which the presence of the Spirit depends. "The lamp of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness!" No Church can escape that law, and no Bishop of Rome either. That is what makes official infallibility impossible. Ideally there is no difference between the authority of the sinless Christ and that of those whom He sends, but in fact there is a great difference. Where sin abounds, error and inability to detect the error will abound also, till the sin that blinds the eye is taken away. God will no more force the mind unto truth, than the will unto obedience. I know that the infallibility which the Roman Church claims for the Pope is one very strictly guarded and limited. But, however limited the sphere of infallibility may be, the same insuperable objection applies to it; and I have never seen an answer to this question even attempted.

Is this mere wire-drawn theory? On the contrary, experience bears it out. The life of the Church depends upon the Word of God and the response of faith which it awakens; and, though his life has been found, and

is found, abundantly in the Church of Rome, it is not found there alone, nor is it found there equally at all times and in all places. But it is always ready for revival there as elsewhere, when God Himself can speak, and human faith respond; and nothing is more wonderful than the Church's power of revival when life seems to have departed. But orthodox belief by itself effects very little. If I had space it would be easy to show how impossible it is in the Church of Rome, as in the Church of England, to say precisely what theological propositions must be accepted and what, however widely taught, need not be. There is, as far as I know, no authoritative list of propositions which are *de fide*. If I joined the Roman Church, I should certainly be bound to accept several propositions which appear to me now to be altogether contrary to the available evidence; but I still should not know exactly what I had to believe. That however is not what keeps me outside, but the reasons which I have tried to explain. When Roman Catholic controversialists attack the Church of England I often agree with much that they say; I am not at all "a good Anglican." But the sins of the Church of England do not weigh heavily upon my conscience, because in that Church I am free to denounce them and to work for better things, while it asks of me nothing in faith or practice that I cannot give. In the Roman Church it would be altogether otherwise.

X

WHY I AM NOT A ROMAN CATHOLIC

THE LORD BISHOP OF GLOUCESTER

I HAVE been asked to discuss the question, why I am not a Roman Catholic. Put in that form it is not perhaps very intelligent. For the reason that I am not a Roman Catholic is that by the fortune of my birth I am an English Catholic, that I am the son of a clergyman of the Church of England, that I have been brought up at an English Public School, and an English University, and that I see no reason for being dissatisfied with the religious traditions which I have inherited.

Perhaps, therefore, the question had better be put in the form: What is there that prevents me from becoming a Roman Catholic? I do not, I think, answer this question from any prejudiced point of view. I have not been brought up in a narrow Protestantism. I have a considerable acquaintance with the work of the Roman Catholic Church on the Continent, and I have had, and have, many friends there who are members of it. Although I am not blind to its deficiencies and limitations, I recognise its strength and the work it accomplishes. I know how effective it has been in strengthening and building up the devout life, and in particular its splen-

did record of missionary work. I am not concerned with the minor points of doctrine or practice in which it differs from the Church of England. I can worship with a considerable amount of edification in a Roman Catholic Church, although I feel strongly the disadvantages of a service in a language not understood by the people. I would look forward gladly to the possibility of reunion between the French and English Churches, as between the English and Scottish Churches. But there is one fundamental error which seems to me an absolute hindrance to any union between the Church of Rome and the Church of England, and would always prevent me from having any thought of being a Roman Catholic, and that, stated quite frankly and definitely, is the Papacy.

What I would say about the Papacy I would divide under two headings. I would speak first of the absence of Biblical, historical, or sound theological arguments in its favour. It does not seem to me to be part of the system of the Christian Church as conceived or designed by Our Lord. And then, secondly, I would speak of the harm which the Papacy and the centralised government of the Roman Church have done to Christianity.

THE PAPACY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BIBLICAL BASIS

The alleged Biblical arguments in favour of the Papacy are the promises made to St. Peter and the position of St. Peter in the Early Church.

Before examining these let me clear away a difficulty which has been raised. There are some critics who have suggested that the promise to St. Peter is not a genuine part of Our Lord's words. It is quite true that it only appears in one Gospel, but I have never been able to convince myself that because words ascribed to Our Lord appear in only one Gospel therefore they are not genuine. All our Gospels are very fragmentary, but the great mass of the subject matter of the synoptic gospels is homogeneous in character, and has all the internal marks of representing a stratum which is earlier than any apostolic teaching, and such as might come from Our Lord Himself. To me the position held by St. Peter and the promise of Our Lord correspond with one another, and I have no difficulty in thinking that the words of the promise are not incorrectly reported.

"Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it." These words promise that Peter shall be the foundation—or perhaps rather one of the foundations—on which the Church shall be built. That interpretation exactly corresponds with the historical position. Undoubtedly Peter was the leader of the Apostles, and so far as we can judge, was chosen by Our Lord for that purpose. Undoubtedly he became the leader of the Church in the first days at Jerusalem. In that sense clearly he was the foundation on which the Church

was built. But there his position ceases. Peter naturally took his place as leader of the Church in its earliest days, because he had been appointed for that work by Our Lord Himself. But the promise and the appointment are quite definitely confined to the work of being the foundation of the Church. There was no promise or command that he should be the leader throughout his life. There was no promise or command or suggestion that he should pass on that leadership to successors. This limitation exactly corresponds with the actual facts. St. Peter in the earliest days took the lead, but that leadership does not appear to have been continued. He did not preside over the Church at Jerusalem, even at the Apostolic Council. That position was occupied by St. James. He is clearly one of those Apostles who are described as pillars of the Church, but he has no distinctive position among them. He is one of the leaders, not the leader. There is no evidence that he exercised authority other than that of an apostle. Although his advice is often taken, clearly sometimes he was wrong. "But when Cephas came to Antioch, I resisted him to the full, because he stood condemned," says St. Paul. Clearly he had no gift of infallibility.

The second part of the promise was: "And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in Heaven." But the same promise of

binding and loosing was given afterwards to the disciples, which we must take to mean the Church as a whole. "And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church. . . . Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in Heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in Heaven." The context, I think, clearly shows that the promise given to Peter, and the powers conferred upon him as the rock on which the Church was founded, were not a personal gift confined to himself, but powers conferred on the Church as a whole, to be exercised by the whole Church. This again exactly corresponds to the historical facts as they are presented to us, as in the Epistles of St. Paul when, apart from, and even in opposition to St. Peter, St. Paul and the Church he had founded exercised these powers.

There is a third promise, but one which has no dogmatic signification. It is the thrice repeated command: "Feed my lambs," "Feed my sheep." Whatever significance these words may appear to have to those who are already convinced of the authority of St. Peter and of the Papacy in themselves, and apart from such pre-supposition, their tendency is rather of an opposite character. The strength of the love that St. Peter had for Our Lord must show itself, not in a position of authority, but in the pastoral care for the sheep of Christ, and its reward will be martyrdom.

I believe, then, that a candid examination of the position of St. Peter in the Early Church and the promises made to him show a remarkable agreement; that he was undoubtedly the leader of the Church at the beginning, that he was, therefore, the rock or foundation on which it was built, but that he had no permanent position of supremacy or authority over the other disciples, and that no powers were given to him which were not given to the Church as a whole. The Church, according to St. Paul, was built on the foundation of the Apostles and Prophets, and Jesus Christ was Himself the corner stone.

Let me, in corroboration of this interpretation of the significance of St. Peter's position, quote the commentary of Bishop Lightfoot.[1] "The silence of the later apostolic history is not less significant than the eloquence of the earlier as to the meaning of Peter's primacy. In the first part he is everything: in the subsequent record he is nowhere at all. He is only once again mentioned in the Acts, and even here he does not bear the chief part. Where the Church at large, as an expansive missionary Church is concerned, Paul, not Peter, is the prominent personage: when the Church at Jerusalem appears as the visible centre of unity, James, not Peter, is the chief agent. Peter retains the first place as missionary evangelist to the Hebrew Christians, but nothing more."

[1] *Clement of Rome*, II, p. 490.

Now if it had been the purpose of Our Lord to assign a position of supremacy to St. Peter, and if that had been the meaning that the Apostolic Church gave to these promises which we have been considering, we should find that they would have been so interpreted by the Fathers of the Church, but this is not so. After the rise to power of the Church of Rome a supremacy was recognized in St. Peter, and it was believed that the supremacy had been transferred to the Church of Rome, but nothing of that sort is to be found in the commentaries of the Early Church. Let me take a typical passage from Origen[3] which I take from Lightfoot, *Clement of Rome,* II, page 483:

"But if we also, like Peter, say, *Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God,* flesh and blood not having revealed it to us, but the Spirit from Heaven having illumined our heart, we become a Peter, and it would be said to us by His word, *Thou art Peter* and so forth. For every disciple of Christ is a rock, from whom all they that partake of the spiritual rock which follows shall drink, and upon every such rock this whole doctrine of the Church and the polity in accordance therewith is built. But if thou supposest that the whole Church is built by God on that one Peter alone, what could'st thou say concerning John, the son of Thunder, or any one of the Apostles? Otherwise shall we dare to say that against Peter especially the gates of Hell

[3] Comm. in Matt. xvi, 13; T. xii, § 10.

shall not prevail, but that they shall prevail against the remaining Apostles? Are, then, the keys of the kingdom of Heaven given by the Lord to Peter alone, and shall none other of the blessed Apostles receive them? Many, therefore, shall say to the Saviour, *Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God,* and if anyone saith this to Him, flesh and blood not revealing it, but the Father which is in Heaven, he shall obtain the promises, the letter of the Gospel says, to that particular Peter, but as the Spirit teaches, to everyone who becomes like Peter."

Such an interpretation is a typical example of what we read in the early Fathers, and I think makes it clear that in the Church of the early centuries there was no thought that these promises gave any supremacy to Peter which he did not share with the early Church, or gave any authority to the Bishop of Rome or to anyone else as inheriting his position. All such interpretations are after-thoughts which rose out of later dogmatic theories.

If we study the position of St. Peter in the New Testament as a whole, we can realise his character, his importance, his courage in going forward, his weakness and his inconsistency. He was the principal leader in early days. He was the first Apostle who had the courage to baptize Gentiles, but he had not the courage to be consistent in what he did, and the leadership passed to St. Paul. Peter, in spite of his many great

qualities, failed in the great work of spreading the Gospel, which was done by St. Paul and not by him.

THE CHURCH OF ROME

It would not be possible in the space at our disposal to examine in any detail the early history of the Church of Rome. It must be sufficient to indicate the main lines of development and leave the justification of what is here said to more specialist works.

It is probable that St. Peter preached in Rome. It is probable that he was martyred there, as tradition asserts. But our earliest authorities do not speak of him as Bishop of Rome. For two centuries or more he is never so mentioned. In the earlier documents he is associated with St. Paul as the first preacher of the Roman Church. The most typical instance is that of Irenæus. He speaks, of "the very great, the very ancient and universally known Church, founded and organized at Rome by the two most glorious Apostles, Peter and Paul." And he tells us that the blessed Apostles there having founded and built up the Church "committed into the hands of Linus the office of the episcopate." At a later date still, Eusebius tells us that "after the martyrdom of Paul and Peter, Linus was the first appointed to the Bishopric of the Church of the Romans." It is his usual custom to put Paul before Peter. There was no conception of St. Peter as the first bishop, and the authority of the Church, which

was very great, was based upon the fact that it had been founded by the two Apostles and preserved their traditions.

In the ante-Nicene period the Church of Rome occupied a position of great importance, and quite early obtained a position of primacy. This it owed to various causes. It very early became a church of importance. Tacitus tells us that a great multitude of Christians there were put to death for their faith. It was the one See of the West which could claim an Apostolic foundation. It was the Church of the capital of the Empire. Irenæus held that it preserved in a special way the apostolic tradition, although the language that he uses is difficult of exact interpretation. "For it is a matter of necessity that every church should agree with this church, on account of its pre-eminent authority that is the faithful everywhere, inasmuch as the Apostolic tradition has been preserved continuously by those who exist everywhere."

He goes on to show how, through a succession of bishops, the traditions of its power had been preserved.

Naturally, some of the Bishops of Rome exercised considerable influence, and it might be possible to see occasionally traces of the same spirit which ultimately built up the Papacy, but we never find any teaching which represented the Bishop of Rome as having any authority over other Bishops. If on one occasion he attempted to exercise such authority it is immediately

rejected. We need not trouble about the discussion of the question whether this or that pope was heretical. We need not attempt to define the position claimed by Victor. It is sufficient to point out that if the Church of Rome, or the Bishop of Rome, had had during this period any such position as they claim later, the history of the Church would have been different and the lines of its development far less autonomous.

We pass to the period of the four great Councils. It was one which added to the prestige and authority of the See of Rome. It shows us the position it occupied and equally it shows us the limitations of that position. The first great Christian Council was held at Nicea. There is some doubt as to who was the President of that Council, but there is no evidence that it was anyone who in any way represented the Bishop of Rome. The decision was arrived at through the influence of the Church of Alexandria, and not of Rome. The delegation, however, which represented the Roman Church was allowed to sign first, for Primacy in that sense belonged to the See of Rome as the capital of the Empire and the Apostolic See of the West.

From the Fourth and Fifth Century onwards we can begin to trace the growth of the Papacy and of the Papal claims. So far, although the Church of Rome was treated with great respect, there was no claim to supremacy. The significant fact is that the development of this claim is a matter of historical growth: that it

was clearly not part of the original constitution of the Christian Church, but something which gradually grew up: that it was not derived from Biblical or Apostolic authority. It was the growth and claims of the See of Rome that caused the passages of Scripture to be interpreted so as to support them. There were many different facts which led to the growing importance of the Roman See. One was the removal of the seat of Empire to the East which left the Bishop without a voice in his own city. Another was the conversion of the Northern races, partly, but not entirely through the courage of Roman missionaries which converted a number of young churches dependent on the Roman See. We can trace the gradual increase of the claims and powers of the Bishops. Leo I, Gregory the Great, Nicholas I, and so on to the mediæval Popes, Gregory VII and Innocent III. We need not pursue the history further. From our point of view the fact that is of importance is that the supremacy of the Roman See was a natural development created by the circumstances of the times, that the Papacy has been one of those human institutions which played a great and momentous and beneficent part in the history of Western institutions, but no evidence of authority or value arose to prove that it was an inherent part of the Christian Revelation. It has never been accepted by the Eastern Church. In the early days of Christianity, Eastern bishops and theologians were prepared to honour and respect the

Roman See, and it was often the strong ally of authority against heresy, but as soon as it was attempted to transform a mortal primacy into a political supremacy, they resented the innovations and the ultimate result was the great schism.

THE PAPACY AND RELIGIOUS UNITY

If the foregoing argument be sound, it proves that there is no sound Biblical or Historical or Theological authority for the Papacy. I pass now to an examination of its influence on the Christian Church. No thoughtful person will deny that the Papacy is, and has been, a great fact in history, that it has accomplished much, and much too that was beneficial. It is quite possible to look upon the Papacy, and especially the mediæval Papacy, as a great instrument created by God to fulfil a part in the development of Christianity and the human race, without accepting its claims, or being blind to the harmful results which ultimately came from the permanent establishment of an institution which had only temporary value. We are concerned particularly with the Papacy at the present day, and I would dwell first on the relation of the Papacy to religious unity.

One of the claims put forward for the Papacy is its value for Christian unity. I do not think that this can be justified. I should hold that throughout history it has been destructive of unity. The first great break in the unity of the Church was the schism between

East and West, and this was undoubtedly due to the resentment felt by the East at the claims of Rome to supremacy. The schism which began in the Ninth Century was completed in the Eleventh and has been one of the most disastrous facts in Christian history, and its evils were intensified by the heartless policy of the mediæval Papacy towards Eastern Christians. It often seems difficult to know whether the aims of the Papacy during the period of the Crusades was the destruction of the enemies of the Christian Faith, or the assertion of the authority of the Roman See over Eastern Christians. At any rate, it cannot be doubted that by its attitude towards what it looked on as schism, especially in the Fourth Century it weakened the Byzantine Empire and Christian rule in the East and helped to cause the great catastrophe of the fall of Constantinople.

The next great epoch of discussion was the Reformation, and again the Papacy and its policy of religious suppression was the fundamental cause of division. The scholastic philosophy which had been the great achievement of the Middle Ages had degenerated in its presentation and it ceased to represent adequately human thought. New ideas of a fundamental character had been the product of the Renaissance and the traditional theology did not suffice. The Papacy had become corrupt. It had transformed the Church into a secular state, and by the Inquisition it had supported an

attempt to suppress freedom of thought. The result was the schism of the Reformation. Had the Church been free, a transformation of thought and worship might have taken place by peaceful changes. The Church was not free, and the cause was the dominance of Rome. The excessive individualism of the Reformation was the natural reaction from the centralized autocracy of Rome.

A third period when the influence of Rome is detrimental to Christian unity is the present day. It claims to be the one true church, and on the basis of that claim would aim at uniting Christianity in the acceptance of its supremacy. But that has come to mean the suppression of individual thought and liberty. It means the imposition of one form of thought on the human race, and the riveting of its bonds by a strong external authority. But the ideal of modern Christianity is freedom in obedience to Christ. The problem of unity is the conciliation of corporate life and individual allegiance. The problem is not one which it would be difficult to solve in an atmosphere of freedom, but as soon as the claims of Rome begin to be asserted, the fear of them produces a reaction against any form of unity, and tends to divorce modern thought from the stabilizing influence of Catholic traditions. The effect of the Reformation was to divide Catholic tradition and Evangelical religion into two hostile camps, the one represented by the Roman Church, the other by

the chaos of Protestant individualism. A united Christianity can only come by a synthesis of the two, and so long as Catholicism, that is the religion of tradition and of institutionalism, is, or appears to be, identified with Romanism and the suppression of religious liberty, so long must the present divisions of Christianity remain.

THE PAPACY AND RELIGIOUS TRUTH

The second direction in which the Papacy inflicts the greatest injury is by stereotyping false presentations of Christianity.

The Papacy claims to be infallible, and on the authority of its infallibility to present to the world the saving truths of the gospel. But as it has no evidence or authority (except its own assertions) for its infallibility, the value of its support is purely delusive. It does not add anything of weight to the evidence of Christianity, nor does it make belief easier for anyone who reflects. Moreover, it ultimately weakens the authority of Christianity by presenting it in association with dogmatic statements which are obviously false. Its presentation of Christianity is not one which can be accepted by anyone who looks at the world from the modern point of view. Now no one would claim that modern thought has any right to consider itself infallible; it may well be that many things which have been asserted as the results of modern thought may be

erroneous, and if there is a clear consistency between modern thought and Christianity there is no need to assume that it is Christianity which is untrue. But the question is, what is Christianity? And it may become apparent that much has been put forward as a necessary part of Christianity which is purely ephemeral in its character. In three directions a conflict has been found between the Christian tradition and 'modern thought: philosophy, science, and literary and historical criticism. In relation to all these the Church of Rome attempts by the exercise of its authority to impose obsolete beliefs on the modern mind. The scholastic philosophy was a great achievement of the human mind, and no philosopher who cared for truth could neglect the study of it or despise its teaching, but it is clearly not a necessary part of the Christian tradition. It may have been of great assistance in helping to understand some of the questions which Christianity has raised, and in formulating its problems, but the Christian Faith was taught long before there was a Scholastic philosophy, and to most persons it seems that modern philosophy has made considerable advances on mediæval philosophy—at any rate in presenting the problems which demand investigation and fixing the limit of human thought. But the Church of Rome attempts to call us back by authority to mediævalism. We believe that accepting loyally the revelation in Christ we have received much help, in estimating and

understanding it, from different aspects of modern thought. As we look back on the history of Christianity, we seem to see how the thoughts and actions of successive generations have helped in the lucidation of the original revelations; modern thought and philosophy have equally their part to play, and the cause of Christian truth will not be helped by the imposition of any particular system of philosophy by authority.

What is true of philosophy is still more true of science. The Church of Rome has asserted that when science conflicts with the literal interpretation of the text of scripture, the teaching of science may not be accepted. That appears to add a solid stumbling-block to the acceptance of Christian teaching. It is quite a tenable proposition that the science of the Bible may be the science of the writer's own epoch, and that yet the religious teaching of the Bible may be entirely true. No sensible person looks upon modern scientific teaching as infallible, and we are quite willing to believe that new discoveries may overturn or modify what has been an accepted doctrine. But yet we do not hold that it is in the least likely that the main outline of the geological history of the world will be profoundly modified, and to put before a candid and intelligent mind at the present time the alternative of the Bible or geology, of Christianity or science, is to create stumbling-blocks in the acceptance of Christianity, and

not to define the Faith. And this is what the Church of Rome has done.

It is the same as regards criticism. No sound critic will ever doubt the fallibility of criticism. Changes and modifications may well take place. But all the same we know that we cannot go back to an old-fashioned view of the Bible and Biblical history. We have discovered that a loyal acceptance of the truth of Christianity is quite consistent with an acceptance of the critical attitude—in fact we believe that many old difficulties cease to trouble us when we have attained a more intelligent view of Biblical history. We think that to impose old-fashioned views of the Bible by the voice of authority is to create quite unnecessary difficulties to the acceptance of Christianity. It is only in an atmosphere of freedom that the modern problems which are raised by the Christian message can be solved.

Now, all these are instances of what seems to me to be the fundamental and the disastrous error of the Church of Rome. It claims to be infallible, and although it seeks for relaxation of the rigidity of its system, by failing to define its infallibility, it uses its authority to impose on the human race a rigid system of thought and life and worship in many ways inconsistent with the thought of the day. That system is based on Christianity, and therefore has many sound and healthy elements in it: but supposing the Church of Rome were successful, supposing it were first to suc-

ceed in uniting all Christianity under its rule, and then in imposing its rule on the civilised world, it would mean the destruction of free thought and of human progress. Short of that, by identifying Christianity with reactionary views it tends to identify progressive views with anti-Christianity, and makes the acceptance of the Christian message by educated people very much harder. It is really only in an atmosphere of freedom that the Christian message can be accepted in the world, and the Church of Rome aims at destroying freedom.

The reason, then, why a man will not be a Roman Catholic is that Roman Catholicism means the Papacy, that the Papacy is an addition to, and not a part of the fundamental teaching of Christianity, that the Papacy means the establishment of a religious system in the world which would be fatal to religious, to scientific and to political liberty if it were successful, and if it does not succeed is injurious to Christianity by destroying Christian unity and by driving into antagonism to Christianity many of the most wholesome elements of modern thought.

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